Andrea E.E. Tuck-Jackson

A young person was sentenced following a guilty plea to possession of an unloaded prohibited firearm (sawed-off shotgun) with readily accessible ammunition.

The offence was discovered during execution of a search warrant at the young person's residence.

The court found this to be an exceptional case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, warranting a custodial disposition.

The court imposed a six-month Deferred Custody and Supervision Order followed by 16 months of probation, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The sentence balanced the serious aggravating factors (possession of multiple types of ammunition, storage in a shared residence with the young person's mother) against significant mitigating factors (guilty plea, no prior record, unloaded firearm, constructive rather than actual possession, and strong rehabilitative potential).

The accused was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order, breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit mischief, assault, and forcible seizure.

The Crown sought a declaration that the accused be designated a Long-Term Offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code and sought an eight-year long-term supervision order.

The defence challenged the application on Charter grounds, arguing unreasonable delay in sentencing proceedings.

The court dismissed the Charter application and declared the accused a Long-Term Offender, imposing a 60-day custodial sentence on top of pre-sentence detention credit, followed by a seven-year long-term supervision order.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence, and determined that community control was possible only through a long-term supervision order.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on observations by the arresting officer of suspicious driving and parking, physical indicators of impairment, and breath test results.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand and the timing of breath samples.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand based on the totality of circumstances, the samples were taken as soon as practicable, and the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from a motor vehicle collision at Weston Road and Eglinton Avenue West in Toronto: (1) care or control of a motor vehicle with blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit; (2) failure to remain at the scene of an accident; and (3) care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's theory was that the accused drove a Lexus that fled the collision scene and subsequently had care or control of the vehicle while parked on Cordella Avenue with elevated blood-alcohol levels.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's pre-arrest statements and breath sample results on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court rejected all Charter applications and found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit (driving over 80) and while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown relied on breath test results from an Intoxilyzer 8000C showing readings of 187 and 175 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood.

The defence brought applications seeking COBRA data (downloadable data from the breath testing instrument) in electronic format and seeking a view of the breath room at Traffic Services.

The court allowed in part the COBRA data application, ordering disclosure of all COBRA data generated by the specific instrument from the quality assurance checks through the subject tests in native raw text file format.

The court dismissed the view application, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation and no demonstrated advantage to taking a view over two years after the fact.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results and toxicological evidence.

The court had previously ruled that the accused's Charter rights were violated during the investigation, removing the Crown's access to statutory presumptions of identity and accuracy.

The Crown was therefore required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath test results were accurate and that the accused's blood-alcohol concentration at the time of driving exceeded the legal limit.

The court found that the Crown met this burden, rejecting the defence arguments regarding bolus drinking and the reliability of the toxicological assumptions.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The accused faced charges of impaired driving and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit arising from an incident on December 27, 2010.

The information was sworn on January 4, 2011, and the trial was scheduled for October 19, 2012, resulting in approximately 21.5 months of delay.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that while institutional resource constraints accounted for approximately 9.5 months of delay (within the 8-10 month guideline), the accused had not established sufficient prejudice to warrant a stay of proceedings.

The motion was dismissed.