Douglas Grenkie

Following a motion regarding post-secondary expenses for the parties' daughter, the respondent sought full indemnity costs of $9,124.75.

The applicant argued that each party should bear their own costs or that any award should be minimal.

The court found the respondent was the successful party but noted neither party made an offer to settle and the respondent's bill of costs was disproportionate.

The court ordered the applicant to pay costs of $4,500 inclusive of HST.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2017 final order regarding parenting and child support.

The father had failed to provide financial disclosure for several years.

The court granted the mother final decision-making responsibility over education and health due to the father's lack of cooperation and the special needs of one child.

Primary residence remained with the mother with the father having weekend parenting time.

Applying the Colucci framework, the court ordered the father to pay $13,925.48 in retroactive child support arrears due to his increased income and failure to disclose, and set ongoing support at $808.76 per month.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order that the post-secondary expenses for the parties' adult child be shared equally between the parents and the child.

The respondent mother opposed, arguing she could only afford to pay the table amount of child support due to her limited financial means.

The court found that the child had the means to make a significant contribution to her own expenses and that the mother had limited financial ability compared to the father.

The court ordered the mother to pay the equivalent of table child support directly to the child, with the father responsible for the remaining balance of the reasonable expenses.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg contrary to the Criminal Code.

He argued that the breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) due to a 90‑minute delay between the roadside stop and the first Intoxilyzer test, and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached by a delay before speaking with Legal Aid.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings of fact regarding police resource allocation and transport to a detachment with a breath technician were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The evidence supported the conclusion that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable and that the right to counsel was not violated.

Even if a breach had occurred, the breath results would not have been excluded under s. 24(2).