Deborah A. Kinsella

A 16-year-old youth was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code for conduct that occurred on December 13, 2015.

The complainant, a 19-year-old, alleged that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina without consent during a sexual encounter that began with consensual sexual activity.

The accused admitted to vaginal intercourse but claimed it was unintentional and that he believed he was engaging in anal intercourse to which the complainant had consented.

The trial addressed both the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the substantive elements of sexual assault, including the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer contrary to section 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Police responded to a 911 call for medical assistance at a residence where a seizure was occurring.

The accused, upset and intoxicated, was asked to leave the kitchen to allow emergency personnel access.

A confrontation ensued between the accused and the officer.

The Crown alleged the accused attempted to head-butt the officer.

The trial judge found that while the accused was agitated and advancing aggressively, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally attempted to head-butt the officer.

The accused was acquitted.

An appeal from a conviction under section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle if safe to do so.

The appellant argued that the offence could only be committed upon passing a stopped emergency vehicle, not upon approaching it.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the interpretation that the obligation to move lanes is triggered "upon approaching" a stopped emergency vehicle.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from the transmission of genital herpes to his intimate partner.

The Crown alleged that the accused failed to disclose his herpes status before engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse, thereby vitiating the complainant's consent through fraud.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused transmitted the virus, and alternatively, that consent was not vitiated because the accused did not intend to cause bodily harm.

The court acquitted the accused on both counts, finding that the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the source of the infection, and that even if transmission were proven, the accused's non-disclosure did not constitute the requisite "serious deception" necessary to vitiate consent under the fraud doctrine as articulated in R. v. Mabior and R. v. Hutchinson.

The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with a weapon, uttering threats to cause death, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault, and multiple breaches of recognizance and probation.

The central issue was whether the defendant was entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio or limited to 1:1 credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the "bail misconduct exclusion" was not engaged because the Crown did not seek to formally cancel the defendant's bail upon re-arrest, and therefore awarded enhanced credit.

The defendant was sentenced to custody followed by probation with conditions including substance abuse treatment, anger management counselling, and weapons prohibition.