Jane E. Thurber

The Applicant sought full indemnity costs after successfully obtaining an order for DNA paternity testing of the Respondent.

The Respondent opposed, arguing for lower costs and alleging bad faith by the Applicant.

The court, applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, found the Applicant was the successful party but did not find bad faith by either party.

Considering the importance and complexity of the issues, the reasonableness of counsel's time and hourly rate ($300/hour for 18 years experience), and the absence of applicable offers to settle, the court awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court also affirmed that a legally-aided client's fee arrangement with Legal Aid does not need to be disclosed, and costs should be assessed based on the private rate of the solicitor.

The Respondent was ordered to pay $4,500.00 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

This preliminary costs endorsement addresses the propriety of the applicant's reply submissions following a decision on the applicant's motion.

The respondent challenged three aspects of the applicant's reply: allegations of bad faith, arguments regarding legally-aided costs potentially exceeding actual incurred costs, and the introduction of an offer to settle.

The court found the bad faith arguments in reply were proper as they were raised initially.

However, the court allowed the respondent to make further submissions on the legally-aided costs issue, as it was a new argument introduced in reply.

The court struck out the applicant's reply submissions concerning the offer to settle, finding it was raised for the first time in reply and contrary to a prior agreement and ruling.

The applicant mother brought a motion for an order compelling the respondent, who resides in Australia, to undergo DNA paternity testing regarding her 17-year-old child.

The respondent opposed, citing the applicant's delay in bringing the application and his privacy rights.

The court held that while it cannot compel the respondent to undergo testing, it has jurisdiction to grant leave to obtain a DNA test and draw adverse inferences if he refuses.

The court granted leave, finding that DNA testing provides the best evidence of paternity and that delay or privacy concerns do not override the need for this evidence.

Child protection trial concerning a one‑year‑old child apprehended at birth.

The child protection agency sought Crown wardship, alleging the child was in need of protection under s. 37(2) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of harm in the mother’s care.

Evidence included prior child protection proceedings, psychological and parenting capacity assessments, concerns regarding the mother’s cognitive limitations, inconsistent access, and instability in her proposed caregiving plan involving a new partner.

The court found the child to be in need of protection and concluded that less disruptive alternatives, including supervision orders, would not adequately protect the child.

Crown wardship was ordered and the mother failed to meet the statutory test for post‑wardship access.

Child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act where the applicant society sought a Crown wardship order with a view to adoption for a young child who had been in foster care with paternal relatives for more than two years.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to earlier neglect, poor parental decision‑making, and developmental concerns.

However, the evidence showed significant improvement by the mother, including stable housing, consistent participation in services, and successful unsupervised access visits.

Applying the CFSA principle that the least intrusive order consistent with the child’s best interests must be made, the court concluded Crown wardship was premature.

The child was returned to the mother’s care under a 12‑month supervision order with detailed conditions and continued oversight by the society.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking a declaration that a child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without access.

The court reviewed evidence of prenatal drug exposure, the mother’s history of opioid addiction, relapse following treatment, inconsistent engagement with counselling services, unstable housing conditions, and the resumption of a relationship with a partner associated with substance abuse and domestic violence concerns.

The court also considered the mother’s past parenting history, including a prior child protection proceeding resulting in Crown wardship of another child.

Finding that the responding parent filed no updated affidavit evidence and that the agency’s evidence was largely uncontradicted, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The child was declared in need of protection and made a Crown ward for the purposes of adoption with no access.