Marc C. Doucet

Following the dismissal of the defendant municipality’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that the municipality advanced unfounded allegations that the plaintiff corporation was a “sham” created to circumvent the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act (Construction Labour Mobility), 1999.

The court held that although fraud was not ultimately pursued, the allegations effectively challenged the plaintiff’s honesty and business integrity, justifying substantial indemnity costs.

However, the court found the time spent preparing the motion response excessive and reduced the amount claimed.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis in the reduced amount plus disbursements.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of tender claim.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, was an ineligible bidder under the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act because the effective bidder was its related Quebec corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had effectively relocated to Ontario by establishing a corporate office and expanding its operations in the province, thereby exempting it from the restrictions of the Act.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment holding them liable in negligence and nuisance for water damage to the respondent's basement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made three fatal legal errors: improperly shifting the burden of proof by finding a 'presumption of negligence', imposing a non-existent duty on the appellants to assert a claim against the city on behalf of the respondent, and applying a material contribution test for causation instead of the standard 'but for' test.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the action was a collateral attack on a previous order and therefore an abuse of process.

The court also found that the aspect of the claim challenging the propriety of a property sale would require re-litigating previous factual findings, and applied the principles of issue estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Following the release of the main appellate decisions, the successful parties made costs submissions.

Counsel subsequently agreed to the quantum of costs for all four appeals.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs on a partial indemnity scale to TeleZone Inc., G-Civil Inc., Fielding Chemical Technologies Inc., and Michiel McArthur in the agreed-upon amounts.

Four appeals were heard consecutively to determine whether the Ontario Superior Court has jurisdiction over claims for damages against the federal Crown, or whether such claims must be brought in the Federal Court pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Courts Act.

The Crown argued that the claims constituted collateral attacks on federal administrative decisions and required prior judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court retains concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages in contract and tort against the Crown.

Section 18 of the Federal Courts Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court only for prerogative remedies and declaratory relief, not for damages.

The plaintiffs' appeals were allowed and the Crown's appeals were dismissed.

The appellants, including the builder and contractors, appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent condominium corporation for structural deficiencies in a block back-up wall.

The appellants argued the action was barred by res judicata, issue estoppel, and the six-year limitation period, and challenged the findings of breach of warranty and negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the structural defects could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence, and that the warranty clause, interpreted contra proferentem, did not limit claims to one year.

The damages assessment was also upheld.

The respondent employee resigned mid-year and successfully sued for a pro rata share of his non-discretionary profit-sharing bonus.

The appellant employer appealed, arguing that the bonus was calculated at year-end and no pro rata share should be implied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the profit-sharing plan was an integral, non-discretionary part of the compensation package and that there was no clear practice denying the bonus upon mid-year departure.