Ellad Gersh

A commercial tenant, Baketree Inc., brought a motion for a prohibitory injunction to prevent its landlord, 315-345 Flint Road Inc., from evicting it from the leased premises.

Baketree's lease had expired, and the property had been sold to the new landlord, Flint.

Baketree sought a temporary extension to allow it sufficient time to find new premises, renovate, and relocate its extensive bakery operations, arguing that immediate eviction would lead to the collapse of its business and the loss of 100 jobs.

Flint opposed, citing an Estoppel Certificate and "Entire Agreement" clauses, and offered a short extension until February 2020.

The court granted the prohibitory injunction, finding that Baketree met the low threshold for such an injunction, demonstrated irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured a temporary stay.

The court ordered Baketree to vacate by October 31, 2020, and adjusted the rent payments for the interim period.

A law firm (Robins Appleby LLP) obtained a fee judgment against its former client (Todd Family Holdings Inc.) for unpaid legal fees after successfully prosecuting a lawsuit that resulted in a $2.2 million judgment and approximately $1 million in costs.

The client subsequently retained new counsel (GMS Law Professional Corporation) on a contingency fee basis to pursue an appeal of the original judgment.

When the new counsel obtained a costs award, Robins issued garnishment notices to intercept the funds.

The client and new counsel sought a charging order and priority over Robins' charging order, and sought to vacate the garnishment notices.

The motion judge denied all relief.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the client failed to establish the prerequisite for a charging order (inability or unwillingness to pay fees) and that absent exceptional circumstances, a former lawyer may enforce a fee judgment without violating the duty of loyalty owed to a former client.

The appellant appealed an order regarding a charging order under the Solicitors Act to the Divisional Court, arguing the monetary value was under $50,000.

The Divisional Court held that a charging order is a final order and the appellant failed to prove the value was under $50,000, as the garnishments exceeded $200,000.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's decision that dismissed their motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for a declaration that three agreements of purchase and sale were valid and enforceable.

The central issue was the interpretation of handwritten amendments to the agreements that used the terms "verdict" and "official verdict" in place of the defined term "OMB Decision." The appellants argued that the use of different terms presumptively indicated different meanings were intended.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the terms had the same meaning, finding that the parties' clear intention was to condition the agreements on receipt of a final decision from the Ontario Municipal Board regarding a proposed development.

The applicant, Saeed Yahyavi, brought an emergency motion to restrain the sale of his home by the respondent, Nadi Inc., under power of sale.

The applicant alleged that Nadi Inc. failed to disclose and account for a $250,000 payment received from a settlement in a fraudulent conveyance action, which should have been credited against the judgment debt secured by the mortgage on his home.

The court found that Nadi Inc. knowingly misstated the amount due in the notice of sale by improperly characterizing the settlement funds as punitive damages and costs rather than a realization on the judgment.

The court declared the notice of sale void and enjoined Nadi Inc. from completing the sale.

The applicant was ordered to pay $1,100,000 into court, and the issues regarding the proper amount due were referred to a Master for accounting.

Following the dismissal of the moving parties' motion for a Mareva injunction, the respondents sought their costs.

The court awarded substantial and full indemnity costs to the respondents, totaling over $126,000, finding that the moving parties had made serious, unfounded allegations of fraud and breach of trust, and had engaged in inappropriate conduct by raising unrelated regulatory issues to smear certain respondents.

The moving parties, construction lien creditors of the Mady Group of Companies, brought a motion seeking to lift a CCAA stay of proceedings, amend their statements of claim, and obtain a Mareva injunction against several individuals and corporations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to make full and fair disclosure, failed to establish a strong prima facie case of fraud or breach of trust, and provided no evidence of a risk of dissipation or removal of assets from the jurisdiction.

The appellants achieved substantial success on appeal regarding the respondents' claim for commission earned and the personal liability of Ms. Mascall.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants for both the trial and the appeal, with a slight reduction to account for the respondents' subsidiary success on their quantum meruit claim.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 for the appeal and $130,000 for the trial.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding a real estate broker commission on the sale of a property pursuant to a holdover clause in a listing agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the broker's failure to provide written notice of the introduction of the purchaser, as required by the holdover clause, was a bar to the contractual claim for commission.

However, the Court allowed the broker's cross-appeal in part, awarding $20,000 on the basis of quantum meruit for services provided to the vendor after the listing agreement had expired.

The Court also found that the corporate principal was not personally liable for the compensation.

The plaintiff brought an action for non-payment of rent against the corporate defendant and its guarantor.

The defendants filed a defence and counterclaim before the corporate defendant was voluntarily dissolved.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing the dissolved corporation lacked capacity to litigate.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that under section 242(1) of the Business Corporations Act, a dissolved corporation retains the right to defend an action and continue a counterclaim commenced prior to dissolution.

The court also authorized a former director to give instructions on behalf of the dissolved corporation.