ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
4810 998 24 48126495
4810 998 24 48126494
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
SERIA LUFF
Before Justice Peter N. Fraser
Heard on April 25, 2025 & August 22, 2205
Reasons for Sentence released on September 2, 2025
A. Martin counsel for the Crown
C. Zeeh counsel for the accused Seria Luff
Fraser J.:
1Seria Luff plead guilty before me to possession of cocaine, oxycodone and hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking, arising out of an investigation on March 16, 2024. She further plead guilty to breaching the house arrest conditions of her release, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing the proceeds of crime in connection with the events of August 29, 2024. She has admitted some additional related criminal activity, as set out below, by way of an agreed statement of fact filed by the parties.
2The Crown seeks a penitentiary sentence of 3 years, less credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody. The defence seeks a conditional sentence.
Facts
3On March 16, 2024, Ms. Luff was arrested on an outstanding warrant while driving a black Jeep Grand Cherokee. A black satchel fell out of the vehicle as she exited the driver’s seat. It contained a digital scale, separately packaged quantities of powder and crack cocaine, and several empty plastic baggies. A purse was found in the back seat containing a wallet with Ms. Luff's identification, a large quantity of Canadian and US currency, cellular phones, a Teva-Oxycocet prescription pill bottle, and a Ziploc-style baggie with additional Oxycocet pills.
4In the center console of the Jeep, officers found an un-labelled pill bottle containing a large quantity of 8 mg hydromorphone pills and a smaller quantity of Oxycocet pills. There was also a small Ziploc baggie with morphine pills, a used crack pipe, and some additional Canadian currency.
5Police obtained a search warrant for Ms. Luff’s residence and for another vehicle, a grey Audi, that was registered to her. Inside the residence, police found a small satchel in the hall closet containing a digital scale and powder cocaine. Inside the Audi, police found a small baggie of crack cocaine and a cell phone. The total amounts of the items seized from the investigation were as follows:
Crack cocaine: 38.88 grams
Powder cocaine: 40.76 grams
Oxycodone: 411.08 grams of Oxycocet pills composed of 5 mg oxycodone and 325 mg acetaminophen (there were 708 pills with an estimated value of $3540)
Hydromorphone: 14.43 grams (there were 96 pills with an estimated value of $1400-$1920)
Morphine: 13.27 grams (there were 21 pills with an estimated value of $315)
Canadian currency: $8271.00
U.S. currency: $420.00
6On June 20, 2024, Ms. Luff was released on a house arrest bail for these offences. She was to remain in her residence unless in the company of her surety. Soon after, the police engaged in surveillance and observed Ms. Luff driving the Jeep Grand Cherokee and holding a black satchel bag on several dates. They obtained another search warrant for the Jeep and for her residence.
7On August 29, 2024, the police observed Ms. Luff outside her residence, driving the Jeep alone. She was arrested and the vehicle was searched. Police found a black satchel on the floor by the driver’s seat containing cocaine and Dilaudid pills (hydromorphone). A quantity of Canadian currency was found in the centre console. The total amounts were as follows:
Cocaine: 26.25 grams
Hydromorphone: 67 Dilaudid pills
Canadian Currency: $9,993.70
Principles of Sentencing
8Sentencing is a highly individualized process: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 58. The Court must give effect to a number of different and often competing sentencing objectives. Section 718 of the Criminal Code directs that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and, more specifically, to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. According to s. 718.1, the fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. The sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Parity of sentence is a corollary to proportionality. It requires that similar sentences be imposed upon offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 2.
9Where sentences are imposed for multiple offences, the Court must consider the principle of totality. Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the Court must ensure the combined sentence is not unduly long or harsh and that the global sentence does not exceed the offender's overall culpability: R. v. C.A.M., 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500.
10I consider the potential need to separate Ms. Luff from society in order to protect the public and the need to promote in her a sense of responsibility for the harm she has done. I consider the principle of restraint, which is codified in s. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Code. I also consider the principle of rehabilitation.
The Gladue Issue
11The defence submits that Ms. Luff is Indigenous and the principles set out by the Supreme Court in R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and by Parliament in s. 718.2(e) apply to this case. The Crown submits there is insufficient evidence to establish Ms. Luff’s Indigenous ancestry.
12The defence engaged with Aboriginal Legal Services (ALS) to obtain a Gladue report. In a letter addressed to the Court, ALS advised that a Gladue report could not be prepared in relation to Ms. Luff, as her Indigenous heritage could not be confirmed.
13Extensive research had been conducted using the Canadian census, newspaper articles, and Ancestry.ca, a user-generated family tree application. This research indicated only that Ms. Luff’s ancestry on her mother’s side was European, with specific ties noted to England, Scotland and Ireland. Records were found relating to over a dozen ancestors, however, there was no evidence of Indigenous ancestry:
There were no Indigenous identifiers for any of these individuals, and none of them appeared to live on or near a First Nation in any record Ms. Galley could locate. Additionally, even if an Indigenous ancestor were able to be identified, on its own, a connection from the 1800s or earlier is too tenuous for the preparation of a Gladue Report.
14Ms. Luff had never met her father, and little could be learned about his family background. But, according to the accused’s mother, Ms. Luff’s father was named Alejandro Rodriguez Gonzalez and he was from Uruguay.
15I also have the benefit of a pre-sentence report in this matter, which is dated June 19, 2025. Ms. Luff reported that her family identifies with spiritual traditions linked to their Indigenous background, particularly the Wolf Clan. She further claimed that the family regularly attends powwows and participates in other traditional activities, helping them maintain a connection to their Ojibwe heritage.
16These assertions are contradicted by the letter from Aboriginal Legal Services, which is dated June 12, 2025. The writer of the letter advised that, “Ms. Luff could not speak about her experiences as an Indigenous person and did not know more about that subject.” The same was reported in relation to the accused’s mother, Deanna Luff: “She could not discuss her experiences as an Indigenous person and did not know more about that subject, nor could she discuss the experiences of her family members.”
17There is some question about the standard of proof that should apply to the question of whether an accused is an Indigenous person for the purpose of sentencing. Both counsel ventured that proof on a balance of probabilities, which is the standard that applies to mitigating factors on sentence, might apply here. I am not persuaded that one’s status as an Indigenous person is akin to a mitigating factor on sentence, such that the same standard of proof should apply. It is, rather, a threshold question that determines the principles of sentencing that are engaged and the lens through which the accused person’s life experiences should be viewed. I am keenly aware that the destructive effects of colonialism are themselves the reason many Indigenous persons struggle to find reliable information about their heritage. Within this context, I am inclined toward a lower standard of proof. There is some authority for this approach: R. v. Brown, 2020 ONCA 657; R. v. Ninan, 2025 ABCJ 93.
18Ultimately, I need not determine the precise threshold, as the evidence before me falls short of any standard of proof that might reasonably apply to this question. In my view, Ms. Luff’s Indigenous ancestry has not been established for the purposes of sentencing.
19This is not to say that Ms. Luff has no Indigenous ancestry. I cannot know that, nor could ALS rule that possibility out. But, as a matter of law, I cannot find that she is an Indigenous person for the purposes of sentencing on this record. And I am unable to evaluate the impact, if any, of that historic experience upon her specifically, or upon these offences.
20Nor is this to say that some of the same considerations that arise in the context of sentencing of Indigenous persons cannot apply here. Depending on the circumstances, an accused person’s background and personal challenges may be highly relevant to sentencing no matter their ancestry. The disruptions to Ms. Luff’s family structure, and the intersection of substance abuse, economic disadvantage and trauma, are very much relevant considerations in this case. As counsel for Ms. Luff submits, her family and personal history are significant to the sentencing process, regardless of whether she is sentenced according to the principles in R. v. Gladue.
Circumstances of the Accused
21Ms. Luff is a 33-year-old first offender. She had a difficult upbringing and had to overcome some challenging life circumstances, as set out in the pre-sentence report. Her early family environment lacked stability. She never met her biological father. She witnessed an incident of physical abuse by her stepfather towards her mother which led to their separation. Ms. Luff reported that she was taken from her mother by the CAS for about two months when she was nine years old. She reported physical, emotional and neglect abuse in foster care during that time. She struggled in school with what she described as ADHD and what her mother characterized as a mild learning disability. She described her teenage years as turbulent, involving negative peer associations, smoking, and an unplanned pregnancy at age 18.
22Ms. Luff was in an 18-year relationship with the father of her daughter. That relationship was strained by the partner’s decade-long drug addiction, which influenced Ms. Luff herself to engage in substance use. Following that, her most recent relationship was abusive, and ended with her partner’s incarceration.
23Ms. Luff has reported a history of drug use and addiction. She has asserted that these charges are directly related to her addiction and to financial hardship. I am prepared to accept that addiction was a partial motivation for these crimes. However, I agree with the Crown that the quantities of drugs involved here far outstripped what would be required to support any kind of subsistence-level drug addiction: on this point see R. v. Cinelli, 2018 ONSC 4983 at paras. 29-32.
24There is also information in the pre-sentence report about the family’s history of economic disadvantage. However, there is little evidence of Ms. Luff working to support herself through any legal means prior to committing these offences. Her employment history was limited to some part-time work in her teenage years, and some work as a house cleaner for 8 months in 2020.
25While I accept that both of these factors played a role in these offences, I find this was a sophisticated and sustained drug trafficking operation, done primarily for profit.
Aggravating Factors
26There are serious aggravating factors in this case. I consider the nature of the drugs in question. Ms. Luff was trafficking in hard drugs, including hydromorphone, oxycodone and cocaine. These are highly addictive, extremely destructive drugs, which is reflected in the heavy sentences that accompany convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking. I return to this later in consideration of the range of sentence.
27I take into account the significant quantity of illegal drugs in this case. These were large amounts, well beyond what could be associated with personal use. They are also beyond what a low-end, street level trafficker would possess. I conclude that Ms. Luff was a mid-level trafficker, capable of re-supplying street level dealers with large amounts of hard drugs, including ounce level quantities of cocaine. I reach this conclusion in view of the large amounts in her possession, the variety of drugs involved, the significant cash proceeds in her possession, and the fact Ms. Luff was able to re-start her trafficking operation and acquire significant quantities of drugs within a month of being arrested: see R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817 at para. 27. These considerations, again, are reflected in my review of the range of sentence.
28Ms. Luff engaged in a sustained and sophisticated drug trafficking operation. This was not a one-off event or a single poor decision. This was a continuing course of conduct, which continued despite Ms. Luff’s arrest and release on bail. This was a planned and considered criminal enterprise, by which Ms. Luff profited at the expense of drug users and the community at large, who in their turn suffered the destructive effects of these pernicious drugs.
29I consider that Ms. Luff committed two separate sets of offences, and that the second set were committed while she was on a house arrest bail. As I have decided to impose concurrent sentences for these offences, I will treat them as aggravating factors in relation to the entire course of conduct.
Mitigating Factors
30I consider the following mitigating factors on sentence. Ms. Luff plead guilty. She has accepted responsibility for these offences. She has spared the Court the time and expense of conducting a trial. This is a significant factor in her favour.
31Ms. Luff has no criminal record. The principle of restraint should be applied to first offenders. The sentence imposed on a first offender should be as short as possible and be tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused: R. v. Sousa, 2023 ONCA 100 at para. 37; R. v. Al-Akhali, 2025 ONCA 229 at para. 72. At 33 years of age, I do not consider Ms. Luff a “youthful” first offender for whom there is a reduced moral culpability or harsher impact upon her due to her early stage in life as contemplated by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Priest, 1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 3369 (C.A.) at para. 23 and R. v. Q.B., 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 354 (C.A.) at para. 36. However, her status as a first offender is still an important mitigating factor.
32Ms. Luff has the support of family members and friends in the community, as evidenced by letters of support and personal attendances in court during the sentencing hearing. The letters also refer to Ms. Luff as resilient, thoughtful and caring. These are favourable indicators with respect to her long-term rehabilitative potential.
33I am prepared to accept that these offences were motivated in part by Ms. Luff’s addiction issues and financial pressures. However, the mitigating value is substantially attenuated according to my assessment of these features of the evidence. As set out above, I find these offences were primarily motivated by profit.
34Since being charged with the second set of offences, Ms. Luff has made efforts to address the substance abuse issue through counselling. She has engaged in programming for life skills, parenting and problem solving while incarcerated and on bail. I consider these efforts to be mitigating.
35I consider also the time spent under particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody, pursuant to R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. Ms. Luff spent 141 days in custody and was subject to numerous lockdowns. The Crown concedes that a reduction is appropriate, and proposes a total credit, including Summers, Downes and Duncan credit of 1 year. I have written at some length about the conditions in pre-trial detention in this province in R. v. Crawford, 2025 ONCJ 385. I need not repeat what I have set out in that decision, but I incorporate by reference the remarks contained in paragraphs 78-100 into this decision. In light of the Crown’s concession, it will suffice to say here that conditions in the remand facilities of Ontario are unacceptable and require urgent remediation.
36In R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 at paras. 51-52, the Court of Appeal emphasized that Duncan credit is a mitigating factor on sentence and need not take the form of a specific deduction in terms of days or months. The Court confirmed there is no error in apportioning a specific quantum, so long as it does not take on unwarranted significance and skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence: see, also, R. v. Ramjoolie, 2020 ONCA 791 at paras. 63-65.
37I have chosen to identify a specific reduction in the sentence, in order that the public see clearly why the sentence is shorter than it should be and understand why it is so: see R. v. Shaikh, 2024 ONSC 774 at paras. 21-31. I will reduce the sentence I would otherwise have imposed by 60 days.
Collateral Consequences
38Ms. Luff has a 14-year-old daughter. I must, therefore, consider the family separation consequences that a sentence of imprisonment would cause to the accused and to her daughter: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at paras. 41-50. This is one of the more difficult issues for a sentencing judge to navigate.
39It must be remembered that offenders and not the courts are to be blamed for the adverse consequences that family members may suffer, but those family members are still innocent. They do not deserve to suffer for the crimes committed by others. Courts must, therefore, prevent and mitigate these adverse consequences as much as possible: R. v. Habib, supra, at para. 46. The separation of family members must be taken into account in deciding whether to incarcerate and, where incarceration is necessary, in determining the length of sentence.
40Courts have to be careful not to let these consequences overwhelm the other principles of sentencing: R. v. Dent, 2023 ONCA 460 at paras. 124-126. These consequences should not lead the court to excuse or overlook the harm done, the need to protect society or the need for denunciation and deterrence. Nor can these concerns lead to the imposition of a disproportionate sentence below the acceptable range. The Court is required to “preserve the family as much as possible” within these limits: R. v. Habib, supra, at para. 44.
41The evidence in this case shows that Ms. Luff plays a significant role in the life of her daughter. And while their relationship has been strained by these charges, it will be important for Ms. Luff to provide guidance and support for her daughter as she moves into a formative period of her life.
Range of Sentence
42The maximum sentence for possession for the purposes of trafficking of Schedule 1 drugs like hydromorphone, oxycodone and cocaine is life in prison. There are no minimum sentences. The Ontario Court of Appeal has emphasized the need for deterrence and denunciation in sentencing persons who deal in “hard drugs” like these.
43Hydromorphone is a synthetic heroin substitute with deadly and destructive effects: R. v. Lynn, 2019 ONCA 277 at para. 5. The Court of Appeal has long held that it is as serious a drug as heroin: R. v. Turner, [2003] O.J. No. 685 (C.A.) at para. 2. Absent exceptional circumstances, the sale of heroin, even in small amounts by first offenders who are addicts, calls for a penitentiary sentence: R. v. Farizeh, [1994] O.J. No. 2624 (CA) at para. 5; R. v. Banovac, 2018 ONCA 737 at para. 5. The same is, therefore, true for hydromorphone.
44Oxycodone is highly addictive and dangerous and has been rightly described as a “scourge on the community”: R. v. Babineau, 2017 ONSC 4872 at para. 18; R. v. Moore, [2009] O.J. No. 6388 at paras. 5-7. This substance has been likened to heroin, though it is less powerful, and sentences spanning the mid-reformatory range to the penitentiary have been imposed for amounts comparable to this case: R. v. King, 2013 ONCA 417; R. v. Bonnie, 2013 ONCJ 243 at paras. 34-37.
45Cocaine is considered a hard drug because it is addictive and because it causes significant direct and indirect damage to users, their families, and the community. In R. v Amour, 2004 O.J. No. 1537 at para. 20, Bassel J. emphasized that cocaine trafficking involves very real victims, in view of “the devastating health effects on cocaine drug users, the terribly addictive aspect of this drug, the disastrous effects on their families, and the ruination of their lives.” As Code J. observed in R. v. Graham, supra, at para. 45:
An additional feature of cocaine trafficking that is well-known in the courts, and that increases the gravity of the offence, is that it is associated with violence. That is because it is an unlawful but lucrative business and so it spawns collateral violent crime, either to protect territory, to protect and enforce unlawful transactions, or simply to steal an unlawful product or its unlawful proceeds.
46There is appellate authority setting the range of sentence for an ounce or less of cocaine between 6 months and 2 years, less a day: R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.); R. v. Ahmed, 2016 ONCA 831 at para. 4. Cases involving half a kilogram or more of cocaine have attracted sentences in the range of 5-8 years: R. v. Bajada; 2003 CanLII 15687 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 721; R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273. For intermediate amounts, carried by mid-level traffickers, the range of sentence generally falls between 2 and 5 five years: R. v. Graham, supra, at paras. 47-48.
47In this case, the total amount of cocaine (in crack and powder form) is 106 grams or about 3.7 ounces. This amount places Ms. Luff’s case well above the Woolcock range and into the intermediate range of 2-5 years.
48Sentencing ranges are not straight-jackets: they represent the distillation of sentences imposed in the past, the direction of the appellate courts, and serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para. 36. There will be situations that call for a sentence outside the existing range: R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 58.
49A conditional sentence is an available sanction for the offence of possession of a schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking. Depending on the circumstances, it may or may not represent an appropriate disposition or a correct application of the principles of sentencing. The defence has referred me to a number of trial level decisions in which conditional sentences were imposed for possession for the purpose of trafficking involving hard drugs. These include the following: R. v. Gordon, 2023 ONCJ 157, R. v. Grant, 2021 ONCJ 507; R. v. Hastings, 2024 ONSC 6328; R. v. Collins, 2023 ONSC 5768; R. v. Mohamud, 2024 ONSC 5009; R. v. Whittaker, 2021 ONSC 5278; R. v. Goodridge, 2022 ONCJ 139.
50Notably, all of these cases involved substantially smaller quantities of illicit drugs than in the present case. They are distinguishable on other bases as well. By way of example, in R. v. Hastings, the accused was not convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking, but was sentenced instead for simple possession of fentanyl. The case of R. v. Whittaker involved a comparable amount of cocaine to this case, but none of the other more dangerous drugs. In R. v. Grant, the Court found the offence was an “isolated foray by an 18 year old person of otherwise good character” into criminality.
51The most compelling of the cases relied on by the defence is R. v. Collins, which represents something of an outlier amongst the authorities. Collins was arrested on one occasion with 24.2 grams of cocaine and other drugs and continued to traffic illicit drugs thereafter. He was later arrested after a search warrant was executed and police located 42.89 grams of cocaine and a loaded firearm with associated drug paraphernalia in his possession. Collins also had a criminal record. The facts are different but occupy a similar realm in terms of overall seriousness to the case at bar.
52Importantly, Code J. found a number of serious Charter breaches in that case and awarded a sentence reduction as a remedy. He also found the offender's moral culpability was reduced by his extraordinary challenges growing up. His mother was murdered when he was 13 and his best friend was killed a year later. He was diagnosed with PTSD. The case is distinguishable for these reasons. But Collins is an example of how an exceptional sentence can be imposed in response to exceptional circumstances.
53In the present case, I must consider the combined effect of Ms. Luff’s possession of hydromorphone, oxycodone and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and the fact the conduct continued after her arrest and release on a house arrest bail. Standing alone, some of these individual charges may have warranted a sentence close to 2 years in view of the significant mitigating factors at play. However, the sum total of the criminal conduct here, given the large amounts of these drugs, puts this case well into the penitentiary range. On even the most favourable view of the mitigating factors, the circumstances are not so exceptional as to move this matter below that range.
54Absent the unique combination of factors here, a sentence of 5 years or more could well have been imposed. The significant mitigating factors, the collateral consequence of the family separation, and the principle of totality, all serve to bring this sentence down from that range substantially, but it still does not approach the reformatory range of less than two years.
55The Supreme Court noted in R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32 that credit for pre-sentence custody cannot turn what would otherwise be a penitentiary sentence into a conditional sentence of imprisonment. In other words, if the sentencing judge is of the view that a penitentiary term is warranted on the facts, a conditional sentence will not become available even though the sentence ultimately imposed is less than two years after deductions for time served. In my view a penitentiary term is clearly warranted.
56Defence counsel submits that it is open to me to attribute all the pre-sentence custody to the August 29, 2024 charges and then impose a conditional sentence of 2 years, less a day to the March 16, 2024 charges, thereby avoiding the error committed in Fice. Even if this proposal were correct in principle, I am not satisfied the first set of charges standing alone could properly attract a sentence below the penitentiary range. Given these findings, a conditional sentence is not available in this case. And, more critically, I do not believe a conditional sentence would be consistent with the principles of sentencing in this matter in view of all the circumstances.
The Fit Sentence
57I have carefully considered the relevant sentencing principles. I have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and evaluated them according to the guiding principle of proportionality. I have addressed the collateral consequences of the family separation and applied the principle of totality.
58I find that a fit and proper sentence would be a global sentence of three years in the penitentiary.
59In order to account for particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody, I will reduce the sentence I would have imposed by 60 days, pursuant to R. v. Duncan, supra. This is not a deduction for pre-sentence custody, but rather the result of my consideration of a mitigating factor on sentence that I have chosen to quantify for purposes of clarity. This brings the sentence to 34 months.
60This sentence is also subject to a formal reduction for time spent in pre-sentence custody. Ms. Luff has served 141 real days in detention. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, I award her credit at the rate of 1.5 to 1 and will reduce the sentence by 212 days.
61The sentence is subject to further reduction for time spent on restrictive conditions of pre-trial release. Ms. Luff has been subject to restrictive bail terms for a little over a year. I will reduce the sentence by 90 days, pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Downes: 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 555 (C.A).
62The resulting sentence is 2 years. At defence counsel’s request, I will not reduce the sentence to 2 years, less a day, as Ms. Luff’s preference is to serve the sentence in a federal penitentiary, rather that a provincial reformatory, on account of better programming options in the federal system. I note here that a federal sentence will give Ms. Luff the opportunity to be released on parole earlier, which may re-unite her with her daughter sooner. The sentences are as follows:
Information 4810 998 24 48109667
Count 2 – Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking [CDSA, s. 5(2)] - 10 months credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive terms of bail, followed by 2 years jail.
Count 3 – Possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking [CDSA, s. 5(2)] - 2 years concurrent.
Count 5 – Possession of hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking [CDSA, s. 5(2)] – 2 years concurrent.
Information 4810 998 24 48126495
Count 1 – Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking [CDSA, s. 5(2)] - 2 years concurrent.
Count 3 – Possession of the proceeds of crime [Criminal Code, s. 354(1)] - 6 months concurrent.
Information 4810 998 24 48126494
- Count 1 – Failure to comply with release order [Criminal Code, s. 145(5)] 6 months concurrent.
Ancillary Orders
- The offence related property is ordered forfeited. There will be a 10-year weapons prohibition. A DNA order will be made for the secondary designated offences.
Released: September 2, 2025
Signed: Justice Peter N. Fraser