Anna Martin

A youth was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police entered a small apartment where several adults possessed large quantities of drugs.

Officers observed the accused subtly move a plastic bag containing nearly 90 grams of cocaine with his foot, while he personally carried a small quantity of crack cocaine sewn into his clothing.

Applying the Beaver test for possession and the Villaroman framework for circumstantial evidence, the court found the Crown proved personal possession of the crack cocaine but failed to prove possession or control over the larger quantity in the bag.

The court held that the accused’s movement of the bag was reasonably explained as an attempt to conceal drugs to avoid implication rather than evidence of possession or trafficking.

The Crown also failed to establish joint or constructive possession or party liability for the drugs possessed by others in the apartment.

A youth was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking following a police raid on an apartment.

The Crown alleged the accused moved a white plastic bag containing 89.76 grams of cocaine using his foot while police were present.

The accused conceded possession of 1.19 grams of crack cocaine found sewn into his pants.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the larger quantity of cocaine in the white bag for purposes of trafficking, or alternatively, whether he was in joint or constructive possession of drugs in the apartment or was a party to the offence.

The court found the accused guilty of simple possession of the crack cocaine on his person but acquitted him of possession for purposes of trafficking on both counts.

The defendant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine on January 16, 2015, with two additional trafficking incidents read in on consent.

The Crown sought an intermittent custody sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court found exceptional circumstances existed based on the defendant's difficult background, including childhood trauma, abuse, and displacement, combined with demonstrated rehabilitation efforts post-offence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with a two-year probation term, finding that custody would jeopardize rehabilitation and that protection of the public was better served by a non-custodial sentence.

The accused was convicted of obstruct police, personation, and possession of marijuana, and acquitted of three counts of assault police and one count of threatening an officer.

The court found breaches of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to extensive police misconduct, including excessive force, collusion, and false testimony.

The Crown sought a reduced sentence as the remedy, while the defence sought a stay of proceedings.

The court granted a stay of proceedings for all three remaining offences, finding that the depth and breadth of police misconduct—including failure to address injuries, false statements to superiors, unchallenged assault, collusion in notes and testimony, and excessive force against a restrained and defenceless accused—was so egregious that only a stay could adequately address the damage to the integrity of the justice system.

The accused was charged with uttering threats, assault on three police officers, obstruction of justice, fraudulent personation, and possession of marijuana following his arrest for public intoxication.

The trial examined events occurring on January 5-6, 2012, spanning arrest, transport, booking, strip search, and cell detention.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused obstructed police by falsely identifying himself as his brother Richard Young and was in possession of marijuana.

However, the Crown failed to prove the threat and assault charges.

The court found the defence established on a balance of probabilities that the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 12 were violated through excessive force applied by police at the booking parade and in the holding cell.

The accused faced charges including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following an encounter with police that began with a purported Highway Traffic Act bicycle infraction.

The court found the police stop was a pretext to investigate possible gang or drug involvement and that the accused was subjected to an unlawful and humiliating public strip search.

The court rejected key portions of the arresting officer’s testimony, finding the officer unreliable and concluding that the detention and search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Given the seriousness of the Charter breaches and the strong temporal connection between those breaches and the discovery of the cocaine in a police cruiser, the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

With no remaining evidence, the charge was dismissed.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the approximately 35½‑month delay between arrest and trial violated the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court assessed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

Significant portions of the delay were attributed to neutral causes, including the co‑accused’s efforts to retain counsel and institutional scheduling limitations, with only minimal Crown delay.

The court found no demonstrable prejudice to the accused’s liberty, security, or trial fairness interests.

Balancing the individual and societal interests, the court concluded that the delay did not amount to a Charter breach.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his Charter analysis under ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the detention was appropriate until the scene was secured, and that despite breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b), the violations were not sufficiently serious to merit the exclusion of the drug evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that grounds existed.

The Court further noted that even if grounds were lacking, the evidence obtained from the search would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant's sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.