Emile Aubrey Carrington

The Crown sought an order permitting two witnesses ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom to testify at trial via videoconference pursuant to section 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The witnesses had testified at the preliminary inquiry by videoconference and were key to the Crown's case, having heard sounds and voices from the room where the alleged murder occurred.

The defence opposed the request, arguing that videoconference testimony would compromise the accused's right to a fair trial and full answer and defence, particularly given the seriousness of the charges and the importance of assessing witness credibility.

The court granted the Crown's request, finding that the witnesses satisfied the requirements of section 714.2, that the defence had not established that videoconference testimony would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, and that the circumstances fell squarely within the legislative intent of section 714.2.

This sentencing decision addresses multiple offences including breach of a release order, assault, and assault causing bodily harm within the context of intimate partner violence.

The offender, C.P., pleaded guilty after trial commenced, and the court considered both the evidence presented and facts read in by the Crown.

The decision emphasizes the seriousness of intimate partner violence, including physical, emotional, and psychological abuse, as well as breach of court orders.

The court balanced aggravating factors such as repeated breaches and ongoing abuse with mitigating factors including the offender’s guilty plea and efforts to address addiction.

The offender was sentenced to 12 months custody on each count concurrently, with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by three years probation with strict no-contact conditions and ancillary orders including DNA sampling and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

Sentencing following convictions for incest and breach of a release order arising from a father-daughter sexual relationship that began after the complainant, as a vulnerable young adult, located the offender and moved into his home.

The court held that consent was irrelevant to incest, emphasized denunciation as the overriding sentencing principle, and treated the complainant's vulnerability, the birth of a child, the offender's introduction of illegal drugs, his blame-shifting, and his criminal record as major aggravating factors.

While the court distinguished authorities involving child victims, it relied on the Supreme Court's guidance on sexual-offence sentencing to craft a significant penitentiary sentence.

The offender received 8 years for incest and 18 months concurrent for the release-order breach, with ancillary orders and enhanced credit for presentence custody.

This decision addresses sentencing for the offence of failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm under s. 320.16(2) of the Criminal Code.

The offender, Austin Young, pleaded guilty after initially denying involvement and fabricating a story to mislead police.

The court carefully balanced aggravating factors, including the offender’s deception and the serious impact on the victim, with mitigating factors such as the offender’s positive background, remorse, and lack of prior record.

The judge imposed an 18-month conditional sentence followed by probation and a three-year driving prohibition, emphasizing that the sentence is for leaving the scene only, not for causing the accident or injuries.

The Crown applied for a common law peace bond against the respondent, Bruce Peters, who agreed to the resolution.

The Crown also sought confirmation that R. v. Mousseau, 2011 ONCJ 222, no longer impedes the issuance of such orders.

The court found that a common law peace bond is more than an order for the payment of money and can be enforced under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded that Mousseau has been superseded by subsequent binding caselaw and does not bar the use of common law peace bonds.

The peace bond was granted.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a range of 12 to 15 months' imprisonment consecutive to a sentence the accused was already serving.

The court considered the accused's Aboriginal heritage, the mitigating factor of his guilty plea, and the harsh effects of incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court sentenced the accused to 12 months' imprisonment consecutive to his current sentence, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a forfeiture order.

The accused, Kyle Sparks-MacKinnon, was charged with second-degree murder.

He admitted to fatally shooting the victim but claimed self-defence, asserting the victim pointed a gun at him.

The Crown argued the accused shot the victim while he was in his car, in retaliation for prior incidents.

The court found that while the accused's credibility was questionable on some points, his testimony, supported by other evidence, raised a reasonable doubt regarding whether he faced a threat of force from the victim.

Despite the accused's significant role in instigating the confrontation by brandishing an illegal firearm, the court concluded that his response of using lethal force when facing a threat of death was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's case was wholly circumstantial, relying on evidence of animus, opportunity, means, and post-offence conduct.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine if reasonable inferences of guilt could be drawn.

The court concluded that the cumulative evidence could support a reasonable inference that the applicant was the shooter, and dismissed the application.

The offender, a 20-year-old first-time offender at the time of the offences, was convicted of robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent following a home invasion.

During the robbery, the victim was shot in the back with a shotgun by a co-accused and suffered grievous injuries.

The Crown sought 9-10 years, while the defence sought 5 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence but considered the offender's youth and the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 8 years.

The offender was sentenced to 8 years concurrent on each count, less 554 days of pre-sentence credit, including enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The accused, Andrew Douglas, was charged with robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life following a home invasion.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on forensic evidence (DNA, gunshot residue on discarded clothing), cell phone records, and the testimony of the getaway driver, Mohamed Taha.

The defence argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that Taha's testimony was unreliable.

The court found Taha's evidence credible due to corroboration by other circumstantial evidence.

The judge concluded that the cumulative effect of all evidence established Douglas's guilt as a co-principal or aider for robbery, and as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm, as these were objectively foreseeable consequences of the common unlawful purpose.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences and weapons violations.

Police obtained search warrants based on information from two confidential informants that the accused was in possession of a firearm.

During surveillance, officers observed the accused carrying a satchel and conducted a takedown stop.

A firearm was found in the satchel during a protective search.

The accused challenged the validity of the search warrants and the lawfulness of the investigative detention and search.

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds to stop and investigate the accused based on the judicially issued search warrants and the circumstances observed, and that the protective search of the satchel was warranted for officer safety.

The two accused were convicted of possessing loaded handguns, marijuana, and proceeds of crime.

One accused was also convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought sentences of 4 to 5.5 years, while the defence sought much lower sentences, citing a Charter breach for delayed bail hearings.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of guns and drugs against the mitigating factors of good rehabilitation prospects and the Charter breach.

Both accused were sentenced to two years less a day in custody, followed by probation.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with possession of a prohibited handgun and related firearm offences.

The accused conceded to committal on all charges except those relating to possession of a handgun, arguing that the seized Jennings J-22 was not operational as defined in the Criminal Code.

The Crown's expert testified that the gun had a broken or missing breechface that prevented it from firing, but that the part could be repaired or replaced with a readily available slide assembly.

The court found that the evidence established the gun could be made operational through straightforward installation of readily available parts in a reasonable timeframe, and committed the accused to trial on all charges.

Alex James and Jesse Dawson were arrested on drug and firearms charges at James' apartment.

Police found a loaded handgun, marijuana, cash, and drug paraphernalia in James' bedroom, and another handgun, cocaine, and an electronic scale outside the apartment.

Both defendants denied knowledge of the weapons and drugs.

The court analyzed the evidence, including the defendants' credibility under R. v. W. (D.), and the law of possession under section 4(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found Dawson guilty of possession of a handgun and cocaine for trafficking, concluding he knew police were present and dropped the items while fleeing.

James was found guilty of possession of a handgun, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of proceeds of crime, as the court disbelieved his denial of knowledge regarding the items in his bedroom.

The applicant, Alex James, sought to exclude evidence (heroin, crack cocaine, marijuana, and a firearm) seized from his apartment, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights due to an unreasonable search and misleading police testimony.

The court found that Detective Constable Gini conducted a warrantless search of a toilet in the applicant's bedroom, removed drugs, and subsequently provided misleading notes and preliminary hearing testimony about the timing of the discovery.

Applying the R. v. Grant test for s. 24(2) Charter exclusion, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the officer's attempts to conceal his actions, outweighed the diminished impact on the applicant's privacy and society's interest in the adjudication on the merits for that specific evidence.

The application was granted in part, excluding only the drugs found in the toilet adjacent to bedroom #3, while other evidence obtained through a subsequent lawful search warrant executed in good faith by other officers was admitted.

The applicant, Alex James, sought to exclude evidence seized from his apartment, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The police conducted surveillance and a warrantless entry into the apartment based on exigent circumstances, leading to arrests and seizure of firearms and drugs.

The applicant challenged the search warrant's validity and the warrantless entry.

The court dismissed the application, finding the search warrant was justified and the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

Even if Charter rights were breached, the evidence would be admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant factors, due to the good faith of the officers and the seriousness of the alleged offences.

The applicant, Jesse Dawson, sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 9, and 11(e) due to being detained for 40.5 hours before being brought before a justice, exceeding the 24-hour limit under section 503(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 503(1).

The court found that Dawson's rights under sections 7 (liberty) and 9 (arbitrary detention) of the Charter were violated, but not section 11(e) (bail) as the delay did not affect his bail hearing date.

The court denied the stay of proceedings, finding that the police conduct, while negligent, was not intentional or malevolent and did not constitute a systemic problem.

Instead, the court ordered judicial denunciation of the police conduct and a potential reduction in sentence if Dawson is convicted, as appropriate remedies.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The young person appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped statement to police.

The first statement was inadmissible due to non-compliance with the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the derived confessions rule, as the second statement was tainted by the first and the police failed to advise the young person that the first statement was inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.