Emile Aubrey Carrington

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to two years less a day.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the identification evidence of a teller and in admitting time and date stamps on school photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that defence counsel had agreed to the admission of the photographs.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was reasonable and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that allowed the Crown's appeal from an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the test for granting leave had not been met and none of the grounds raised warranted granting leave.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged errors in the trial judge's application of Youth Criminal Justice Act guidelines.

However, the Court upheld the decision, finding that the lack of actual prejudice and the gravity of the offence outweighed the inferred prejudice from the delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a global sentence of 22 months.

The Court of Appeal found the overall sentence fit but held the trial judge erred by refusing to consider parole ineligibility when assessing pre-trial custody credit.

Applying recent jurisprudence, the Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to 2:1, resulting in the sentence being varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of theft.

On the first count, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on recent possession was reasonable and supported by circumstantial evidence.

On the second count, the Court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that the appellant possessed the stolen items found in an apartment rented by someone else.

Consequently, the appellant's sentence was reduced from three years to two years, plus pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of post-offence conduct and in her instructions to the jury regarding its use.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the evidence was relevant and probative, and the jury charge properly alerted the jury to the limited use of the evidence.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found the fraud convictions unreasonable because there was no admissible expert evidence explaining how the seized equipment operated to capture financial data.

The police officer who testified was not qualified to give such evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the fraud convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.

Consequently, the sentence for driving while disqualified was varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that the police violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The police had detained the appellant after observing suspicious movements in a parked car and recalling an officer safety alert indicating he might be armed and wearing a bulletproof vest.

After a pat-down search revealed a bulletproof vest, the police searched a bag in the vehicle and found a handgun, which the appellant had abandoned before fleeing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the investigative detention lawful, that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search due to abandonment, and that the search of the bag was justified for officer safety.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing the trial judge applied a different level of scrutiny to the appellant's evidence compared to the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself in accordance with the principles in W.(D.) and reasonably assessed the inconsistencies in the evidence.

The trial judge's credibility findings were within his purview and supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding when he knew of the allegations and failed to address all evidence concerning recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence was not unreasonable and noting the trial judge properly relied on independent evidence from a social worker to reject the recent fabrication claim.

The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea to a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing he received misleading advice from counsel regarding the consequences of the plea.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to demonstrate a viable defence.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal judge applied the wrong legal test, noting the focus should have been on whether the plea was informed, not whether a viable defence existed.

However, the Court denied leave to appeal due to the significant delay and the absence of a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and use of an imitation firearm while committing robbery.

At trial, the judge did not leave the defence of self-defence with the jury, concluding there was no air of reality to the defence based on a pre-emptive strike.

The Court of Appeal found that, taking the appellant's evidence at its highest, there was a basis for leaving self-defence with the jury under s. 37 of the Criminal Code, given the complainant's history of bullying and aggression towards the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and sexual assault-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly balanced the risk of prejudice against the public interest in a single trial, as the evidence for both sets of charges was inextricably intertwined and demonstrated a similar modus operandi.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year global sentence due to the cruelty and torture involved in the offences.

The appellant appealed a three-year equivalent sentence for two serious sexual assaults, seeking a reduction to avoid immigration consequences (deportation to Jamaica).

The appellant introduced fresh evidence of his schizophrenia diagnosis, good behavior, and lack of reoffending over six years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and a reduction for immigration purposes unwarranted, noting that immigration officials could consider his medical and rehabilitative circumstances.

The appellant pleaded guilty to being masked with intent and failing to comply with an undertaking, receiving a 40-month sentence on a joint submission.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a 16-month reduction to avoid deportation consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that immigration consequences cannot justify what would otherwise be an unfit sentence, and the proposed reduction was well outside the agreed-upon range.

The young person appealed her sentence of four months closed custody and two months open custody for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence was fit at the time it was imposed.

However, based on remarkable fresh evidence demonstrating the young person's strict compliance with restrictions, excellent educational progress, and strong family support over the past two years, the court allowed the appeal to permit her to continue her rehabilitation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, which had found that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge had jurisdiction to make that finding and committed no error of law.

Finding the case to be fact-driven with no exceptional qualities to justify granting leave, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on consent and post-offence conduct, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The complainant testified she was passed out during the sexual contact, while the appellant claimed she initiated it.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury instructions and held there was ample evidence to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.