Emile Aubrey Carrington

The appellant appealed a lifetime driving prohibition imposed at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the record did not permit a finding of waiver or an inference of notice under s. 727 of the Criminal Code.

In the absence of proof of notice, the maximum prohibition available was that provided for in s. 259(1)(a).

The lifetime prohibition was varied to three years and nine months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The conviction rested entirely on the evidence of the complainant, who had admitted to fabricating a detailed story to the police about a doctor's visit and pregnancy test.

The Court of Appeal found that the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury failed to adequately highlight the significance of her fabricated evidence.

The Court concluded that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could not have rendered a guilty verdict based exclusively on this evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to two years less a day.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the identification evidence of a teller and in admitting time and date stamps on school photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that defence counsel had agreed to the admission of the photographs.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was reasonable and revealed no error in principle.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and weapons dangerous, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on a co-accused's statement, the verdicts were unreasonable, and the reasons were inadequate.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred in referring to the co-accused's statement but argued the proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence from the other occupants of the van was compelling and the trial judge's reasons adequately explained the basis for conviction despite the error.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of dangerous driving and flight from a pursuing police officer.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the essential elements of the offences, provided inadequate answers to jury questions, and that the guilty verdict for dangerous driving was inconsistent with her acquittal for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or responses to questions, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonably reconcilable on the evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that allowed the Crown's appeal from an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the test for granting leave had not been met and none of the grounds raised warranted granting leave.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged errors in the trial judge's application of Youth Criminal Justice Act guidelines.

However, the Court upheld the decision, finding that the lack of actual prejudice and the gravity of the offence outweighed the inferred prejudice from the delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to reopen his appeals, which had been administratively dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal found that the applicant may not have fully appreciated the implications of a court-ordered Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) assessment when he entered his guilty plea, nor that he was abandoning his right to appeal the NCR disposition when he filed his notice of abandonment.

The court ordered the appeal regarding the NCR matters to be reopened in the interests of justice.

However, the application to reopen the appeal from the summary conviction offences was dismissed for lack of merit and mootness.

The appellant appealed a global sentence of 22 months.

The Court of Appeal found the overall sentence fit but held the trial judge erred by refusing to consider parole ineligibility when assessing pre-trial custody credit.

Applying recent jurisprudence, the Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to 2:1, resulting in the sentence being varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of theft.

On the first count, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on recent possession was reasonable and supported by circumstantial evidence.

On the second count, the Court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that the appellant possessed the stolen items found in an apartment rented by someone else.

Consequently, the appellant's sentence was reduced from three years to two years, plus pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of post-offence conduct and in her instructions to the jury regarding its use.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the evidence was relevant and probative, and the jury charge properly alerted the jury to the limited use of the evidence.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found the fraud convictions unreasonable because there was no admissible expert evidence explaining how the seized equipment operated to capture financial data.

The police officer who testified was not qualified to give such evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the fraud convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.

Consequently, the sentence for driving while disqualified was varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that the police violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The police had detained the appellant after observing suspicious movements in a parked car and recalling an officer safety alert indicating he might be armed and wearing a bulletproof vest.

After a pat-down search revealed a bulletproof vest, the police searched a bag in the vehicle and found a handgun, which the appellant had abandoned before fleeing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the investigative detention lawful, that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search due to abandonment, and that the search of the bag was justified for officer safety.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside his acquittal for impaired driving and ordered a new trial.

The appellant argued the appeal judge made a clear error of law.

The Court of Appeal found no error, agreeing with the appeal judge that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to apply the proper legal principles from Stellato, specifically that any degree of impairment is sufficient and that fatigue does not foreclose the effect of alcohol.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing the trial judge applied a different level of scrutiny to the appellant's evidence compared to the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself in accordance with the principles in W.(D.) and reasonably assessed the inconsistencies in the evidence.

The trial judge's credibility findings were within his purview and supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding when he knew of the allegations and failed to address all evidence concerning recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence was not unreasonable and noting the trial judge properly relied on independent evidence from a social worker to reject the recent fabrication claim.

The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea to a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing he received misleading advice from counsel regarding the consequences of the plea.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to demonstrate a viable defence.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal judge applied the wrong legal test, noting the focus should have been on whether the plea was informed, not whether a viable defence existed.

However, the Court denied leave to appeal due to the significant delay and the absence of a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and use of an imitation firearm while committing robbery.

At trial, the judge did not leave the defence of self-defence with the jury, concluding there was no air of reality to the defence based on a pre-emptive strike.

The Court of Appeal found that, taking the appellant's evidence at its highest, there was a basis for leaving self-defence with the jury under s. 37 of the Criminal Code, given the complainant's history of bullying and aggression towards the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.