Paul Joseph Calarco

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision rendered by Justice J.A.T. Colvin of the Ontario Court of Justice on May 9, 2016, with sentence imposed on August 19, 2016.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence by failing to assess its reliability despite assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment, noting that the trial judge considered all relevant factors affecting the trustworthiness of the complainant's evidence and that corroborating evidence from the complainant's sister was available.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was also refused, as no basis for appellate intervention was demonstrated.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge provided deficient reasons and erred in law regarding the elements of the offence.

However, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown failed to adduce evidence negating a specific exception to the respondent's house arrest condition (attending counselling).

Because an acquittal was the only reasonable verdict on the evidence, the trial judge's errors did not have a material bearing on the outcome.

The appellant, Mr. Liu, appealed his conviction for impaired driving by alcohol.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of non-insane automatism and in finding that his impairment was due to alcohol rather than drugs.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that non-insane automatism is not a defence to impaired driving where drugs or alcohol are voluntarily consumed, regardless of the intent to drive.

The court also found that the trial judge correctly rejected the expert's opinion regarding drug-induced impairment due to a lack of factual basis for the amount of alcohol consumed by the appellant.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against W.R., an intellectually disabled man, for sexual assault, due to unreasonable delay under R. v. Jordan.

The trial judge found a 21-month delay, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and no exceptional circumstances.

The Crown argued errors in assessing complexity, discrete events, and transitional provisions.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the case was not complex, the Crown failed to act diligently in securing expert evidence, and the delay was unreasonable even under pre-Jordan guidelines.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm on two grounds: (1) whether his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and (2) whether the trial judge's finding that the gun used in the robbery was a firearm was unreasonable.

The appeal was heard after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which fundamentally changed the approach to s. 11(b) claims by establishing a presumptive 30-month ceiling for trial completion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial judge had misunderstood the position of defence counsel regarding the appropriate sentence, resulting in a sentence longer than that requested by either Crown or defence.

The Court of Appeal received fresh evidence on consent to clarify defence counsel's position and adjusted the sentence to an effective three years, with credit for 533 days of presentence custody.

The sentence was varied to consist of 562 days for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, with concurrent sentences on related drug and firearm offences.

The appellant was entitled to a reformatory sentence (less than two years) and arrangements were made to transfer him from the penitentiary in British Columbia to the reformatory system in Ontario.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the Crown relied on a certificate of a qualified technician, which required proving the breath sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The trial judge inferred the time of the accident based on the location, traffic volume, and prompt emergency response.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this inference amounted to speculation rather than a rational conclusion, as probabilities are insufficient to establish the statutory condition precedent.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and making it available, and sentenced to three years in penitentiary.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in allowing cross-examination on uncharged computer contents, breaching his right to silence, and finding intent to possess despite his deletion of the files.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cross-examination proper and the trial judge's assessment of possession and control reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the three-year term was within the appropriate range.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and kidnapping of an eight-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on post-offence conduct, in admitting a portion of the co-accused's videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, and in failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the co-accused's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidential foundation for an accessory after the fact defence, that the videotaped statement met threshold reliability, and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to omit a Vetrovec warning at the tactical request of defence counsel.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on sexual offences.

The appeal was initially argued and decided on the mistaken premise that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for dismissing a similar fact application.

After the initial appellate decision was released, the court was made aware that the trial judge had delivered the promised reasons.

In these supplementary reasons, the concurring judge, who would have originally allowed the appeal due to inadequate reasons, reviewed the newly discovered reasons and found no error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and failing to comply with a recognizance.

She argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay from an informant and admitting a statement without a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in both instances but applied the curative proviso, finding the remaining circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the errors were harmless.

The appeal was dismissed.

Crown appeal from a jury acquittal on sexual assault and related charges involving a teen complainant.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in excluding proposed similar fact evidence arising from the respondent's prior conviction for a sexual assault against another teenage complainant.

The majority held that the trial judge applied the correct Handy framework, that the probative value of the single prior incident was relatively low given the generic similarities and substantial prejudice risk, and that the exclusionary ruling should stand.

Although the jury charge on legal consent was erroneous because the complainant was under 16, the majority found no substantial wrong in light of the acquittal on the properly charged sexual interference count.

A dissent would have found the reasons inadequate and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges arising from a domestic relationship, including confinement, threats with a knife, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, partly by requiring expert evidence to explain the complainant's delayed reporting and continued contact with the respondent, and by finding her testimony problematic.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law by requiring expert evidence for assessing the complainant's credibility regarding delayed disclosure and continued contact, contrary to Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (R. v. D.D.).

This error flawed the assessment of the complainant's evidence, which was critical in a "she said, he said" case.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to two and a half years in prison.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misconstrued the law on agency and made factual errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant intended to traffic the drugs regardless of whether he initially held them as an agent for his mother.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation are paramount for fentanyl offences.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The respondent had failed seven times to provide a proper breath sample after being stopped for speeding and exhibiting signs of alcohol consumption.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding a reasonable doubt as to whether the failure was intentional.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal standard for mens rea.

The Court found that absent evidence to the contrary, multiple failures to provide a sample give rise to an inescapable inference of intent.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered.

The appellant appealed a 10-year sentence imposed for sexual interference, breach of probation, and breach of prohibition.

At trial, the Crown and defence had presented a joint submission for a 7-year sentence, which the trial judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not following the joint submission and by imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence that ignored the facts of the offence.

The sentence was reduced to the jointly submitted 7 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break, enter, and theft under $5,000, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of six months' imprisonment and 24 months' probation.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by excluding spontaneous exculpatory statements, reversing the onus of proof regarding alibi evidence, and failing to caution himself on eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the mitigating factors and the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty mid-trial to assaulting his spouse with a weapon by forcing her onto a heated stove element.

At sentencing the trial judge refused the appellant’s request for a conditional discharge and instead entered a conviction, suspended the passing of sentence, and imposed one year of probation.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider mitigating factors including pre-sentence custody, rehabilitation efforts, and the severe immigration consequences of conviction.

The court held that even considering the matter afresh, a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the seriousness of the domestic violence offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal against sentence was dismissed.

The appellant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and left the scene without assisting.

A tractor trailer subsequently struck and killed the unconscious victim.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for failing to stop, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death.

He applied for certiorari to quash the committal for manslaughter and criminal negligence, which was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge properly applied the 'reasonably foreseeable' approach to legal causation from Maybin, and that leaving the scene carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own motion to quash and that there was no prejudice to the appellant.