Paul Joseph Calarco

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of various drugs.

He received a sentence of two years less a day on the aggravated assault conviction with concurrent sentences on drug charges, followed by two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on the aggravated assault charge and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper cross-examination by the Crown on a girlfriend's statement, improper splitting of the Crown's case by calling the girlfriend in reply, and alleged misdirection on the defence of self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from two years less a day to 12 months' imprisonment and vacating the victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and related offences, arguing that the trial judge failed to address a suggestion that a police officer may have condoned the complainant lying in his statement to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the suggestion was not the only interpretation of the evidence and that the trial judge properly addressed inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The court also upheld the sentence of eight years less two years' credit for pre-sentence custody as fit, but granted leave to appeal sentence and varied it only to strike the victim fine surcharge in light of R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and breach of probation, as well as his sentence of 20 months imposed following a judge-alone trial.

The sole issue on the conviction appeal was whether the prosecution should have been stayed for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge found that after appropriate deductions, the delay did not exceed the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's analysis, finding no error in the attribution of delay periods and confirming that the total delay, even after correcting for one instance of double-counting, remained below 18 months.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentencing judge committed no error of law or principle.

The victim surcharge was set aside in light of R. v. Boudreault.

The appellants appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm and, for one appellant, threatening death.

The court upheld the convictions for assault causing bodily harm, finding the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and rejection of self-defence, to be reasonable and supported by evidence.

However, the conviction for threatening death was set aside as unsupported by evidence.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, uttering a threat to cause death, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and pleaded guilty to breach of recognizance.

The crimes involved the slashing and robbery of a 57-year-old blind male complainant.

Identity was the only contested issue at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the alternative suspect defence or the Vetrovec charge.

However, the court found sentencing errors and imposed a stay on the aggravated assault and weapon dangerous convictions pursuant to Kienapple principles, and varied the sentences on the uttering a threat to cause death and breach of recognizance convictions to 18 months and three months concurrent respectively, while affirming the global sentence of seven years less 771 days' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and using an imitation firearm in the commission of that offence.

He was sentenced to six months' incarceration for robbery and 12 months' consecutive for the firearm offence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: the admissibility of dog tracking evidence, the trial judge's use of post-offence conduct evidence (flight from police), the trial judge's treatment of evidence regarding the appellant's intoxication, and a misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his friend during a physical altercation that began as a fist fight and escalated when the deceased produced a knife.

The appellant admitted to causing the death but claimed self-defence.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 12 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of various evidence, the jury charge on self-defence and provocation, and the sentencing decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, though it identified an error in sentencing that had no impact on the outcome.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant did not dispute physical possession of 146 grams of heroin delivered by FedEx from India.

His defence was that he believed he was receiving electronics for a fee of $800 as part of an import scheme.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as neither credible nor plausible and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal on all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the actus reus and mens rea of importing, the appellant's knowledge or wilful blindness, the proper drawing of inferences, the burden of proof, and the Crown's cross-examination.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year concurrent sentences fit given the nature and amount of heroin, financial motive, and prior criminal record.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering a conditional discharge with residence requirements and mandatory reporting to CAMH.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board failed to properly consider whether he continued to present a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board properly applied the statutory criteria under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, considered the appellant's psychiatric condition (schizophrenia with profound negative symptoms), his history of offending, and expert evidence that without continued control the appellant would likely fall away from treatment and pose a significant risk of violent re-offending.

The conditional discharge was found to be a reasonable disposition within the Board's discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 3.5 months.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal regarding conviction: (1) inadequate jury instruction on the limited use of a co-accused's out-of-court statement, and (2) failure to hold a jury inquiry due to alleged juror bias.

The appellant also appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give effect to rehabilitation and failed to consider the lower purity of the heroin as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no manifest unfitness in the sentence imposed.

The appellants were convicted by jury of importing 7.86 kilograms of cocaine into Canada from Jamaica and each received sentences of 6.5 years imprisonment.

Potts appealed both conviction and sentence; Robinson appealed sentence only.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury charge on the mental element of importing, limiting instructions on co-accused statements, right to silence, expert evidence, or character evidence.

The sentencing appeals were also dismissed as the sentences were fit and within the appropriate range for this offence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision rendered by Justice J.A.T. Colvin of the Ontario Court of Justice on May 9, 2016, with sentence imposed on August 19, 2016.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence by failing to assess its reliability despite assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment, noting that the trial judge considered all relevant factors affecting the trustworthiness of the complainant's evidence and that corroborating evidence from the complainant's sister was available.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was also refused, as no basis for appellate intervention was demonstrated.

The appellant, Mr. Liu, appealed his conviction for impaired driving by alcohol.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of non-insane automatism and in finding that his impairment was due to alcohol rather than drugs.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that non-insane automatism is not a defence to impaired driving where drugs or alcohol are voluntarily consumed, regardless of the intent to drive.

The court also found that the trial judge correctly rejected the expert's opinion regarding drug-induced impairment due to a lack of factual basis for the amount of alcohol consumed by the appellant.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against W.R., an intellectually disabled man, for sexual assault, due to unreasonable delay under R. v. Jordan.

The trial judge found a 21-month delay, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and no exceptional circumstances.

The Crown argued errors in assessing complexity, discrete events, and transitional provisions.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the case was not complex, the Crown failed to act diligently in securing expert evidence, and the delay was unreasonable even under pre-Jordan guidelines.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm on two grounds: (1) whether his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and (2) whether the trial judge's finding that the gun used in the robbery was a firearm was unreasonable.

The appeal was heard after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which fundamentally changed the approach to s. 11(b) claims by establishing a presumptive 30-month ceiling for trial completion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial judge had misunderstood the position of defence counsel regarding the appropriate sentence, resulting in a sentence longer than that requested by either Crown or defence.

The Court of Appeal received fresh evidence on consent to clarify defence counsel's position and adjusted the sentence to an effective three years, with credit for 533 days of presentence custody.

The sentence was varied to consist of 562 days for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, with concurrent sentences on related drug and firearm offences.

The appellant was entitled to a reformatory sentence (less than two years) and arrangements were made to transfer him from the penitentiary in British Columbia to the reformatory system in Ontario.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges arising from a domestic relationship, including confinement, threats with a knife, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, partly by requiring expert evidence to explain the complainant's delayed reporting and continued contact with the respondent, and by finding her testimony problematic.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law by requiring expert evidence for assessing the complainant's credibility regarding delayed disclosure and continued contact, contrary to Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (R. v. D.D.).

This error flawed the assessment of the complainant's evidence, which was critical in a "she said, he said" case.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

A contempt of court proceeding against defence counsel Gina DaFonte for her failure to attend court on multiple occasions in a domestic violence matter involving an application to strike guilty pleas.

The respondent failed to appear on January 28, February 4, and February 10, 2014, and most critically on March 10, 2014, despite a court order compelling her attendance on a pre-emptory hearing date.

The court found the respondent guilty of criminal contempt in the face of the court, finding that her conduct demonstrated reckless indifference to her obligations to the court and her client, despite her claims of illness.

The court imposed a fine and referred the matter to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The accused was charged with Impaired Care or Control and Over 80 Care or Control following a motor vehicle incident.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated when the officer detained him pending the arrival of an approved screening device but refused to allow him to contact counsel via his cellular telephone, despite knowing a significant delay would occur and that counsel would realistically be available during business hours on a Tuesday afternoon.

The court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused on both counts.

This is a voir dire concerning the competency and qualifications of a Tigrinya language interpreter proffered by the Crown.

The defendant challenged the interpreter's qualifications despite his passing grade on the Ministry of the Attorney General interpretation test, arguing for an inherent error factor of approximately 30%.

The court rejected this argument, finding that mathematical precision is not required in interpretation and that the interpreter met the constitutional standard under the Charter.

The court held that interpretation is an inherently human endeavour that does not require perfection, and that the interpreter was competent to provide services during trial.