Chris Dwornikiewicz

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board unreasonably found he posed a significant threat to public safety, applied the wrong legal test, and acted unfairly by copying portions of its reasons from a previous year's hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence of the appellant's treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight, and recent aggressive behaviour supported the significant threat finding.

While the Board's copying of previous reasons was ill-advised, the reasons as a whole demonstrated a firm grasp of the current evidence and did not warrant a new hearing.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon after using excessive force against an intoxicated complainant during an arrest.

His appeal to the summary conviction appeal court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the lower courts erred in their application of the justification defence under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding no error of law and concluding that the proposed appeal did not raise an unsettled question of law of public importance.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that revoked his transfer to a less secure hospital and maintained him at a secure facility.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's surprise attack on a co-patient, which changed his risk profile.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion reasonably supported the revocation and that maintaining the appellant at the secure facility was the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a sentence of 18 months for unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of a firearm knowing that its possession was unauthorized.

The court held that although the sentence was clearly very low, the sentencing judge identified mitigating factors including repudiation of gang membership, an early guilty plea, full-time employment, and significant lifestyle change.

The court accepted that deference was owed to the sentencing judge’s assessment of the offender and his prospects.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant appealed her conviction on Highway Traffic Act charges.

Due to a misunderstanding with her paralegal, neither attended her trial, which proceeded ex parte.

A subsequent appeal hearing also proceeded in her absence, resulting in a resolution she claimed she did not consent to.

The Court of Appeal found that the apparent unfairness at trial was not cured by the appeal hearing and ordered a new trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 18-month custodial sentence imposed for an integral, though indirect, role in a home invasion.

She argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle governing first custodial sentences and failed to properly assess evidence of rehabilitation.

The court held there was no basis to interfere because the sentencing judge carefully considered the appellant's personal circumstances, first-offender status, and rehabilitative progress.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of driving while disqualified where the information alleged disqualification under a Criminal Code prohibition order, but the trial evidence established only a provincial licence suspension.

The Crown conceded on appeal that the courts below erred in treating the source of disqualification as irrelevant and leave to appeal was granted under the second branch of the governing leave test.

The majority held that the court should not amend the information under s. 683(1)(g) because the appellant had been misled or prejudiced in both the conduct of the defence at trial and the appeal, particularly given the late request to amend on a second appeal.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered; there was a dissent that would have allowed the amendment and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for traffic violations.

During the stop, an officer directed the appellant to place his hands on the seat in front of him, asked for his name, and ran a background check.

The officer subsequently noticed a handgun protruding from a knapsack next to the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences and sentenced to nine years in prison.

On appeal, the appellant argued his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated and that his Aboriginal status was not properly considered in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appellant was psychologically detained, there was no breach of ss. 9 or 10(b).

Assuming a s. 8 breach occurred during the background check, the court held the firearm was still admissible under s. 24(2).

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately weighed the appellant's Aboriginal background against the mandatory minimum sentence and aggravating factors.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a 2009 finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) to which she had consented.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not establish she failed to appreciate the nature and quality of her acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to adequately explain the nearly four-year delay and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as there was sufficient evidence from the psychiatric assessment and surrounding circumstances to support the NCRMD finding.

The self-represented appellant appealed a decision regarding the conduct of a preliminary hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the reasons of the lower court judge.

The Court noted that the preliminary hearing judge was required to limit evidence to protect information covered by a prior order, and the manner in which this duty was performed fell within her jurisdiction and discretion.

The accused appealed convictions arising from historical allegations of physical and sexual abuse against two complainants, and the Crown appealed sentence.

The court held that the trial judge's rejection of the accused's evidence rested on speculative reasoning, including unsupported findings about anger, alcohol-related memory impairment, and an impermissible assumption that the accused had a motive to lie to avoid criminal liability.

The court further held that the reasons failed to grapple with a significant contradiction between the complainants on a key issue.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

In light of that disposition, the sentence appeal was not addressed.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentences imposed on the respondents for robbery and assaulting a peace officer, arguing the trial judge erred by omitting a house arrest component.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that under the principles in Proulx, conditional sentences should generally include punitive conditions restrictive of liberty, such as house arrest or strict curfews.

The appeal was allowed and a strict curfew was added for the remainder of the respondents' sentences.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the accused on nine counts of historical indecent assault.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, including three to which the accused had just pled guilty, due to a 27-month delay between arrest and trial, finding a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the 16.5 months of institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and the accused suffered only slight prejudice, primarily related to winter travel difficulties rather than the delay itself.

The stay was set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial on the not-guilty pleas and sentencing on the guilty pleas.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by rejecting a joint submission on sentence without explicitly giving counsel an opportunity to address it.

The Court of Appeal found that counsel had an opportunity during a break in proceedings.

The Court upheld the trial judge's decision, agreeing that the joint submission was grossly inadequate and that this was one of the rare cases where it was necessary to depart from it.

The appeal was dismissed.