Paul Joseph Calarco

The appellant and a co-accused were convicted of aggravated assault after throwing a beer bottle and mug at the complainant in a bar.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and improperly used the co-accused's out-of-court statement against him.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in her treatment of the co-accused's statement, the error caused no harm and the verdict would have been the same.

The curative proviso was applied, and the appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The young person appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was not clearly disproportionate to the offence and that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's determination that the sentence served the purposes and goals of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving two children who had been placed in temporary foster care in his daughter's home.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements from one of the children under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in using the evidence of each child as similar fact evidence on the counts relating to the other.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule and that the trial judge's findings of guilt did not improperly rely on similar fact evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud over $5000 against her employer and sought leave to appeal her three-year sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in ruling her daughter an adverse witness, allowing improper cross-examination, refusing to edit her criminal record, and failing to inquire into jury observations of her driving outside court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no significant prejudice or unfairness despite some procedural shortcomings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year term was fit given the $50,000 fraud, her prior record for crimes of dishonesty, and the devastating effect on the victim.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and assault with intent to resist arrest.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent custody and a two-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the gravity of the conduct which involved running two red lights and causing significant injuries to two people.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a seven-year penitentiary sentence for manslaughter arising from a serious driving incident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the seven-year starting point but found the trial judge erred in granting only 1:1 credit for 550 days of pre-trial custody following a bail breach.

Given the appellant's youth, prospects for rehabilitation, and lack of evidence that he caused the delay, the Court granted credit at 1.5:1 and reduced the net sentence from five years and three months to four years and three months.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 60 days intermittent after pleading guilty to production and trafficking of marijuana.

He argued the trial judge failed to sufficiently consider his medical condition when declining a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge clearly based the lenient intermittent sentence on the appellant's medical condition and implicitly factored in pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, assault with a weapon, and mischief.

The Court of Appeal set aside the break and enter conviction because the trial judge failed to find that an indictable offence was committed or intended.

The assault with a weapon conviction was also set aside because the trial judge failed to address important exculpatory evidence from the investigating officer.

The court set aside all convictions and ordered a new trial, noting the appellant had already served his sentence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police observed her crouch behind a cooler display in a Beer Store where drugs were subsequently found.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework and engaged in speculative reasoning that reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the circumstantial evidence, correctly applied the core tenets of W.(D.), and did not shift the burden of proof to the accused.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences against two complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the reliability of the complainants' evidence and the standard of evaluation, and that the Crown made improper comments on reasonable doubt during closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate and the Crown's improper comments were cured by the trial judge's instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the prolonged regime of sexual abuse by a parent figure justified the sentence imposed.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence for assaulting a child.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis of the evidence or her approach to the defence evidence.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding it was not manifestly excessive given the nature of the assaults, the child's age, and the breach of trust.

The appeal was dismissed, save for a consent variation to the probation order allowing the appellant to be alone with his own son.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for knowingly supplying a handgun and ammunition to a member of the Hells' Angels while under a firearms prohibition order.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence grossly inadequate and an error in principle for not making the sentence for the section 117.01 offence consecutive.

Taking into account the respondent's guilty plea, lack of prior convictions, and the hardship of re-incarceration, the Court varied the sentence to a total of 20 months consecutive to the 18 months of pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a boy left in his care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding credibility assessments but applied the Kienapple principle to enter a conditional stay on the sexual assault conviction, as both charges shared the same factual and legal nexus.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the fresh evidence of the appellant's spouse's health issues did not justify a conditional sentence for such a serious breach of trust.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault.

The determinative issue was whether the trial judge erred in failing to provide an adequate answer to the jury's questions concerning the timeline of various events.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge did not properly answer the questions and it was not satisfied the result would have been the same had they been properly answered.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

He challenged the trial judge's reliance on shoe evidence, a CAA card found in the possession of a woman seen in a video, and video identification by police officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly limited the use of the shoe evidence, appropriately weighed the CAA card evidence, and reasonably accepted the police officers' identification based on their familiarity with the appellant's distinctive features.

The appellants appealed convictions and penitentiary sentences arising from prolonged physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of a vulnerable complainant in a domestic setting.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge conflated credibility and reliability, misapprehended medical and nursing evidence, rendered unreasonable verdicts, or misapplied the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

Reading the reasons as a whole, the court held that the trial judge properly considered the entire evidentiary record, the defence fabrication theory, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeals were dismissed as the global sentences, including consecutive terms for one appellant, were fit.

The young person appealed the trial judge's decision to sentence him as an adult for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by directly deducting two and a half years of pre-trial custody rather than treating it as a discretionary consideration.

The appeal was allowed, the adult sentence was set aside, and the maximum youth sentence was imposed to better facilitate the young person's rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and other offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in classifying an inoperable rifle without a breech bolt as a 'firearm' under the Criminal Code, as there was no evidence that parts to make it operable were available on the scene.

The convictions for robbery with a firearm were quashed and substituted with robbery with an imitation firearm.

The court dismissed the appellant's arguments regarding the admissibility of KGB statements from two witnesses.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the trial judge's discretion on pre-trial custody credit.

The appellants appealed their sentences, arguing the trial judge erred in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the guilty pleas.

Given the appellants' serious criminal records and the fact that the offences were committed while on probation or parole, the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

The respondent was charged with sexual assault.

On the scheduled trial date, no court was available, and the trial was adjourned for eight months.

The trial judge subsequently stayed the charge, finding a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter due to institutional delay.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct the required Morin analysis and ignored the societal interest in a trial on the merits and the lack of prejudice to the respondent.

The stay was vacated and the matter remitted for trial.