Riun Shandler

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing at a nightclub.

At trial, he claimed he acted in self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that excluded prejudicial portions of his police statements, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct and exculpatory statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly reweighed the probative value of the police statements after the defence put the officer's conduct in issue, and that the jury instructions on post-offence conduct and reasonable doubt were sufficient.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on accomplice evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his designation as a dangerous offender, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and ample evidence to support the verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as medical evidence supported the finding that the appellant was not amenable to treatment, justifying the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 1984, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention in a general forensic unit.

The Board found that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to his explosive anger, untreated paranoia, and lack of insight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's finding of significant threat was reasonable and that it correctly applied the least onerous and least restrictive disposition test under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 9-year sentence for serious offences.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by granting 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody instead of 1.5:1 under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in finding loss of earned remission insufficient to trigger enhanced credit, the appellant's extensive criminal record of over 70 convictions would have justified detention under s. 515(9.1), thereby excluding him from enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

Following the court's earlier ruling that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional and that the trial sentence was manifestly unfit, the remaining issue was whether the respondent should be re-incarcerated after having completed the sentence originally imposed.

The court held that a fit sentence at trial would have been two years less a day, with 12 months' credit reducing the remaining custodial term to 12 months.

However, given the lengthy appellate delay, the respondent's successful completion of the conditional sentence, and his demonstrated rehabilitation, the court permanently stayed execution of the 12-month sentence.

The appellant was convicted of two provincial offences after failing to appear at his trial dates.

Under s. 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, he was deemed not to dispute the charges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 9.1 violates s. 11(d) of the Charter by denying him a fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 9.1 does not violate the Charter, as the notices provided clear warnings of the consequences of failing to appear, allowing the court to infer a valid waiver of s. 11(d) rights.

However, the appeal was allowed and new trials ordered because the City of Toronto conceded the appellant did not receive a fair hearing on his initial appeals.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years for criminal negligence causing death and impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The offences resulted in the death of a five-month-old baby and serious injuries to the mother.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, noting the appellant's prior record for impaired driving and the severity of the consequences.

The appeal was dismissed, and the seven-year total sentence was upheld as fit and not offending the totality principle.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years' imprisonment for possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm and other firearms offences.

He challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code for a second or subsequent offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violated s. 12 of the Charter as it would be grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical scenarios, and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

However, the appellant's seven-year sentence was upheld as fit given his extensive criminal record and the gravity of his offences.

The appellant, a repeat firearms offender, appealed his global sentence of eight years' imprisonment for eight firearm-related offences, including possession of a restricted firearm and breaches of two firearms prohibition orders.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the prohibition breaches, that the global sentence offended the parity principle, and that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences and concluding the global sentence was fit and did not offend the parity principle.

The Court declined to address the constitutional challenge as the sentence was justified regardless of the mandatory minimum.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had declared the three-year mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a five-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the declaration that the mandatory minimum violates s. 12 of the Charter, relying on its companion decision in R. v. Nur.

However, the Court found that the trial judge made unsupported findings of fact that improperly mitigated the offence.

The Court concluded the original sentence was manifestly inadequate and requested further submissions to determine an appropriate sentence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 of the Charter because it is grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonable hypothetical offender at the regulatory end of the spectrum.

The court declared s. 95(2)(a)(i) of no force or effect, but affirmed the appellant's specific sentence of time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

He argued that he did not possess a needle during the incident and that his trial was unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting that the trial judge accepted the victim's evidence regarding the needle and that the record did not support the claim of an unfair trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge gave appropriate weight to the appellant's aboriginal heritage, difficult childhood, and addiction issues, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and aggravated assault, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel ignored his instructions that he wished to testify in his own defence.

Trial counsel failed to respond to the allegations and had been disbarred for similar conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant established on a balance of probabilities that his instructions were ignored, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

In a criminal appeal involving cross-appeals by the Crown and the accused, the court held that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to quash a sexual assault count after the jury returned its verdict.

The court further held that the count, although spanning periods before and after the complainant reached the age of consent, did not undermine jury unanimity because the jury was instructed that non-consent had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found reversible error in the failure to give a proper limiting instruction on the use of extensive bad character evidence arising from allegations of long-term physical and sexual abuse within a household.

The Crown appeal was allowed, the accused’s appeal was allowed, the order quashing count 3 was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all counts that had resulted in convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge should have given a specific caution regarding the complainant's evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was capable of assessing the complainant's credibility using common sense and the general instructions provided.

The court also held that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could have reached the verdict.

The appellant pleaded guilty to simple robbery and was sentenced to 30 months in prison based on a joint submission.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer allegedly failed to follow instructions to immediately accept an earlier, more lenient plea offer from the Crown before seeking bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lawyer's evidence more credible that the appellant had insisted on seeking bail first due to severe withdrawal symptoms.

The court also rejected arguments that counsel should have advocated for a return to the original offer or a reduced sentence based on inadequate medical treatment in custody.

The appellant appealed an 18-month sentence for assaulting a police officer by spitting in the officer's face.

The Crown conceded that the appellant should have received credit for 134 days of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly excessive, noting that while denunciation is required, a 12-month sentence adequately meets the needs of deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 365 days, less 134 days of pre-trial custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of 231 days.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible and detained in a psychiatric facility, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board.

He argued that his transfer to a more restrictive unit violated his rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter, and sought a conditional discharge as a stand-alone remedy under section 24(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's findings that the transfer was necessary due to the appellant's dangerous conduct and did not violate his Charter rights.

The Court also affirmed that the Board lacks jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy, such as a conditional discharge, that would endanger public safety and frustrate its statutory mandate.

The appellant appealed a treatment order but was found fit to stand trial shortly after the order was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the broader issues of principle regarding treatment orders were already under reserve in another case, and the remaining issues were fact-specific.

The appellant appealed her sentence.

Based on fresh evidence regarding her excellent performance at the Vanier institution and her proposed living arrangements with her young son and cousin, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced her sentence to time served, leaving the probation order in place.