Riun Shandler

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The Crown moved for directions to transfer the application to the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application under s. 679(7.1) of the Criminal Code, as a Superior Court judge is an ex officio justice of the peace under the Justices of the Peace Act.

The application was transferred to the Superior Court because the Crown intended to call viva voce evidence, which is more readily accommodated in that court.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of 15 years and 3 months' imprisonment followed by a 10-year supervision order for severe, long-term domestic abuse.

The amicus curiae conceded there were no arguable grounds for the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the amicus argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's age and progressive dementia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting expert evidence that the appellant posed a moderate to high risk to re-offend and that his dementia might stabilize with treatment.

The court agreed with the trial judge's characterization of the offences as the worst case of domestic abuse short of murder, concluding the sentence was fit.

The Crown appealed an order of an Ontario Court of Justice judge who purported to exercise delegated habeas corpus powers to declare the accused's detention in jail unlawful.

The accused had been ordered to undergo a mental health assessment at a hospital but was held in jail due to a lack of beds.

A Superior Court judge had remitted the accused's habeas corpus application to the lower court under s. 775 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the lower court judge's order was not a judgment issued on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, as s. 775 does not permit the delegation of superior court habeas corpus powers to a lower court.

Consequently, there was no statutory jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 784(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

During jury selection, the trial judge departed from the statutorily mandated procedure under s. 640(2) of the Criminal Code by having the first two jurors act as triers for the challenge for cause for the entire panel, rather than rotating them.

The Court of Appeal held that this was a fundamental jurisdictional error that resulted in an improperly constituted court.

The error could not be cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual abuse, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar fact evidence, excluding a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, and permitting cross-examination on prior complaints.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the test for concoction regarding the similar fact evidence, properly exercised his discretion to exclude the College decision due to prejudicial effect, and appropriately instructed the jury on the use of prior complaints for assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board applied an incorrect legal test by focusing exclusively on public safety and unreasonably disregarded expert evidence that he could be managed in a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly considered all statutory criteria and balanced the appellant's treatment needs against the risk he posed to the public.

The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that the proposed management plan was speculative and that the appellant was not an appropriate candidate for a medium secure setting due to his unwillingness to undergo a necessary medication trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment after stabbing an unarmed victim eight times during a fistfight with a concealed prohibited weapon.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his remorse, characterizing the victim as vulnerable, and imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's remorse was not genuine, that the unarmed victim was vulnerable to a concealed weapon, and that the brutal circumstances of the attack justified a sentence at the high end of the range for aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant hospital appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition transferring the respondent, who was found not criminally responsible for multiple murders and sexual offences, from a maximum security facility to a medium security facility.

The Review Board concluded that the respondent's risk could be managed in medium security.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Review Board erred in law by focusing solely on risk management and failing to holistically apply all factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

The Board failed to consider evidence that the restrictive conditions and lack of vocational therapy at the medium security facility would be detrimental to the respondent's mental health and increase his risk to the public.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for stabbing his wife.

At trial, he admitted to the killing but raised the defence of provocation, arguing he lost control after she made a comment implying infidelity.

He sought to introduce expert evidence on Islamic cultural views regarding female infidelity to support the subjective and objective elements of provocation.

The trial judge excluded hearsay evidence of the victim's statements to a hotel clerk and instructed the jury not to consider the appellant's cultural background for the objective 'ordinary person' test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay exclusion was a harmless error and that the provocation defence lacked an air of reality because there was no evidence the appellant personally held the cultural beliefs described by the expert.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to problems with eyewitness identification procedures and inconsistencies in the description of the getaway car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that the verdict was supported by a formidable circumstantial case, including the appellant's association with a car closely matching the getaway car.

The appellant, convicted of armed robbery, sought to reopen and reconsider a sentence appeal decision that reduced his life sentence to 16 years but imposed a 7-year period of parole ineligibility.

Duty counsel argued the court incorrectly applied its discretion under the Criminal Code regarding the length of the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal denied the request, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal once it had been heard on the merits and the final order had been entered.

The court noted that such a challenge to the correctness of the decision must be directed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the surviving victim, who had a significant criminal record, gave inconsistent statements, and had a motive to lie.

The trial judge refused to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the victim's evidence, reasoning that such warnings do not apply to victims.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as a Vetrovec warning was mandatory given the witness's unsavoury character and the importance of his testimony.

The error could not be saved by the curative proviso, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her youth court sentence.

The Crown acknowledged that, regardless of whether the original disposition was fit, the appellant had made remarkable progress in turning her life around, as evidenced by a post-sentence report.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varying the custodial portion of the sentence to time served and setting aside the probation order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard to circumstantial evidence.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's competing inference on the basis that it was not 'equally plausible'.

The Court of Appeal held this was a clear legal error, as reasonable possibilities in favour of an accused may give rise to a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The 70-year-old appellant, a career criminal, pleaded guilty to robbery after threatening bank staff with a fake bomb.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence primarily to give the parole board flexibility in managing his release.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by imposing a maximum sentence without considering a fixed penitentiary term that would achieve the same goals of specific deterrence and public protection.

The appeal was allowed, and the life sentence was substituted with a 16-year term with parole eligibility delayed for seven years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing proposed evidence of the complainant's propensity to inflict injuries on herself as collateral, as it was relevant to a central fact in issue.

The convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm were quashed and a new trial ordered.

However, the appeal from the breach of recognizance convictions was dismissed, as there was ample evidence that the appellant knowingly breached the conditions.

The Crown appealed a fourteen-year effective sentence imposed for possession of child pornography and multiple sexual assaults against children and a teenage victim, arguing the sentence was demonstrably unfit and should be increased to eighteen years.

The Court of Appeal held that appellate intervention on sentence is available only where the sentence reflects a substantial and marked departure from sentences customarily imposed for similar offenders committing similar crimes.

The court found no error in principle, accepted that the sentencing judge properly weighed the gravity of the offences, the offender's position of trust, the profound impact on the victims, mitigation, and totality, and declined to vary the sentence.

The court also refused to intervene regarding an alleged four-month error in calculating pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed the disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which concluded that he continued to present a real and substantial danger to the public.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's focus on the risk the appellant posed to the community and agreed with its conclusion based on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and appealed both convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the Vetrovec caution for an unsavoury witness and the instructions on manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge adequately cautioned the jury about the dangers of relying on the unsavoury witness's evidence and properly identified potentially confirmatory evidence.

The Court also held that the trial judge clearly explained how the appellant could be convicted of manslaughter if the jury found he only engaged in a plan to cause bodily harm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, relying on a dissent in the court below.

The appeal was brought pursuant to section 693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the matter to determine if the dissent raised a valid question of law.

The Court concluded that the dissent in the court below did not raise an issue of law as required by the statute.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.