Susan Mulligan

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to dismiss a dangerous offender application and instead designate the respondent as a long-term offender.

The trial judge had found that the statutory criteria for a dangerous offender were met but concluded the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk the respondent presented in the community.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in imposing this burden of proof on the Crown.

The issue of whether the public threat can be reduced to an acceptable level through long-term offender provisions does not require either party to satisfy a burden of proof, but is a matter of judicial discretion based on the whole of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new dangerous offender hearing was ordered because the trial judge failed to make necessary findings of fact.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder after stabbing a victim during an altercation at a dance club.

The appellant argued he acted to protect his cousin.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence and defence of a third party with the jury, and the appellant challenged the jury instructions on provocation and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions on unanimity regarding provocation were confusing and that the instructions on post-offence conduct were erroneous and inadequately corrected.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and appealed both convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the Vetrovec caution for an unsavoury witness and the instructions on manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge adequately cautioned the jury about the dangers of relying on the unsavoury witness's evidence and properly identified potentially confirmatory evidence.

The Court also held that the trial judge clearly explained how the appellant could be convicted of manslaughter if the jury found he only engaged in a plan to cause bodily harm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for pointing a firearm, robbery, and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The convictions were largely based on a videotaped KGB statement given by a witness who claimed no memory of the events or the statement at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the statement, finding it met the necessity and reliability requirements, and concluded the verdict was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder.

The respondents had been convicted of manslaughter and forcible confinement after participating in the beating and confinement of the victim, who was left bound in a remote cabin and subsequently died.

The trial judge ruled there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge impermissibly weighed the evidence and usurped the jury's function.

The Court held there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent, planning, and deliberation to leave the murder charges to the jury, and ordered a new trial on first-degree murder.

The appellant appealed a decision of a summary conviction appeal judge that set aside his acquittal for assault and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant after finding a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant intentionally applied more force than the ordinary touching that takes place with implied consent in a conjugal relationship when he took his wife's arm.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in her interpretation of the trial judge's reasons and in setting aside the acquittal.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and firearm offences, arguing that the trial judge erred by not excluding evidence from an informal line-up due to alleged breaches of his ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter rights, and by misapprehending identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach and noting that the trial judge did not rely on the line-up evidence.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was the shooter, as all witnesses agreed the shooter was the person pursued and beaten by the crowd, which matched the appellant.