Riun Shandler

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay two charges of sexual interference due to a 31-month delay between the accused's arrest and the proposed trial date.

The trial judge had attributed delays caused by the defence's difficulties in serving third-party record materials to systemic or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in this characterization, determining that approximately 15 months of the delay should not be attributed to the Crown.

The remaining 16 months of systemic delay fell within the acceptable range for matters in the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious assault.

At trial, the Crown introduced telephone records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act to rebut the appellant's alibi that he was with his former wife at the time of the offence.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider whether the records were made in the usual and ordinary course of business and their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the records were properly admitted and reliable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 3-year sentence for the vicious attack was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in determining the location of the assault.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the trial judge to infer the assault occurred at the complainant's room based on the absence of a blood trail.

The Court also found that any misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's brother's cooperation with police was not material to the result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

The Court of Appeal applied the standard of review from R. v. Owen, assessing whether the Board's risk assessment and disposition order was unreasonable.

The Court found the disposition was reasonable and represented the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for a 1978 murder.

After years of gradual release, he resumed substance abuse and the Review Board ordered his continued detention at a psychiatric hospital, finding him a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's order as unreasonable and directed an absolute discharge, while refusing to admit fresh evidence of recent violent behaviour.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not unreasonable given its expertise and the evidence of the respondent's resumed cocaine use.

The Court also held that the fresh evidence should have been admitted in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed the dispositions of the Ontario Review Board and the verdict of unfit to stand trial made by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that the fitness hearing should have been conducted by a judge and jury under s. 672.26 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict of unfit to stand trial, declaring the proceeding a nullity, and referred the matter back to the trial court for a fitness hearing before a judge and jury.

The Ontario Review Board's determination was also set aside.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis, including clear expert opinion on continuing danger, risk assessment, and the appellant's ability to manage his behaviour, to support the Board's decision.

The 15-year-old first offender appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give apparent weight to the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation.

Noting that the appellant had completed the secure custody portion of his disposition and done well, the Court granted leave to appeal, struck out the open custody portion, and maintained the probation term.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds: lack of juror impartiality, admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's instruction on discreditable conduct evidence, and the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, noting that defence counsel at trial was satisfied with the juror inquiries and that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of collusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm against his wife.

At trial, the wife recanted her initial statements to police, testifying that her injuries were caused by an accidental fall.

The trial judge admitted her prior statements to police for their truth under the K.G.B. exception to the hearsay rule, but provided minimal reasons for finding the statements reliable despite the absence of an oath or video recording.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons for admitting the hearsay evidence, particularly given the contradictory evidence regarding the circumstances under which the statements were made.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 4 months.

The appellant had confined his former girlfriend in the trunk of her car, bound her, and placed a plastic bag and canvas bag over her head secured with duct tape.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions regarding the use of the plastic bag and the appellant's subjective intent to kill were supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the threat conviction, noting it did not require proof of a weapon.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered the aggravating factors, including the domestic context and breach of bail.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his transfer from a medium security facility to a maximum security facility (Oak Ridge).

The appellant conceded he posed a significant threat to public safety but argued the Board unreasonably assessed issues of risk and trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonably supported by uncontradicted expert evidence regarding the appellant's lack of progress, risk level, and need for a highly structured environment.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his infant daughter, who died from extensive intracranial bleeding.

The Crown alleged the death was caused by severe shaking, supported by extensive expert medical testimony.

The appellant appealed, seeking to introduce fresh expert evidence from a forensic neuropathologist and arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment, admitting certain expert evidence, and instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and conflicting medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria, and the jury instructions adequately conveyed the necessary legal principles.

The appellant sought prerogative writ relief to prohibit a Superior Court judge from proceeding with sentencing, arguing the judge lacked jurisdiction to order a psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that prerogative writ relief does not lie against a Superior Court judge's decision absent a constitutional violation.

The Court further noted the application was an improper attempt to circumvent the rule against interlocutory appeals in criminal trials.

The matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his former girlfriend with a machete.

Prior to sentencing, he brought a motion to strike his guilty plea, claiming he was confused and did not understand the proceedings.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant comprehended the plea and inferring that his trial counsel had properly ensured he understood its nature and consequences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, noting that a guilty plea entered by a represented accused is presumed valid and the appellant failed to discharge the onus of proving otherwise.

The appellant appealed a decision of a motions judge who denied an order of prohibition and upheld the trial judge's order for a psychiatric assessment under the Mental Health Act for sentencing purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the conclusion that the trial judge exercised her discretion judiciously to obtain information for sentencing, and finding no evidence of bias.

The accused was previously found unfit to stand trial on two charges of first degree murder.

The Ontario Review Board subsequently determined he was fit to stand trial and ordered him returned to court.

The accused sought to appeal the Review Board's opinion.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that there is no statutory right of appeal from a Review Board's opinion on fitness under section 672.48 of the Criminal Code, and no interlocutory appeals exist in criminal matters.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction on two grounds: a reasonable apprehension of bias and misdirection to the jury.

The trial judge had previously acted for the appellant in an earlier appeal of the same charge, creating an appearance of bias despite the appellant's consent to the judge presiding.

Additionally, the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the complainant's delayed emotional outburst and complaint, improperly suggesting it could corroborate her account.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants challenged convictions for conspiracy to rob, robbery, and accessory after the fact arising from a violent pizza store robbery committed by co-accused.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge was materially deficient because it failed to present the defence theory, failed to relate the evidence to the issues, inadequately instructed on the three-step conspiracy analysis, and did not properly limit the use of co-accused statements and guilty pleas.

Additional errors were found in the response to a jury question, the accessory-after-the-fact mens rea instruction, and the absence of a proper after-the-fact conduct instruction.

Although the refusal of severance disclosed no reversible error, the cumulative charge errors precluded application of the curative proviso.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, who had a long history of psychiatric disorders and was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions governing the disposition of NCR accused.

He argued that section 672.54 of the Criminal Code violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada, relying on its concurrent decision in Winko, held that the provisions do not violate the Charter as they are carefully crafted to protect the liberty of the NCR accused while ensuring public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.