Daisy E. McCabe-Lokos

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude his post-arrest statement to police, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter and arguing the statement was involuntary.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach occurred when an officer questioned the accused en route to the station before he spoke to counsel, but admitted the subsequent 13-hour interview statement under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the remaining Charter claims and found the statement voluntary, concluding the accused was not overborne by the length of the interview or the officer's use of the Reid technique, but rather chose to speak after being confronted with overwhelming incriminating evidence.

During a murder trial, the accused brought a mid-trial application to admit an additional portion of a deceased witness's video-recorded statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown opposed the admission.

The court found that while necessity was established, the statement lacked threshold reliability due to unmitigated hearsay dangers related to perception and narration.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The applicant applied to reopen and reconsider a prior ruling that his post-arrest confession to two murders was voluntary.

The application was based on the subsequent exclusion of internet search queries under s. 24(2) of the Charter, which had been put to the applicant during his police interview.

The court dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances because the police acted in good faith using a presumptively valid warrant at the time of the interview.

The court concluded that the subsequent inadmissibility of the evidence did not render the police conduct oppressive or affect the voluntariness of the statement.

The applicants brought a pre-trial application to excise certain passages from transcripts of intercepted private communications, arguing the audio was inaudible and the transcripts would prejudice the jury.

The court dismissed the application, applying established law that the audio recordings are the evidence and the jury may use the transcripts as an aid.

The court found that the jury, properly instructed, could resolve disputes about the accuracy of the transcripts by listening to the recordings and considering cross-examination.

The co-accused applied to sever a second-degree murder count from two first-degree murder counts on the same indictment.

The co-accused argued that the stronger evidence on the first two counts, including a confession, would cause moral and reasoning prejudice on the third count, where the cause of death was disputed.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, as all three deceased were members of the same family involved in an ongoing child custody dispute.

The court also found that count-to-count similar fact evidence was likely admissible to prove identity, and that the interests of justice, including avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings, favoured a joint trial.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an omnibus motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude three categories of evidence obtained through various s. 8 Charter breaches: a PDF of a lock found on a cellphone, banking records, and internet search queries found on a laptop.

The court applied the Grant framework to each category.

The court admitted the PDF evidence, finding the police acted in good faith and the breach was at the lower end of the seriousness scale.

The court excluded the banking records, finding the production order was overbroad and based on a misleading Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also excluded the internet search queries, finding a pattern of police misconduct, including misleading testimony, alteration of investigative records, and failure to disclose unauthorized access to the applicants' email accounts, which severely impacted the applicants' Charter-protected interests and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if admitted.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault against his former domestic partner.

The court found as fact that the offender engaged in non-consensual digital penetration, forced fellatio, and attempted intercourse.

The offender, a permanent resident and pastor, faced deportation without a right of appeal if sentenced to more than six months.

The court held that while immigration consequences are relevant, they cannot dominate the sentencing process.

The court sentenced the offender to 20 months' incarceration, finding a reformatory sentence appropriate given the gravity of the offence and the offender's lack of criminal record.

This ruling addresses whether the applicants, Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore, had a reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in data stored on a 'loaner phone' provided by police after their original phone was seized.

The court applied the totality of circumstances test, considering the subject matter (data), the applicants' interest in it, their subjective expectation, and its objective reasonableness.

The court found that the applicants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data on the loaner phone, primarily because police had previously informed Ms. Merritt that a warrant would be required to access data on their seized family phone, fostering a reasonable belief that the same protection would apply to the replacement device.

Five appellants convicted of drug-related offences appealed their convictions, challenging the application judge's admission of evidence obtained pursuant to wiretap authorizations under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants argued that the application judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by failing to adequately recognize the impact of prior police misconduct and by not giving appropriate effect to findings of serious carelessness in the affidavits.

Ba Tuan Tran also appealed his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding the application judge's analysis fair, balanced, and correct.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a preliminary screening motion to determine whether they could adduce evidence of additional alleged Charter violations on their upcoming s. 24(2) application.

They sought to introduce evidence of violations of third parties' rights, other violations of their own rights, and unconstitutional police practices in unrelated investigations to establish a 'pattern of abuse' under Grant.

The court held the applicants lacked standing to assert third-party rights and rejected evidence of unrelated police practices.

For the applicants' own rights, the court permitted evidence of additional violations only where they met the Goldhart nexus test or had sufficient probative value to demonstrate a pattern of abuse without consuming disproportionate judicial resources.

The applicants, charged with multiple murders, brought an application to exclude electronic intercepts and tracking warrant evidence, alleging violations of section 8 of the Charter.

The application challenged the necessity of judicial authorization for police email exchanges in an undercover operation, the police's actions in repacking belongings containing listening devices, and the validity of a tracking warrant based on alleged material errors and omissions in the information to obtain.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email communications, that police actions regarding the trailer were within the scope of implied invitation, and that the tracking warrant was valid.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Charter application alleging s. 8 violations regarding the search of a trailer on their property and the subsequent warrantless seizure and technological examination of laptops and USB drives found inside.

The court held that the initial search of the trailer was lawfully executed because police took control of the premises within the time specified in the warrant.

The warrantless seizure of the electronic devices was justified under s. 489 of the Criminal Code as the officers had reasonable grounds to believe they would afford evidence.

However, the court found s. 8 violations occurred when an officer conducted a warrantless preview of a USB drive, when the subsequent search warrant failed to authorize a technological examination, and when detention orders were improperly extended.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained by police from Walmart and CIBC.

The police obtained CCTV footage and a transaction receipt from Walmart without a warrant, and basic account information from CIBC prior to obtaining a production order.

The court found the applicants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CCTV footage, the transaction receipt, or the limited banking information provided to police.

However, the court found the subsequent production order issued to CIBC was overbroad and invalid.

The court declined to sever the valid portions of the production order, concluding that the records produced by CIBC were obtained in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

The applicants brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of their garbage, which included items containing DNA evidence.

The applicants argued they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage and, alternatively, in the DNA information embedded on the items.

Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court found that the applicants had abandoned the garbage by placing it out for municipal collection.

The court further held that the abandonment of the garbage effectively constituted the abandonment of any privacy interest in the DNA information it contained.

The application to exclude the evidence under section 8 of the Charter was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a cell phone seized from one of the accused without a warrant during a police interview.

The accused alleged violations of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was not detained during the interview, so s. 10(b) was not violated.

The warrantless seizure of the cell phone was lawful under s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code due to exigent circumstances.

The court also held that the accused lacked standing to challenge searches of the deceased's cell phone and email, and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in basic subscriber information.

However, the court found that the search warrant subsequently obtained to examine the contents of the seized cell phone was facially invalid because it did not authorize a technological search, resulting in a s. 8 violation.

The court concluded that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was sufficient to have supported a proper warrant.

The determination of whether to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) was deferred.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements made by two deceased victims in a first-degree murder trial.

The statements were evaluated under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court ruled that three statements made by one victim were inadmissible because necessity was not established, as better quality evidence was available, and their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

However, a statement made by the second victim was ruled admissible, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability without undue prejudicial effect.

The applicant, Godday Dadzie, sought release via habeas corpus from immigration detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

He had been detained since 2014, primarily due to being a flight risk and issues with establishing his identity and country of origin, exacerbated by his lack of cooperation.

The court considered whether his detention was "very lengthy" and of "uncertain duration" factoring in the nature of the detention facility and the applicant's non-cooperation.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not exceptionally lengthy when accounting for his lack of cooperation, nor was its duration uncertain due to his own obstructionist tactics.

The application was dismissed, as the court concluded that the detention was for a valid immigration purpose, not arbitrary, and consistent with fundamental justice principles.

Following interception of a parcel from India containing heroin hidden in pneumatic valve joints, police conducted a controlled delivery to a former rooming house address connected to the accused.

The trial judge rejected the accused’s denial of knowledge and found his police statement and supporting defence evidence to be fabricated.

Applying circumstantial-evidence principles, the court relied on the value of the heroin, the accused’s surveillance-like driving, his acceptance of delivery for a former tenant, the removal of the shipping wrapper, and cellphone evidence linking him to the tracking number and communications from India.

The court held that the accused knowingly possessed heroin for the purpose of trafficking, aided the importation, and was a party to a conspiracy to import heroin.

On a pre-trial voir dire in a jury murder prosecution, the Crown sought admission of two utterances allegedly made by the accused to persons in authority.

The court held the first utterance, made upon arrest for a separate firearm discharge offence, was voluntary and had an adequate evidentiary link to that shooting to permit its admission, with the ultimate interpretation left to the jury.

The court rejected the argument that the Crown was required to call every officer present between arrest and the utterance.

The second utterance, made after an assault on a Crown witness in courthouse cells, was excluded because it did not reasonably support an inference of witness intimidation and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

In a jury trial on four counts of first degree murder, the accused sought exclusion of proposed motive evidence tendered by the Crown.

The court held that evidence suggesting the accused wished to impress a mentor with an authentic reputation for violence had a sufficient logical connection to the alleged shooting to satisfy relevance.

The court further held that evidence of the accused having been shot in the same area in 2001 was admissible, not as proof of a generalized animus to the neighbourhood, but as part of the explanation for the choice of location.

The defence submission that the evidence would invite speculative reasoning akin to post-traumatic stress was rejected, and the motive evidence was admitted subject to strict limits ensuring no inference other than that the accused had been an innocent victim in 2001.