Lindsay Karla Bandini

The accused was charged with committing an indecent act by exposing his genitals and masturbating in a public place on a highway in the presence of a minor, and with criminal harassment by repeatedly following the minor and causing her to fear for her safety.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence relating to a subsequent incident on Highway 401.

The court admitted the similar fact evidence and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused subsequently brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the total delay of 17 months and 5 days (after deducting defence delay) fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court proceedings.

The accused, Michael Allen, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to his six-month-old stepson, Hayden Ouellette-Meissner, after the infant sustained bilateral humeral fractures.

The defense admitted the injuries but disputed causation, arguing they were accidental.

The court heard conflicting expert medical opinions from a pediatrician specializing in child abuse (Dr. Nolan) and a pediatric orthopedic surgeon (Dr. Wedge).

Dr. Nolan found the injuries highly suspicious for inflicted injury and inconsistent with the proposed accidental mechanism.

Dr. Wedge suggested an accidental mechanism involving the infant's arms getting caught in couch cushions during a fall, though his testimony was found less persuasive and inconsistent.

The court, applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Griffin, found that while the case was highly suspicious, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the fractures, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for impaired driving and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit, alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The defendant was charged on February 21, 2015, and the application was heard on November 2, 2016, representing a 16-month delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the delay was not unreasonable under both the pre-Jordan and post-Jordan frameworks.

The court attributed significant delay to the defendant's counsel's actions, including the decision to insist on a one-day trial slot rather than accepting a two-day slot or seeking an earlier date.

The court found no prejudice to the defendant and emphasized the societal interest in trying drinking and driving cases on their merits.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single motor vehicle collision on February 29, 2015.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d), arguing that statements made to police prior to arrest were compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and that he was detained without being informed of his rights.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the accused was not detained during the initial police encounter, which was a preliminary investigation of the accident scene.

The court found the accused's statements were voluntary and not compelled.

The breath samples were properly obtained and admissible.

The court convicted the accused on the impaired driving charge and entered a conditional stay on the over 80 charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for circumstantial evidence, particularly by requiring reasonable doubt to be based on proven facts, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly assessed the circumstantial evidence.

The court held that the alternative explanations for the appellant's erratic driving (weather, medical issue, searching for an item) were speculative and not reasonable inferences from the evidence, especially when combined with the indicia of alcohol consumption.

The court also clarified that while reasonable doubt can arise from a lack of evidence, the alternative explanations themselves must be reasonable, not merely hypothetical.

The accused was charged with assaulting his common-law partner and assaulting her daughter with a wine bottle.

The court first addressed a Charter application seeking to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b), which was dismissed for non-compliance with Criminal Rules.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty of assaulting the common-law partner but acquitted him of assaulting the daughter with a weapon.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable due to intoxication and inconsistencies, while accepting the complainant's evidence as credible and coherent.

The accused was charged with invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, and sexual interference against his daughter between July 10, 2014 and December 23, 2014.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial turned on the credibility and reliability of the child complainant's testimony.

The court found the complainant to be both credible and reliable despite certain inconsistencies in her evidence, which were assessed in light of her age and the distinction between credibility and reliability.

The court rejected the defence argument that the complainant had fabricated the allegations or learned about sexual acts from other sources.

The court found the Crown had proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused applied to exclude the Intoxilyzer test results pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, thereby violating rights under s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court found that while the officer subjectively believed reasonable and probable grounds existed, the belief was not objectively reasonable.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the long-term interests of the administration of justice favoured exclusion.

Both charges were dismissed.

A 17-year-old youth pleaded guilty to four counts of internet luring, one count of possession of child pornography, and eleven counts of extortion.

The offences occurred over a two-and-a-half-month period between May and August 2014, involving the solicitation of explicit images from minors via Facebook and subsequent threats to publish those images unless additional images were provided.

The youth targeted vulnerable victims, including a 12-year-old, a 13-year-old, and a 15-year-old autistic girl.

The court imposed a custodial sentence with conditions addressing the serious nature of the offences, the youth's lack of remorse and insight, and his pattern of breaching court orders.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by a drug, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the defendant drove erratically after voluntarily consuming Alprazolam (Xanax), a non-prescribed anti-anxiety drug obtained from a friend, in addition to his prescribed Clonazepam.

The defendant argued he had developed tolerance to his prescribed medication over several years and did not intend to drive while impaired.

The court found that the defendant's voluntary ingestion of the non-prescribed drug, combined with his prior knowledge of its effects and warnings against mixing drugs, established the requisite mens rea for the offence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with two offences: having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol, and refusing to comply with a lawful demand to provide breath samples.

The Crown proved that the defendant was intoxicated and that police had reasonable and probable grounds to demand a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision.

The defendant claimed insufficient evidence of care and control and argued his injuries provided a reasonable excuse for refusing the breath demand.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the impaired charge but convicted on the refusal charge, finding the defendant's injuries did not provide a reasonable excuse and that his conduct in the breath room demonstrated his refusal was not medically motivated.