Craig Harper

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on sexual offences.

The appeal was initially argued and decided on the mistaken premise that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for dismissing a similar fact application.

After the initial appellate decision was released, the court was made aware that the trial judge had delivered the promised reasons.

In these supplementary reasons, the concurring judge, who would have originally allowed the appeal due to inadequate reasons, reviewed the newly discovered reasons and found no error.

The appeal was dismissed.

Crown appeal from a jury acquittal on sexual assault and related charges involving a teen complainant.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in excluding proposed similar fact evidence arising from the respondent's prior conviction for a sexual assault against another teenage complainant.

The majority held that the trial judge applied the correct Handy framework, that the probative value of the single prior incident was relatively low given the generic similarities and substantial prejudice risk, and that the exclusionary ruling should stand.

Although the jury charge on legal consent was erroneous because the complainant was under 16, the majority found no substantial wrong in light of the acquittal on the properly charged sexual interference count.

A dissent would have found the reasons inadequate and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The convictions rested primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to exercise necessary caution in accepting the accomplice's evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the accomplice's subsequent sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency, and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness and made no reversible error in assessing credibility.

The applicant, convicted of fraud and sentenced to 5.5 years in prison with significant restitution and fines, applied for the appointment of counsel for his appeal under s. 684 of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal primarily contested factual findings and lacked merit.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to adequately explain the whereabouts of the defrauded funds or prove his lack of financial means, and the court concluded he was capable of advancing his own arguments given his business experience and the materials prepared by his trial counsel.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, threatening, and breach of probation, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting two out-of-court statements from the complainant, alleging a failure to properly assess threshold reliability factors such as drug use and motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to these issues and properly admitted the statements, noting the complainant denied drug use during the interviews and was fully available for cross-examination at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault after witnesses observed him repeatedly kissing an 11-year-old girl in his truck.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately analyze whether the conduct was for a sexual purpose or occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the repeated kissing between a 44-year-old man and an 11-year-old girl was of a sexual nature was supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the conviction appeal, noting that the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by evidence of fresh injuries, a 911 call, and civilian witnesses.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed appropriate given the appellant's record of 85 previous convictions, including domestic-related assaults.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and failed to explain the marked departure finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and firearm-related offences, as well as his 11-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended medical and gunshot residue evidence, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 11-year sentence as fit but granted leave to vary the pre-sentence custody credit to 1.5:1 in accordance with R. v. Summers.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing a certiorari application arising from a preliminary inquiry committal in a homicide prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her limited jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences reasonably available on the evidence and by preferring the inference favourable to the appellants.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence was incapable of placing one appellant within the scheme to do violence, holding that any relative weakness in the evidence was irrelevant at the committal stage.

The appeals were dismissed.

The accused was tried for multiple offences relating to the possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and Ketamine found in a vehicle he was driving.

The accused argued he had no knowledge of the contraband, and a passenger testified that the items belonged to him.

The court rejected the passenger's evidence as not credible and found that the accused, as the principal driver, had constructive possession of the items.

Alternatively, the court found the accused was wilfully blind to the presence of the firearm.

The accused was found guilty on all remaining counts.

During a criminal trial involving armed robbery and firearms offences, the Crown sought admission of three oral statements and one video statement made by the accused while in custody.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the statements were voluntary under the confessions rule.

The court found that the accused’s initial spontaneous remark to a police officer while being escorted to a washroom was voluntary and admissible.

However, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that subsequent statements made during an unrecorded 52‑minute discussion with police and the resulting video statement were voluntary, particularly given concerns about possible inducements and the absence of a reliable recording of the interrogation.

The later statements were therefore ruled inadmissible.

The Crown sought judicial review by certiorari of a preliminary inquiry decision discharging multiple accused charged with murder, manslaughter, and attempted murder arising from a fatal shooting outside a nightclub.

The preliminary inquiry judge concluded there was insufficient evidence connecting the accused to the handgun used in the shooting and discharged all accused.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences and weighing the evidence beyond the permissible “limited weighing” required for circumstantial cases under R. v. Arcuri.

The evidence supported reasonable inferences of motive, means, opportunity, and a joint enterprise to ambush the victims, and the judge improperly preferred an inference favourable to the accused.

The discharges were therefore quashed and the accused were ordered committed to stand trial.

The appellant appealed from convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in his approach to collusion between complainants, failed to address a specific defence submission, and unreasonably admitted a videotaped statement after a two-year delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the potential tainting of evidence, that the omitted defence submission would not have affected the outcome, and that the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion to admit the videotaped statement given the reasons for the delayed disclosure.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and breaking and entering, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a co-perpetrator's out-of-court statement, failed to properly caution himself about unsavoury witnesses, and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a witness's recantation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement was properly admitted, the trial judge did not need to explicitly articulate a Vetrovec warning to himself, and the fresh evidence of the recantation was incredible and lacked sufficient impeachment value to affect the verdict.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for murder, specifically the increase of the period of parole ineligibility to 15 years.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made no error of principle in inferring that the appellant had a controlling attitude toward women and that the murder involved an aspect of planning.

The sentence was within the appropriate range, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a government employee, was convicted of fraud on the government and breach of trust after directing government funding applicants to a consulting firm that subcontracted work to his wife's company.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misinterpreted s. 121(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and erred in admitting offshore banking documents obtained contrary to foreign law.

He also appealed his six-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 121(1)(c) does not require the accused to personally benefit when a family member receives the benefit, the admission of the banking documents did not render the trial unfair, and the sentence was fit given the need for general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for domestic assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample evidence to support them.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant in the community.

The trial judge based this on the appellant's lack of motivation to change, directly contradicting unanimous expert psychiatric evidence that strict external controls would be effective regardless of motivation.

The dangerous offender designation was set aside and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm after his truck collided with a van.

He fled the scene and claimed he consumed alcohol only after returning home.

The trial judge rejected his evidence, drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his mother and a friend to corroborate his post-accident drinking, and finding he lied about a conversation based on a misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the evidence and improperly drawing an adverse inference against the accused for failing to call confirmatory evidence.

The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, while the sentence appeal for failing to remain and public mischief was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and breach of recognizance, as well as his life sentence for attempted murder.

The victim was shot six times at point-blank range and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence, which included recognition by the victim and an independent witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exemplary assessment of the identification evidence.

The court also upheld the life sentence, finding it proportionate to the grave, unprovoked nature of the crime and the need to deter gun violence in public places.