Craig Harper

The appellant, B.J.T., was convicted of two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault for shaving his daughter's pubic hair at her request in 2011 (when she was 13) and again in 2013 (when she was 15).

The trial judge struck down the mandatory minimum sentences as unconstitutional and imposed minimal sentences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the 2011 sexual interference conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to adequately address the specific intent requirement.

The Court dismissed appeals on the 2013 convictions and upheld the sentencing decisions, including the finding that the mandatory minimum sentences violated the Charter.

The appellant appealed a December 13, 2018 Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention on a General Forensic Unit at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant had been on conditional discharge and did not attend his Board hearing on December 10, 2018.

His counsel requested an adjournment without providing reasons or a timeframe.

The appellant argued the Board denied him procedural fairness by rejecting the adjournment request and proceeding in his absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Board's discretionary decision to proceed with the hearing.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code concerning the Ontario Review Board's disposition restricting the liberty of a person in forensic custody.

The appellant, detained for 35 years following a brutal sexual assault conviction, challenged the Board's finding that he posed a continuing threat to public safety.

The appellant also raised procedural fairness concerns regarding the Board's refusal to issue a summons for surveillance tapes, withholding staff names, and declining to address Charter arguments raised only in submissions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's substantive findings but struck one provision of the order regarding an independent assessment due to lack of notice to the parties.

The accused pleaded guilty to eight counts of first-degree murder for the killings of eight men over a seven-year period.

The Crown sought consecutive periods of parole ineligibility totaling 50 years under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code, while the defence sought concurrent periods totaling 25 years.

The court weighed the horrific nature of the crimes, the impact on the victims' families and the LGBTQ community, and the accused's age of 67.

Given the accused's early guilty plea, which spared the community a traumatic trial, and the fact that he would be 91 years old before being eligible to apply for parole, the court ordered the 25-year parole ineligibility periods to run concurrently.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of contempt of court for refusing to disclose the identity of an alleged third party who he claimed was the actual murderer.

The trial judge sentenced him to three years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by sentencing him on the basis that he may have been the murderer and by failing to credit pre-trial custody.

The majority dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's language was contextual and did not impact the sentence.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to two years, finding the trial judge improperly considered the possibility of the appellant's guilt and failed to credit pre-trial incarceration as relevant information.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, cocaine, and drug proceeds, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant possessed a Browning semi-automatic handgun, cocaine, and a scale that were discovered in the snow outside a bedroom window after the appellant fled a police-surveilled apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge should not have inferred that he personally placed these items outside, contending that others could have thrown them or that a young person who also fled could have dropped them.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding that the trial judge's inference was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's clothing capacity, his crouching action near the items, and the lack of opportunity for others to have disposed of them.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel on appeal pursuant to section 684(1) of the Criminal Code following his conviction for second-degree murder and life sentence.

The initial application was dismissed on the basis that the applicant had not established insufficient means to retain counsel.

On renewal, the applicant provided comprehensive financial disclosure including tax returns, property assessment, and pension information, along with evidence of a separation agreement executed prior to trial.

The court found the applicant had insufficient means and appointed counsel, conditional upon the applicant entering into a contribution agreement to pay $500 per month toward legal expenses commencing April 1, 2018.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an incident involving an argument and physical interaction between the appellant and a passenger, during which the appellant's vehicle struck and injured the passenger and collided with a retaining wall.

The appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no inconsistency between the acquittals and the conviction, and upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle warranting intervention.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an acrimonious divorce and custody/access dispute with his ex-wife.

The appellant alleged the trial judge demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias through improper intervention, unequal scrutiny of evidence, and imposing a sentence significantly exceeding Crown submissions.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in imposing a sentence substantially longer than Crown submissions without prior notice and opportunity for further submissions.

The sentence was reduced from 18 months to 12 months imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal of a conviction.

The appellant raised two grounds: an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and an argument that the fee arrangement with his counsel constituted a prohibited contingency fee under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's evidence regarding ineffective assistance to be totally incredible and rejected the contingency fee argument as having no basis on the record.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant was convicted of 28 counts of fraud over $5,000 in connection with a Ponzi scheme involving three accused persons and losses exceeding $2,000,000.

He appealed his convictions and sentence on grounds of delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that while the total delay of 59½ months exceeded the presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework, it was justified by defence delay, discrete events (including the co-accused's illness), case complexity, and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on the parties' reasonable reliance on the Morin framework.

The jury instructions were found to be fair and balanced when reviewed as a whole.

The appellant, a man in his early 70s, appealed both his conviction and sentence for two counts of sexual assault of young girls (ages 12 and 9).

He pleaded guilty following plea negotiations and was sentenced to two years less a day in custody plus three years' probation.

On appeal, he alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, rendering his guilty pleas involuntary and the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal found that the guilty pleas were voluntary and informed, that trial counsel provided reasonably competent advice, and that the sentence was fit and justified by the multiple incidents of sexual assault.

The court also identified that the sentence for one count was technically illegal as it exceeded the maximum available on summary conviction, but found that consecutive sentences were available and the overall sentence remained appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a 2½-year-old child in his care and assault causing bodily harm.

He was acquitted of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the jury instructions were inadequate, that the murder conviction was unreasonable, and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the jury was properly instructed, that the evidence supported the murder conviction, and that the verdicts were reconcilable based on their different elements and temporal distinctions.

On sentencing, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of his Aboriginal status, which was admitted but found insufficient to warrant a reduction in the 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed convictions under s. 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code for driving while disqualified.

The appellant also challenged a forfeiture order that included his pick-up truck, alleged that police seized items outside the scope of the forfeiture order, and sought variation of a probation condition prohibiting possession of housebreaking tools that prevented him from working in construction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and forfeiture order but approved a variation of the probation condition to permit possession of tools required for his livelihood, subject to prior written approval of his probation officer.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for criminal harassment appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that he constituted a significant threat to public safety and should be transferred between secure forensic units.

The appellant had been detained in the mental health system for over ten years.

Fresh evidence from the appellant's treating psychiatrist and a clinical forensic psychologist using a stalking-specific risk assessment tool concluded the appellant no longer posed a significant threat and was entitled to an absolute discharge.

The majority allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Board for fresh determination.

The dissenting judge would have granted an absolute discharge directly, finding the fresh evidence uncontradicted and unequivocal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from a conviction for assault, criminal harassment, and mischief to property.

The charges arose from an altercation with his girlfriend following a Raptors game, during which he spat on her, subsequently destroyed her property worth approximately $1,000, and engaged in threatening communications.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial with appointed counsel assisting in cross-examination, raised grounds including failure to provide reasonable assistance to a self-represented accused, reasonable apprehension of bias, and failure to consider essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the issues lacked significance for the general administration of justice and that the summary conviction appeal court judge had correctly articulated the governing legal principles and properly rejected each ground of appeal.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, unlawful confinement, and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in admitting his second statement to police.

The appellant had requested counsel after arrest but was questioned by the first officer, resulting in a first statement.

After consulting with duty counsel for four to five minutes, he was interviewed by a different officer and gave a substantially similar second statement.

The trial judge admitted the second statement, finding it was not tainted by the first.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the wrong legal test and that the second statement was tainted by the first statement obtained in breach of the appellant's right to counsel.

The court excluded both statements under section 24(2) of the Charter and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of arson under sections 433 and 434 of the Criminal Code for deliberately setting fire to his two-storey building in Espanola with the intent to collect insurance proceeds.

The Crown's case relied on evidence of motive, planning, preparation, forensic evidence linking the appellant to the fire, and testimony from a disreputable witness who was likely an accomplice.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: that the trial judge improperly used neutral evidence to confirm the accomplice's account, misused the appellant's exculpatory statements as evidence of guilt, improperly excluded relevant evidence through misapplication of the collateral fact rule, and engaged in speculative reasoning inconsistent with the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made some errors, they were not material to the conviction given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several violent offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering that he remain subject to a detention order.

The appellant argued the Board erred by denying his request for a conditional discharge and failing to conduct an individualized assessment of risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant had limited insight into his mental illness, minimized his offences, and required a managed transition into the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and driving while disqualified following a fatal snowmobile accident.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the appellant's statements, application of the burden of proof, or admission of reply evidence.