Heather Pringle

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered after pleading guilty to carrying a concealed weapon contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had elected to proceed by indictment.

The critical issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to receive the guilty plea.

The appellant was entitled to elect his mode of trial under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code, but was never put to his election.

The court found that the failure to comply with the election requirements went to the jurisdiction of the trial court and could not be cured by the procedural proviso.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal on second degree murder and conviction for manslaughter.

The respondent stabbed and killed his girlfriend, admitting to the killing but claiming lack of intent for murder or alternatively acting under provocation.

The jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown advanced two grounds of appeal: whether the trial judge erred in leaving the provocation defence with the jury, and whether expert psychiatric evidence was admissible.

The appellate court dismissed the first ground, finding the Crown could not advance a contradictory position on appeal after accepting provocation was available at trial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding significant portions of the psychiatrist's evidence regarding the accused's disposition and mental state were inadmissible as they invaded the jury's province and went beyond the proper scope of expert psychiatric opinion.

The court ordered a new trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample following a three-vehicle motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a lawful demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the demand on four grounds: lack of subjective reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption, lack of objective reasonableness, absence of evidence of driving within three hours, and failure to convey the mandatory nature of the demand.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect based on the defendant's statement regarding his G-2 driver's licence jeopardy and that the defendant was driving within the relevant timeframe.

However, the court found the officer's presentation of the demand created ambiguity regarding its mandatory nature, leaving reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant actually refused or misunderstood his obligations.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code based on 55 images found in the temporary Internet files on a shared computer.

The trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding how images are automatically cached in temporary Internet files, incorrectly concluding the appellant had deliberately downloaded the images.

The summary conviction appeal judge similarly misapprehended the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and set aside the conviction, finding that accessing child pornography is not a lesser included offence of possession, and that amending the information to charge accessing would prejudice the appellant.

The appellant appealed convictions under s. 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code for driving while disqualified.

The appellant also challenged a forfeiture order that included his pick-up truck, alleged that police seized items outside the scope of the forfeiture order, and sought variation of a probation condition prohibiting possession of housebreaking tools that prevented him from working in construction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and forfeiture order but approved a variation of the probation condition to permit possession of tools required for his livelihood, subject to prior written approval of his probation officer.

On appeal from convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession, the appellants challenged the trial judge's findings.

The appellants, common law spouses, were convicted of two counts of possession of oxycodone and Percocet for trafficking purposes, and one count of simple possession of methadone.

The trial judge found both appellants in joint possession and guilty of trafficking.

The appellants appealed on grounds including misuse of prejudicial evidence regarding child endangerment and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the trial judge improperly admitted and relied upon evidence of child endangerment to infer trafficking intent, and that there was insufficient evidence of the mens rea required for the respondent's conviction.

Judge-alone criminal trial on historical allegations of sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 16 arising from alleged incidents in a shared household.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's blanket denial, but nonetheless found that the totality of the evidence left a reasonable doubt, particularly given the circumstances of the alleged incidents, the prior partial disclosure evidence, and reliability concerns arising from the complainant's later use of the allegation during a separate confrontation.

The Crown therefore failed to prove either count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned after he failed to perfect it, and a subsequent application to re-open the appeal was denied.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and to introduce fresh evidence regarding a surveillance video and a deportation order resulting from his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found it had jurisdiction under s. 839 of the Criminal Code, admitted the fresh evidence regarding the deportation order, and allowed the appeal in part, permitting the applicant to re-open his summary conviction appeal as it relates to sentence only.

The Lewis cousins were found guilty of aggravated assault following a jury trial, resulting from an attack that left Ryan Turcotte with a severe brain injury.

This decision outlines their sentences.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the unprovoked group attack, Turcotte's defenselessness, the high likelihood of serious injury, the extent of the injury, and the offenders fleeing the scene.

Mitigating factors included their youth, lack of prior criminal record, solid academic and work histories, strong family and community support, and the out-of-character nature of the offence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives, imposing a sentence of two years less a day incarceration followed by three years probation for each offender, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year firearm prohibition, DNA sample provision, and no-contact orders.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a group altercation outside a restaurant.

At trial, the judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was engaged in a consensual two-punch fight or acting in self-defence, instead accepting the Crown witnesses' evidence that the appellant and his friends engaged in a one-sided attack on the complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, and erred in assessing reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a home invasion where the victim was shot in the chest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of a Vetrovec witness, in admitting a gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He also argued the sentence violated the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the witness or the s. 24(2) analysis, and rejected the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the shooting was a cold-blooded assault resulting in near-fatal injuries.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking exclusion of a police interview statement on the basis that their right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was breached.

The detainee repeatedly requested to speak with a specific lawyer, but police made limited efforts to contact that lawyer and suggested duty counsel after learning the requested lawyer practised civil litigation.

The court held that police failed to diligently facilitate the accused’s right to counsel of choice and did not provide the required explanation that questioning would be delayed until a reasonable opportunity to consult that lawyer had occurred.

Applying the test in Grant, the court found the breach serious and potentially impactful on the accused’s decision to speak.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2), although the court held that the statement would otherwise have been voluntary under the confessions rule.

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his 18-month consecutive sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant deposited a shank in a fellow inmate's pocket at a detention centre.

The sole ground of the conviction appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and rejecting the appellant's claims that counsel coerced him not to testify or failed to pursue evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 18-month consecutive sentence fit given the appellant's horrendous criminal record, even when considering the totality principle.

The Crown brought an application to remove defence counsel on the basis of a conflict of interest arising from counsel's prior representation of a key Crown witness, the complainant's mother.

The proposed defence theory involved a sweeping attack on that witness's credibility and alleged fabrication, obstruction, and perjury.

Applying the governing principles respecting counsel of choice, confidentiality, loyalty to former clients, and the appearance of fairness, the court held that public confidence in the administration of justice required disqualification.

The witness's waiver was found uninformed and, in any event, insufficient to overcome the appearance of impropriety.

Partial disqualification was also rejected because the conflict infected the entire defence theory.

The appellant was arrested without a warrant for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police received tips from confidential informants and observed him discarding a digital scale with cocaine residue.

A frisk search yielded cellphones and money but no drugs, prompting a strip search at the police station which uncovered drugs hidden between his buttocks.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest and the decision to strip search were lawful.

However, the Court found that the strip search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating section 8 of the Charter, because the door was left open, the search was videotaped without consent, and the appellant was not given the option to remove the drugs himself.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud under $5,000, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his post-conviction application to reopen the trial to introduce videotape evidence.

The appellant claimed the videotape showed the real perpetrator was someone else.

On consent of the Crown, the Court of Appeal reviewed the videotape and concluded there was a reasonable possibility of misidentification.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault.

The trial judge had relied on what he characterized as admissions by the appellant to reinforce the complainant's credibility.

The Crown conceded on appeal that the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence, as the appellant had not made those admissions.

The Court of Appeal held that this error vitiated the findings of guilt, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

Four accused were charged with possession of cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking after police intercepted shipping containers from Pakistan containing chromium ore concealing approximately 4.6 metric tons of cannabis resin.

Police removed the drugs and conducted a controlled delivery of a sample to a Toronto warehouse, where the accused were arrested after entering the premises.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including surveillance, fingerprint evidence, and the accused’s association with the shipment and each other.

The court held that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any accused had knowledge or control of the hidden drugs.

Alternative inferences consistent with innocence remained available, including the possibility that the accused were unwitting participants in the shipment’s handling.

Thirty‑three accused sought exclusion of wiretap evidence arising from “Project Marvel,” a large police investigation into shootings, robbery, and organized gang activity in Toronto.

The applicants argued the authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to establish “investigative necessity” under s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and improperly named certain individuals as “known persons” under s. 185(1)(e).

The court applied the deferential Garofoli review standard and held the authorizing judge had a reasonable basis to conclude investigative necessity existed despite alternative investigative techniques such as cell‑phone analysis.

The court further held that the challenged individuals were properly named as targets because interception of their communications could assist the investigation and the statutory threshold is low.

A separate sub‑facial challenge relating to the search of a backyard shed and the curtilage doctrine was also rejected.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including the sale of a half kilogram of heroin to an undercover police officer.

He subsequently brought an application to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing that a police agent induced him to sell the drugs in exchange for documents related to a civil lawsuit.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he had a personal financial stake in the transactions and was not induced by the offer of documents.

The entrapment application was dismissed.