Heather Pringle

The offender, a repeat firearms offender with an extensive criminal record, was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a lifetime weapons prohibition order for the fifth time.

The Crown sought a 20-year sentence, while the defence argued for 7 to 8 years.

The court found that the offender's repeated failure to abide by firearms laws and prior lenient sentences meant rehabilitation was not a significant factor, prioritizing specific deterrence and public protection.

The court imposed a total sentence of 11.5 years, consisting of 9 years for the firearms possession and a consecutive 2.5 years for breaching the prohibition order, reduced to 7.5 years net after granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood‑alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

She argued the trial judge’s extensive interventions during the examination and cross‑examination of a key police witness compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge improperly usurped the role of Crown counsel by conducting most of the examination‑in‑chief, directing witnesses how to answer, and interfering with defence cross‑examination.

Considering the cumulative effect of these interventions, a reasonable observer would conclude that the accused did not receive a fair trial.

The conviction was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and use of a firearm during the commission of an offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown that the conviction under s. 85(1)(a) was statute-barred because its wording specifically excludes a s. 344 offence.

The court set aside the s. 85(1)(a) conviction and entered an acquittal.

The court also agreed that the concurrent sentence for the s. 85(1)(a) offence was illegal.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence for robbery with a firearm, which was based on a joint submission, dismissing the sentence appeal.

The accused applied for production of investigative records from the Special Investigations Unit arising from his arrest during the execution of a search warrant, during which he sustained serious injuries.

The application was brought to support a potential Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under ss. 7, 12, and 24(1).

Applying the framework from R. v. O’Connor, the court balanced the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the confidentiality interests asserted by the SIU.

The court found the SIU witness interviews and follow-up reports highly probative of the circumstances of the arrest and necessary for the accused’s Charter claims.

The privacy interests asserted by the SIU were limited because the statements related to officers performing public duties and confidentiality promises were not absolute.

Production of the reports and interviews to the defence was ordered subject to standard disclosure conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing his actions did not constitute a criminal attempt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to distinguish between the actus reus and mens rea of an attempt.

The Court held that the appellant's inquiries, lacking any follow-up conduct, did not go beyond mere preparation and therefore the actus reus for an attempt was not established.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material through his websites, which featured simulated explicit sex with violence.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in the admission of meta-tags, hyperlinks, written stories, and expert testimony, as well as deficiencies in the jury charge and a failure to grant a stay for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the $28,000 fine as a fit sentence.

The accused was convicted of indecent exposure based primarily on the non-expert recognition evidence of a transit officer who identified him from a surveillance video still.

The trial judge admitted the evidence without a voir dire.

The summary conviction appeal judge found a voir dire should have been held but applied the curative proviso, concluding the evidence would inevitably have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that while the 'prior acquaintance/better position' test applies, it was not inevitable that the evidence would have been admitted had a voir dire revealed the officer's familiarity was based on a single brief encounter two years prior.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to correct an allegation of recent fabrication made by the Crown in closing, and that the Crown's cross-examination improperly invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to call a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown's closing and cross-examination were proper, and noting the trial judge gave the standard instruction that the accused had no obligation to call evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within a reasonable range and not tainted by legal error.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to sexual interference involving a child under 16.

The trial judge had imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 14 days' imprisonment and probation.

The appeal court found multiple errors in principle, including misapprehension of a psychiatric report, failure to properly consider aggravating factors, and improper characterization of the offence as being at the low end of seriousness.

Although the appellate court concluded that the sentence was manifestly unfit and that a range of six to twelve months would ordinarily be appropriate, it declined to intervene due to significant delays and the respondent’s completion of the custodial portion of the sentence and substantial compliance with probation.

The Crown appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 15-month sentence for trafficking in a Schedule 1 drug.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter motion to exclude evidence, claiming the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the officer's reliance on a reliable informant and corroborating observations provided sufficient grounds.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's commercial motive, prior criminal record, and subsequent breach of bail.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association applied on behalf of Salma Jaffer for court-assessed fees above the legal aid rate of $88.00 per hour for work performed as amicus curiae in a serious sexual offence case.

The defendant was charged with multiple serious sexual offences, had difficulty maintaining solicitor-client relationships, and had questionable fitness.

The court appointed Jaffer as amicus to assist in ensuring the preliminary inquiry proceeded while protecting the defendant's fair trial interests.

The court granted the application and set Jaffer's remuneration at $150 per hour, finding that while the legal aid tariff is a significant factor, it is not conclusive and must be balanced against counsel's experience, the importance and complexity of the assignment, and the broader interests of the administration of justice.

The accused applied to strike his guilty plea to a charge of threatening death, arguing that it was not informed, voluntary, or unequivocal due to his mental state, restrictive bail conditions, and a misunderstanding of the plea bargain.

The court found that the accused understood the legal consequences of his plea, was not coerced, and unequivocally admitted the essential facts.

The court concluded that the accused made a tactical decision to plead guilty and only sought to withdraw it upon realizing he might receive a harsher sentence than anticipated.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant laid a private information against his ex-wife alleging perjury, arson, and fraud.

At the pre-enquete, the justice of the peace refused to issue process, finding insufficient evidence.

The appellant applied for an order in lieu of mandamus, which was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the justice erred by failing to consider hearsay evidence under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the justice's refusal was based on the overall insufficiency and speculative nature of the evidence, not merely its inadmissibility, and that evidentiary errors generally do not amount to jurisdictional errors remediable by mandamus.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a home invasion committed against his ex-wife in the presence of their children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence, which included a three-year probation period, to be fit and even lenient given the horrific nature of the offence.

Although the appellant had taken courses while incarcerated to address anger management and addiction issues, the court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day of incarceration for an offence involving supplying alcohol to a 16-year-old CAS ward he was hired to protect and engaging in sexual intercourse with her despite her protests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's moral blameworthiness, which outweighed the restorative objective of a conditional sentence despite his expressions of remorse.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a fatal stabbing during a bar altercation.

At trial, the appellant raised self-defence and sought to introduce the deceased's criminal record and a transcript of a guilty plea to demonstrate the deceased's propensity for violence.

The trial judge excluded this evidence.

Furthermore, in response to a jury question, the trial judge instructed that 'recklessness' for murder meant foreseeing a 'risk' of death rather than a 'likelihood'.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in excluding the propensity evidence and in the jury charge on recklessness.

The curative proviso was not applied, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial for first degree murder.

The preliminary hearing judge had committed the appellant based on the theory that the murder occurred during a sexual assault or unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal found there was no evidence of anal intercourse, as only a trace amount of the deceased's own sperm was found, and no evidence of unlawful confinement.

The appeal was allowed, the committal for first degree murder was quashed, and the appellant was ordered to stand trial for second degree murder.

The appellant brought an appeal against the sentence imposed by the lower court.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the matter to determine if the sentencing judge erred.

The court concluded that there was no error in principle in the sentencing of the appellant.

Consequently, leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with sexual offences arising from a large-scale police investigation.

During the trial, it emerged that the Crown had failed to disclose notes and a will-say statement of a former police officer who had contacted the mother of one of the complainants.

The trial judge recused himself from hearing a stay application due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and another judge heard the application.

The application judge found that Crown counsel had wilfully withheld the materials and ordered a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction to hear the matter, but erred in finding wilful non-disclosure.

The evidence showed the non-disclosure was inadvertent.

The Court held that a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown were not justified for inadvertent non-disclosure.

The stay and costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.