COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Doherty, Feldman and Cronk JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Ronald Todorov
Appellant
Barry A. Fox, for the appellant
Craig Harper, for the respondent
Heard: December 8, 2008
On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice P.A. Grossi of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 29, 2006.
ENDORSEMENT
1The trial judge held that the grounds set out in the information to obtain the search warrant for the appellant’s residence were insufficient to justify the granting of the warrant. Consequently, the trial judge held that the search was unreasonable and contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. The Crown does not challenge that finding.
2The trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. In his reasons, he accurately set out the three-pronged approach to be taken to the determination of whether evidence obtained in a manner that infringes the Charter should be excluded from evidence. The trial judge correctly concluded that the admission of the evidence seized in this case would not affect the fairness of the trial.
3The trial judge recognized that the violation was serious in that it involved a non-justifiable state intrusion into a person’s residence. The trial judge focused on the nature of the police conduct. He rejected the appellant’s contention that the use of a single information to obtain a series of warrants for different places all alleged to be related to the same investigation somehow misled the authorizing justice. The trial judge held that the police conduct “was not below the requisite level of care and diligence”. The trial judge also considered, and rejected, the appellant’s claim that in seeking the warrants in issue the police acted in bad faith or otherwise sought to deliberately mislead the issuing justice.
4We see no reason to interfere with the trial judge’s findings of fact. In particular, there is nothing inherently misleading in using a single information when seeking a series of warrants that relate to the same investigation. Indeed, even if individual informations were used, it would be prudent for the police to describe the investigation in full in each information.
5In oral argument, counsel for the appellant argued that the officer did not identify which of the material described in the information to obtain a warrant could be found at the appellant’s residence as opposed to the other locations for which warrants were sought. It would have been preferable had the author of the information indicated which of the specified items there was reason to believe could be found in each of the various locations. We do not, however, think that the failure to do so made the information misleading.
6The trial judge also considered the effect of the exclusion of the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice. He emphasized, in particular, both the seriousness of the offences (large scale counterfeiting) and the importance of the evidence to the prosecution.
7Contrary to the appellant’s contention that the trial judge’s reasons fail to adequately explain the basis for the admission of the evidence, the trial judge’s reasons reveal a full appreciation of the relevant considerations. The trial judge referred to pertinent authorities and drew valid distinctions between the facts of some of those cases and the facts of this case as he found them to be. The trial judge’s factual findings, which are in the main not in dispute, are unassailable. The trial judge’s application of the relevant principles to the facts as he found them is entitled to deference in this court: see R. v. Harrison (2008), 2008 ONCA 85, 231 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (Ont. C.A.).
8We would not interfere with the trial judge’s determination that the evidence seized at the appellant’s residence should not be excluded despite the violation of s. 8.
9No other grounds of appeal were advanced.
10The appeal is dismissed.
“Doherty J.A.”
“K. Feldman J.A.”
“E.A. Cronk J.A.”