Chad Devlin Pilkington

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants and an order requiring them to seek leave before instituting further legal proceedings.

The court reviewed the respondents' extensive litigation history, including repetitive claims, collateral attacks on previous orders, and persistent failure to pay costs.

The court found the respondents to be vexatious litigants under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the applications, imposing a standard leave requirement and a "Chavali Order" to prevent serial applications for leave.

Intact Insurance Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by J.P. Towing Service & Storage Ltd. concerning towing and storage fees.

J.P. Towing cross-moved for various declarations and consolidation.

The court dismissed Intact's motion, finding that while most of J.P. Towing's claims (vexatious litigant, prohibitive order, consolidation, and monetary/punitive damages) were not viable, its claim for a declaration that the daily storage rate of $70.00, as determined in a prior Small Claims Court decision (Sherwood), was res judicata against Intact, was valid.

The court allowed J.P. Towing's cross-motion and granted summary judgment on this specific declaration, holding that Intact was bound by the Sherwood decision regarding the daily storage rate when acting on behalf of its insureds.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant appealed the decision of Justice James F. Diamond dated August 22, 2016, and the associated costs order dated September 27, 2016.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the costs submissions of both parties and determined that the respondent was entitled to costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court found no basis for awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for declaratory relief related to an insurance policy and sought leave to appeal a substantial indemnity costs award of $1,250,000.

The trial judge found that the policy contained a common mistake in the paid-up values table and ordered rectification.

The appellant argued that rectification was unavailable as a remedy and that any rectification claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that rectification was an appropriate remedy for the common mistake and that the claim was not statute-barred because the injury, loss, or damage only occurred when the appellant sought to resile from the parties' common understanding.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, finding the appellant's conduct worthy of judicial sanction.