Lauren Mills Taylor

The defendant, Aescape Inc., brought a motion seeking to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens, and set aside service.

The plaintiff, Intercap Equity Inc., alleged a breach of an oral option agreement to invest in Aescape.

The court found that Intercap established a "good arguable case" that a contract was formed in Ontario, satisfying the "real and substantial connection" test for jurisdiction.

The court also determined that Aescape failed to demonstrate that New York was a "clearly more appropriate forum" to displace Ontario's jurisdiction.

Consequently, the motion was dismissed on all grounds.

The appellants sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement to purchase a family home from the respondent.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no enforceable agreement due to a lack of agreement on the fundamental term of price.

The appellants argued this finding was a palpable and overriding error, asserting the price was $850,000 and the dispute was merely over a $100,000 gift/discount.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding, agreeing that an objective, reasonable bystander would conclude the parties had not agreed on the purchase price, as the $100,000 difference was material.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a UK-based company, brought a motion to stay the application against it for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter, or to set aside service ex juris.

The applicant cross-moved to amend its Notice of Application to plead additional grounds for service outside Ontario and to add a claim for inducing breach of contract.

The court granted the applicant leave to amend, finding no non-compensable prejudice.

However, while the court found service ex juris was validly effected under the amended rules, it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction simpliciter over the foreign respondent because none of the presumptive connecting factors from Van Breda were established.

The application against the foreign respondent was stayed.

The Investigative Receiver sought various forms of relief, including a sealing order over asset valuations and an order requiring the respondent and his wife to disclose the use of proceeds from a $2.4 million mortgage on their family home.

The court granted the sealing order, finding it met the requirements of Sherman Estate.

The court also ordered the disclosure of the mortgage proceeds, finding the respondent's claim of ignorance regarding the funds to be not credible and determining that the information fell within the Receiver's investigative mandate.

The appellant, Grant Litt, appealed his conviction for breaking and entering, touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose, and attempting to choke a person to commit sexual assault, stemming from a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of evidence, particularly expert evidence on a boot print, and the dismissal of a Charter application to exclude evidence.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence: a revised expert opinion on the boot print, downgrading its association with the appellant's boot.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the cogency and due diligence criteria, as the trial judge had heavily relied on the original expert opinion and failed to sufficiently scrutinize other circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the Crown for failure to hold timely bail hearings, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter rights violations.

The motion judge dismissed certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cause of action in negligence (claims attacked core policy decisions), the fiduciary duty claim abandoned, and the Charter claims lacking common issues and not being a preferable procedure due to the need for individualized assessments.

The appellant, M.V., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appeal raised four grounds: unreasonable verdict, error in dealing with demeanour, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's diary, and error in dismissing a recusal application.

The court found no unreasonable verdict and accepted the trial judge's assessment of demeanour.

However, the court found that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence concerning the child's diary and erred in dismissing the recusal application, which was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the complainant's mother being a court reporter who had worked with the trial judge.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentences vacated, and a new trial ordered.