Michael E. Royce

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice and wrongful birth claim against a radiologist and an obstetrician.

The radiologist performed a second-trimester ultrasound that revealed fetal anomalies but failed to communicate the findings urgently.

The obstetrician failed to review the ultrasound report in a timely manner and did not expedite follow-up or refer the patient to a fetal medicine clinic before 24 weeks' gestation.

The court found both doctors breached the standard of care.

Applying the modified objective test, the court concluded that but for the negligence, the plaintiffs would have elected to terminate the pregnancy in Ontario before 24 weeks.

The defendants were found liable.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action following the death of a 22-year-old man in hospital.

The deceased had been switched from morphine to Dilaudid by the respondent physician, and the appellants alleged the dosage was excessive and caused his death by opioid overdose.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's expert evidence that the dosage met the standard of care and that the cause of death was not an opioid overdose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to liability, standard of care, or causation.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action alleging that a hospitalist physician negligently prescribed excessive doses of hydromorphone (Dilaudid) to a patient who had previously received morphine and was allegedly opioid‑naive.

The patient died several hours after receiving multiple doses of Dilaudid, and the coroner’s report listed the cause of death as acute mixed hydromorphone and morphine intoxication.

The court heard competing expert evidence regarding opioid equivalency ratios, titration practices, and whether the physician’s 5 mg dosing fell below the standard of care for a hospitalist managing severe uncontrolled pain.

The court preferred the defence experts’ evidence that the dosing decision was a reasonable clinical judgment given the patient’s persistent severe pain and lack of response to morphine, and that reliance on experienced nurses for monitoring was appropriate.

The court also found the clinical course inconsistent with opioid toxicity and concluded the plaintiffs had not proven causation on a balance of probabilities.

The negligence claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff underwent an ambulatory phlebectomy for a varicose vein near her ankle, during which the defendant physician inadvertently removed a 20.5 cm segment of her sural nerve, causing permanent damage.

The plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in both the recommendation of the procedure and its execution.

The court found that while recommending the procedure met the standard of care, the execution of the procedure was negligent based on circumstantial evidence, including the amount of force required to avulse the nerve and the physician's failure to recognize he had hooked the nerve.

The plaintiff was awarded agreed-upon damages of $128,975.00.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging that two obstetrician-gynecologists breached the standard of care during a laparoscopic assisted vaginal hysterectomy, resulting in the transection of the plaintiff’s ureter.

The court considered expert medical evidence regarding the standard of care, the surgical technique required to protect the ureter, and whether circumstantial evidence could support an inference of negligence.

The court held that ureteric injury can occur even when surgeons exercise appropriate care and that the evidence did not establish that the surgeons deviated from accepted surgical practice.

The court accepted the defence explanation that the injury resulted from aberrant anatomy and that the procedure was performed with appropriate supervision and technique.

The plaintiffs failed to prove negligence on a balance of probabilities.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in favour of the respondent emergency room physician in a medical malpractice case following the death of Dave Palmer from cardiac arrest secondary to a bowel obstruction.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to provide an adequate jury instruction by not reviewing the evidence or identifying factual issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a trial judge should ordinarily outline the evidence, the failure to do so here did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the factual issues were straightforward and thoroughly canvassed by counsel in closing addresses.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for negligent misrepresentation against a financial institution and its vice-president.

The appellants alleged the vice-president failed to warn them about a third party's criminal conviction for fraud during a meeting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the vice-president was unaware of the conviction, did not provide financial advice, and made remarks that amounted to mere puffery upon which reliance was unreasonable.

The appellant, RBC Dominion Securities, sued its former branch manager and several investment advisors who left en masse to join a competitor, Merrill Lynch.

The trial judge found the branch manager breached his implied contractual duty of good faith by orchestrating the departure, and awarded substantial damages for loss of profits.

The trial judge also awarded damages against the investment advisors for unfair competition during the notice period.

The Court of Appeal overturned these awards.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the damages against the branch manager for breach of good faith, but upholding the Court of Appeal's decision that the investment advisors were not liable for unfair competition during the notice period.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action.

The trial judge found that the obstetrician negligently failed to obtain informed consent for a mid-forceps delivery, which caused the infant's brachial plexus injury and brain damage.

However, the trial judge concluded that even with proper disclosure, the doctor would have recommended the forceps delivery and the mother would have consented.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding error.

The appellant obstetrician prescribed the fertility drug Clomid to the respondent mother, who subsequently gave birth prematurely to twin girls with severe disabilities.

The jury found the appellant negligent for failing to properly inform the mother of the risks of twinning and premature birth associated with Clomid, and that she would not have taken the drug if properly informed.

The trial judge held that the twins had a valid cause of action against the appellant and that the parents could recover future care costs for the twins beyond the age of 18.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the jury's verdict on causation and the parents' entitlement to future care costs.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the twins' claims, holding that the appellant owed no duty of care to the unborn children when prescribing a fertility drug to the mother, as his duty was solely to provide the mother with sufficient information to make an informed choice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for damages for abuse on the basis of laches and delay.

They argued the motions judge erred because laches and delay were not specifically pleaded by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues were raised in the factums, fully argued, and caused no prejudice or surprise to the appellants, who had known of their claim since 1989 but waited 13 years to commence proceedings.

The appellants, former senior executives of the respondent corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding that no 'change in control' had occurred to trigger generous compensation provisions in their employment contracts.

During a period of financial difficulty, a shareholder group accumulated proxies for over 35 percent of the voting shares to requisition a special meeting to replace the board of directors.

A settlement was reached before the meeting, and the executives subsequently claimed payouts from a trust fund established for change of control scenarios.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that the mere accumulation of proxies did not confer the right to control or direct the voting power of the corporation, and thus did not constitute a change in control under the agreements.

The appellants appealed a trial decision which found that the respondent did not misuse confidential information to obtain a commercial contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the confidential material was not used by or of assistance to the respondent, as the minimum price had been agreed upon before the information was supplied.

The appellants challenged a trial judgment holding the corporate appellant liable for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act and imposing personal liability on the sole director and shareholder under s. 13(1).

The principal issue was whether the individual appellant had the requisite knowledge that the impugned disbursements amounted to a breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence clearly supported a finding that he reasonably ought to have known the disbursements were a breach of trust.

The court also declined to interfere with the trial judge’s discretionary decision on interest.

The appeal was dismissed with costs and the cross-appeal on interest was dismissed without costs.