Ronald D. Manes

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Kerry Samms from cancer.

The jury found that the defendants, including the family physician Dr. Wilraad Lottering, had not fallen below the standard of care.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on two grounds: (1) the standard of care instruction, arguing the jury was improperly directed to rely solely on expert evidence and could not apply common sense to determine whether standard medical practices were themselves negligent; and (2) the error of judgment instruction, arguing it was inappropriate in a case involving administrative failures rather than clinical judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that when read contextually, the jury instructions properly conveyed the applicable legal principles and that the jury would have understood they could apply common sense to assess whether standard practices were negligent.

The plaintiff, a golf professional, brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant orthopedic surgeon regarding an elective total wrist fusion surgery.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to obtain informed consent by not disclosing alternative, less drastic surgical options that would have preserved some wrist mobility, which was essential for his livelihood.

The court found that the defendant breached his duty of disclosure by failing to explore the plaintiff's specific needs, inadequately describing the surgery, and failing to discuss viable alternative procedures like a four-corner fusion or proximal row carpectomy.

The court concluded that both the subjective and objective tests for causation were met, as neither the plaintiff nor a reasonable person in his position would have consented to a total wrist fusion if properly informed.

The plaintiff was awarded $20,000 in general damages and $40,000 for past loss of income.

The appellant, 407 ETR, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the application of the Limitations Act, 2002 to unpaid toll debts.

The Court of Appeal held that a civil action to collect unpaid tolls is not an 'appropriate means' under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act until the statutory licence plate denial process has run its course and the debtor's vehicle permit expires.

The Court also held that a 15-year limitation period in a transponder lease agreement is enforceable under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act, even though it is a consumer agreement, because s. 22(3) permits parties to extend the limitation period.

The appeal was allowed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to clarify when the two-year limitation period begins to run for claims arising from unpaid Highway 407 toll invoices.

The dispute concerned whether the limitation period commenced when the debtor’s vehicle permit expired during licence plate denial or when the debtor was first placed into licence plate denial under the Highway 407 Act.

The court held that the limitation period begins when the Registrar places the debtor’s licence plate into licence plate denial.

This interpretation avoids allowing the toll operator to control when the limitation period begins and is consistent with the statutory collection scheme and the principles underlying limitation periods.

The court therefore confirmed that the limitation period in the case began on the date the licence plate was placed into denial.

This was a costs endorsement following dismissal of an application seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator under a 2009 agreement.

The successful party sought $32,896.93, including partial indemnity fees to December 7, 2012 and substantial indemnity thereafter based on an offer to settle.

The court rejected substantial indemnity costs, found some of the successful party's arguments and cross-examination unhelpful or irrelevant, and reduced the requested amount.

Fair and reasonable costs were fixed at $22,000 all-inclusive, payable forthwith.

The appellant, a private school, expelled a student for smoking marijuana in the school residence.

The student and his parents successfully applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the expulsion decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA).

The school appealed, arguing the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the expulsion decision was governed by the private contract between the parents and the school, not public law.

The decision lacked a sufficient public dimension to be subject to public law remedies under the JRPA.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to section 2.8 of an agreement.

The application judge dismissed the application because the appellant had already commenced an arbitration under section 8.18 on all issues, including working capital, and could not change course mid-way.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that jurisdictional issues were properly reserved to the arbitration, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicants sought judicial review of a private school's decision to expel a student after he admitted to smoking marijuana in a dormitory room.

The Divisional Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision because the school was created by a Special Act, making its disciplinary decisions an exercise of a statutory power.

The majority quashed the expulsion decision, finding a breach of procedural fairness because the student and his parents were denied an adequate opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriate sanction.

The court declined to order the school to confer a diploma, remitting the matter to the Head of School.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in favour of the respondent emergency room physician in a medical malpractice case following the death of Dave Palmer from cardiac arrest secondary to a bowel obstruction.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to provide an adequate jury instruction by not reviewing the evidence or identifying factual issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a trial judge should ordinarily outline the evidence, the failure to do so here did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the factual issues were straightforward and thoroughly canvassed by counsel in closing addresses.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision striking his jury notice.

The underlying dispute involved whether Minutes of Settlement should be enforced or set aside due to fraud, undue influence, and unconscionability.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was essentially for specific performance and the defendant's counterclaim for rescission, both of which fall under s. 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, precluding a jury trial.

The court held that the motion judge's decision was not open to very serious debate and there were no conflicting decisions.

Leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services refusing to consent to the abolition of the municipal police force unless the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) agreed to binding arbitration regarding the hiring of a specific officer.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commission's jurisdiction under section 40(3) of the Police Services Act is limited to ordering arbitration between a police board and a member regarding severance pay.

The Commission had no statutory authority to order the OPP to submit to arbitration regarding an officer's suitability for employment.

The condition was set aside and the Commission was directed to consent to the termination.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement.

The defendant had agreed to pay $500,000 to settle allegations of sexual assault during a doctor-patient and employer-employee relationship, but stopped payments after $56,000, alleging the agreement was obtained through fraud and economic duress.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that genuine issues of fact and credibility regarding the nature of the relationship and the validity of the duress defence required a trial.

The appellant, an indigent litigant, appealed the dismissal of his motion for a declaration that Small Claims Court fees violate the Charter and the common law right of access to justice.

The Divisional Court held that while poverty is not an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Charter and the fees do not violate s. 7, the absence of a statutory provision allowing for the waiver of fees for indigent persons with meritorious claims violates the common law constitutional right of access to justice.

The Court ordered that a statutory amendment be enacted to permit proceedings in forma pauperis in the Small Claims Court.

Following an appeal where success was divided, the court issued an endorsement on costs.

The court ordered that no costs of the appeal be awarded to either party.

Furthermore, the court declined to clarify its reasons, directing the parties to settle the order in accordance with Rule 59.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant, Meditrust Healthcare Inc., operated a national mail-order pharmacy business through subsidiaries to comply with provincial regulations.

Meditrust sued the respondents for various economic torts, alleging a conspiracy to destroy its business.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing most claims, holding that under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, Meditrust could not sue for damages that were derivative of those suffered by its subsidiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision on all grounds except for Meditrust's claim for loss of goodwill, finding that damage to reputation could constitute a direct, personal loss to the shareholder.

The respondent financial advisory firm was engaged by the appellant trust company to raise debt or equity financing.

The agreement permitted the appellant to sell its assets without obligation to the respondent.

After the respondent obtained a letter of interest from a bank, the appellant terminated the engagement, paid the contractual fees, and later sold its assets to the bank.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $420,000 for unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding that the respondent failed to establish an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, or the absence of a juristic reason, as the services were not freely accepted for an asset sale and the respondent had no reasonable expectation of compensation beyond the contract.

Following further written representations on costs and funds in court, the Court of Appeal amended its order in a commercial appeal.

The court directed that funds paid by the appellant on account of land transfer tax relating to a registered instrument be released from prior orders and paid to the appellant.

The remaining issues of costs and the balance of money in court were left to the assessment officer, with the remaining funds to stay in court pending a final order of assessment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge’s conclusion that a purported purchase and sale transaction was not genuine and therefore was not bona fide for the purposes of s. 70 of the Registry Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge found the transaction to be a sham and that there was ample evidence supporting that conclusion, including back-dated documents, lack of due diligence, and deficiencies in the evidence.

A cross-appeal concerning slander of title, punitive damages, and costs was also dismissed, although leave to appeal costs was granted.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, except that a non-participating respondent was awarded no costs.

In a personal injury appeal arising from a motor vehicle accident, the appellants challenged a damages award exceeding $1 million on the basis that the trial judge misapprehended the plaintiff's evidence, the medical evidence, and the vocational evidence concerning future work capacity, surgery, retraining, and retirement.

The Court of Appeal held that the award flowed from a series of serious factual errors and assumptions that could not be justified on the record, making a new trial necessary.

The court also held that, while contingency-like fee arrangements may exist between solicitor and client, a risk premium should not be included in a solicitor and client costs assessment under Rule 49 following an offer to settle.

Appeal allowed, judgment set aside, and new trial directed.

The appellant doctor appealed an interlocutory order striking portions of his statement of defence and counterclaim, as well as portions of an affidavit.

The underlying action was brought by the respondent patient to enforce a settlement agreement.

The appellant alleged the settlement was obtained by fraud, relying on a sworn statement by the respondent recanting her allegations of sexual assault made to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act creates an absolute bar to the admissibility of documents prepared for CPSO proceedings in civil actions, even where fraud is alleged.