Dr. Cameron

The applicant sought a determination that he sustained a catastrophic impairment as a result of a motor vehicle accident, along with entitlement to various attendant care benefits and treatment plans.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal evaluated the applicant's impairments under Criterion 7 (Whole Person Impairment) and Criterion 8 (mental and behavioural disorders).

The Tribunal rejected several of the applicant's physical impairment ratings due to a lack of causal evidence and methodological flaws, concluding the applicant did not meet the 55% WPI threshold.

Under Criterion 8, the Tribunal found the applicant had only mild impairments in activities of daily living and social functioning, failing to meet the threshold of three marked or one extreme impairment.

As the applicant was not catastrophically impaired and had exhausted his non-CAT limits, the claims for attendant care and treatment plans were dismissed.

Personal injury trial arising from a 2015 motor vehicle accident involving a plaintiff with a prior 2012 collision and earlier mental health history.

The court rejected the defence theory that the plaintiff was malingering or merely misattributing pre-existing impairments, and found that the 2015 accident caused soft tissue injuries, chronic pain, psychological injury, headaches, and cognitive deficits that permanently impaired work and daily functioning.

Applying the but-for causation test and the thin skull rule rather than the crumbling skull principle, the court held that the plaintiff had substantially recovered from the earlier accident but remained vulnerable to more serious consequences from the later collision.

The court awarded general damages, past and future income loss, future care costs, and derivative damages to the family claimant.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term following his guilty plea to aggravated assault for an unprovoked stabbing of a stranger.

The court considered extensive psychiatric evidence and a Gladue report detailing the offender's traumatic childhood, substance abuse, and mental health issues.

The court found that while the offender posed a high risk of violent re-offending, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his violent conduct was intractable, noting his recent improvements and the impact of Gladue factors.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, designated the offender as a long term offender, and sentenced him to 7.5 years in prison followed by a 10-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The appellant appealed a jury award of zero damages and a trial judge's ruling that her claim for non-pecuniary loss did not meet the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the jury verdict was perverse and the trial judge erred in his threshold analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the jury to conclude the appellant's post-accident difficulties were inevitable due to pre-existing osteoarthritis, and there was ample evidence supporting the trial judge's threshold ruling.

The plaintiff's motor vehicle accident action was dismissed after failing to meet the statutory threshold, despite a jury awarding $30,000 in general damages.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found that the defendant's counsel engaged in uncivil conduct, failed to cooperate on a joint document brief, delivered late expert reports, and repeatedly ignored a trial management order and court deadlines.

Although the defendant was the successful party and would normally be entitled to costs of approximately $100,000, the court exercised its discretion to deprive the defendant of costs due to counsel's misconduct.

The defendant was ordered to pay $441.13 for half the copying costs of the joint document brief.

In this motor vehicle damages trial, liability was admitted and the jury assessed damages only.

The court then determined a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act and held the plaintiff failed to prove that the collision caused either the alleged chronic pain syndrome or a later gastric volvulus.

The court made strong adverse credibility findings, relied on conflicting medical evidence, and concluded causation had not been established on a balance of probabilities.

Although the jury awarded $30,000 in general damages, the statutory deductible eliminated the award and the action was dismissed.

Following a jury trial in a personal injury action where the defendants were found not liable, the defendants sought costs of the proceeding.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be reduced due to impecuniosity, excessive preparation time, inclusion of disbursements for unused experts and surveillance, and the derivative nature of a Family Law Act claim.

The court held that disbursements for unused experts may still be recoverable if reasonably incurred in preparation for trial, but reduced the defendants’ claim by excluding preparation related to two aborted trials.

The court also considered the plaintiff’s financial hardship as a discretionary factor.

Balancing Rule 57.01 considerations, the court awarded reduced costs to the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiff to attend additional defence medical examinations and to strike the impending trial date.

The plaintiffs raised a preliminary objection that the defendants required leave under Rule 48.04(1) because the action had been set down for trial.

The court dismissed the preliminary objection, finding the defendants had not consented to the action being placed on the trial list.

On the substantive issue, the court dismissed the motion for further medical examinations, holding that the defendants failed to provide sufficient medical or factual evidence to justify the request under Rule 33.02(2) and the Bonello principles.

Following a jury trial on damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act arguing that the plaintiff had not established a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The jury awarded $10,000 in general damages but no other damages, which would result in no recovery after the statutory deductible.

The court independently assessed the threshold issue and concluded that the plaintiff suffered chronic pain, fibromyalgia, and major depression causally related to the accident, resulting in permanent impairments affecting employment capacity and daily functioning.

The court rejected defence expert evidence alleging malingering and preferred the evidence of treating physicians and other experts.

The statutory threshold was therefore met and the defendant’s motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university committee's decision to involuntarily withdraw him from a radiological technology program following a patient safety incident during a clinical practicum.

The applicant argued he was denied natural justice because the primary witness against him submitted a written statement and was not cross-examined.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's counsel never requested to cross-examine the witness, and the committee's decision was reasonable and within the core academic functions of the university.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found she suffered no compensable damages from a motor vehicle accident because her injuries did not meet the Insurance Act threshold.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court addressed the appellant's claim for past and future loss of income, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that her inability to work was not caused by the accident.

The appeal remained dismissed, and costs of the appeal were fixed at $5,000 payable to the respondents.

The plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries to her neck in a motor vehicle accident.

At trial, the judge found she had suffered a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function, meeting the threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, and the jury awarded her $7,000.

The defendant appealed the threshold determination.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that while the impairment was permanent and affected an important function, the trial judge failed to properly analyze whether the impairment was 'serious' as required by Meyer v. Bright.

The court concluded the plaintiff's impairment, which primarily reduced her frequency of ballroom dancing, did not meet the threshold of seriousness.

In a personal injury appeal arising from a motor vehicle accident, the appellants challenged a damages award exceeding $1 million on the basis that the trial judge misapprehended the plaintiff's evidence, the medical evidence, and the vocational evidence concerning future work capacity, surgery, retraining, and retirement.

The Court of Appeal held that the award flowed from a series of serious factual errors and assumptions that could not be justified on the record, making a new trial necessary.

The court also held that, while contingency-like fee arrangements may exist between solicitor and client, a risk premium should not be included in a solicitor and client costs assessment under Rule 49 following an offer to settle.

Appeal allowed, judgment set aside, and new trial directed.

The appellant suffered a back injury in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for loss of earning capacity as a self-employed bakery owner.

The trial judge assessed pecuniary damages based on the after-tax cost of replacement labour and found the appellant did not fail to mitigate her damages by refusing further medical testing, as her doctors recommended conservative treatment.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, criticizing the damages calculation and finding the refusal of testing unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the replacement labour cost was a reasonable method to assess damages in these circumstances and that the appellant's refusal of medical testing was not arbitrary or unreasonable given the medical evidence.