Joshua Lee Ginsberg

The appellant, 407 ETR, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the application of the Limitations Act, 2002 to unpaid toll debts.

The Court of Appeal held that a civil action to collect unpaid tolls is not an 'appropriate means' under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act until the statutory licence plate denial process has run its course and the debtor's vehicle permit expires.

The Court also held that a 15-year limitation period in a transponder lease agreement is enforceable under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act, even though it is a consumer agreement, because s. 22(3) permits parties to extend the limitation period.

The appeal was allowed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to clarify when the two-year limitation period begins to run for claims arising from unpaid Highway 407 toll invoices.

The dispute concerned whether the limitation period commenced when the debtor’s vehicle permit expired during licence plate denial or when the debtor was first placed into licence plate denial under the Highway 407 Act.

The court held that the limitation period begins when the Registrar places the debtor’s licence plate into licence plate denial.

This interpretation avoids allowing the toll operator to control when the limitation period begins and is consistent with the statutory collection scheme and the principles underlying limitation periods.

The court therefore confirmed that the limitation period in the case began on the date the licence plate was placed into denial.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application to assess the legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding there were no special circumstances to permit the assessment.

The court noted the application judge failed to account for an admitted 15% discount that may not have been honoured and the existence of an escrow agreement securing the disputed amount.

Leave was granted to assess all accounts rendered by the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to section 2.8 of an agreement.

The application judge dismissed the application because the appellant had already commenced an arbitration under section 8.18 on all issues, including working capital, and could not change course mid-way.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that jurisdictional issues were properly reserved to the arbitration, and dismissed the appeal.