Jonathan C. Lisus

This appeal concerned the quantum of class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium following a $153 million class action settlement for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge had awarded $25 million in fees and denied a $30,000 honorarium.

The appellants sought an increase in fees to $44 million and the honorarium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision on both fees and honorarium, finding no palpable and overriding error or misdirection on law.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, having been entirely successful in the liability phase of a bifurcated proceeding concerning the status of the "Disputed Beach" as reserve land, sought costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs awards and apportionment among the multiple defendants.

The court awarded Saugeen their costs on a partial indemnity scale, totaling $3,221,802.54, on a joint and several liability basis.

These costs were apportioned for indemnification purposes among Canada (10%), Ontario (40%), and the Town of South Bruce Peninsula (50%).

Additionally, the court granted Canada a Sanderson order, requiring the Town to pay Canada $470,000 in partial indemnity costs, recognizing Canada's success on the essential issue of the reserve boundary location.

The Town's claim for costs against Canada was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada sought to reconsider a mid-trial ruling on solicitor-client privilege, requesting leave to file a new affidavit to support their claim.

The plaintiffs opposed this request.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to revisit the ruling, emphasizing the importance of finality in trial proceedings and noting that the issue had been fully argued previously.

The Attorney General was directed to forthwith produce the unredacted documents as per the original ruling.

During a complex commercial trial, an evidentiary dispute arose regarding the reading in of examination for discovery transcripts under Rule 31.11.

The defendant sought to introduce additional excerpts from its own witnesses' discoveries to qualify the plaintiffs' read-ins, and also sought to read in discovery evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses who had already testified.

The court allowed some of the qualifying read-ins that directly explained the original answers but excluded others.

The court largely dismissed the defendant's request to read in the plaintiffs' discovery evidence, finding that doing so after the witnesses had testified without putting the evidence to them in cross-examination violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn and caused trial unfairness.

During a complex commercial trial involving the auction of wireless spectrum licences, the plaintiffs challenged the defendant's assertion of solicitor-client privilege over redacted portions of nine documents.

The defendant argued the challenge required leave under Rule 48.04 as the action had been set down for trial.

The court held that a trial judge has broad discretion to order production of non-privileged documents at any time under Rule 30.04(5) without leave, but would have granted leave in the interests of justice regardless.

After inspecting the unredacted documents, the court found that while some redactions properly protected legal advice, others merely reflected policy discussions or operational decisions that referenced legal risks, which do not attract privilege.

The defendant was ordered to produce the improperly redacted portions.

The Representative Plaintiff, Marc-Oliver Baroch, brought a consent motion in a certified and settled class action to amend the Distribution Protocol.

The motion sought approval to reallocate uncashed funds from the first distribution, distribute accrued interest, allow for further distribution to class members who missed the first distribution, and obtain a cy-pres order for any remaining excess funds to be donated to SickKids Hospital and/or the OTA Education Foundation.

The defendants did not oppose the motion, and the court granted the requested amendments to ensure efficient and complete distribution of settlement funds.

The applicant, Competition Motors Limited (CML), sought to set aside an arbitral award from an Appeal Panel under the National Automobile Dealer Arbitration Program (NADAP) Rules, pursuant to sections 46(1)3 and 6 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

CML argued the Appeal Panel exceeded its jurisdiction by applying an incorrect standard of review (correctness on facts without deference, akin to a de novo hearing) when reversing an initial arbitral decision that found Toyota Canada Inc. (TCI) unreasonably withheld consent to CML's dealership sale.

The court dismissed CML's application, finding that the issue raised was not one of true jurisdiction under s. 46(1)3, and even if it were, the Appeal Panel acted within its mandate by interpreting and applying the NADAP Rules' unique correctness standard for both law and fact, which allows for a re-evaluation of evidence to reach a "better" conclusion without conducting a full de novo trial.

The court also dismissed the procedural fairness argument as it was contingent on the jurisdictional claim.

The Regional Municipality of York brought an application for judicial review seeking mandamus after the Minister failed for several years to make a decision on its environmental assessment for a wastewater project.

After the application was commenced, the Ontario legislature passed legislation that effectively repealed the requirement for a decision and mandated a different wastewater solution, rendering the application moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot constitutional and administrative law issues.

However, due to the government's 'reprehensible' delay and 'egregious' conduct in covertly passing legislation to bypass the environmental assessment process, the court relieved the applicant from a prior agreement to waive costs and awarded the applicant its costs on a full indemnity basis.

This decision addresses two cross-motions in complex, joined real estate development actions: the plaintiffs' motion for a further affidavit of documents and the defendants' motion to bifurcate the action and postpone document production.

The court dismissed the defendants' bifurcation motion, holding that bifurcation under Rule 6.1.01 requires party consent, which was absent.

The request for delayed production was also denied, as the defendants failed to demonstrate serious prejudice or that the documents were solely related to damages.

The plaintiffs' production motion was granted, with the court finding the requested documents relevant to both liability and defence, and the request proportionate given the $65 million in dispute.

The court emphasized that the deemed undertaking rule mitigates concerns about commercially sensitive information.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking reconsideration and amendment of a prior endorsement that approved a minor's settlement in a tort action.

The motion sought to clarify or correct findings regarding the settlement quantum, structured settlements for minors, and the enforceability of contingency fee and referral fee agreements.

The court dismissed the motion for reconsideration, except for a minor accidental slip, reaffirming the narrow scope for judicial reconsideration of decisions before formal judgment entry, emphasizing that such motions are generally not a substitute for appeal.

In a certified and settled class action, the Representative Plaintiff brought a consent motion to amend the Distribution Protocol, seeking an additional $90,000 for administrative expenses to complete a Second Distribution of settlement funds.

The initial settlement of $22,250,000 included $780,000 for administration.

Due to uncashed cheques and ongoing administrative efforts, the settlement administrator and financial expert required more funds.

The court found the request for additional administrative expenses fair and reasonable given the settlement value, number of class members, and complexity of the distribution, and granted the motion.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment in a land claim case.

Following an earlier declaration that a substantial portion of Sauble Beach was reserved for the sole use and benefit of the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and forms part of Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29, the court considered whether to grant a life interest in certain 'Disputed Lots' to current family title owners (Landowners).

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and Canada opposed this.

The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to impose a proprietary interest contrary to the Indian Act and Constitution Act, as reserve land is inalienable.

It also found that granting such an interest would not advance reconciliation.

Consequently, the temporary delay in the original declaration that no third parties have an interest in the land was terminated, making the declaration effective immediately.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of McEwen J. dated January 5, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The court declined to award costs to the successful responding parties because they failed to file a Costs Outline.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation brought an action seeking a declaration that a 1.4-mile strip of Sauble Beach (the Disputed Beach) is part of their unsurrendered reserve land under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The court found that the Imperial Crown's surveyor, Charles Rankin, improperly marked the northern terminus of the reserve's eastern boundary further south than the Treaty stipulated, depriving the First Nation of the promised coastline.

The court held that the Imperial Crown and the federal Crown breached their sui generis fiduciary duties and acted inconsistently with the honour of the Crown by failing to properly survey, protect, and preserve the reserve.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the First Nation's claim was defeated by Crown patents, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Limitations Act, laches, dedication, or proprietary estoppel.

The court declared that the Disputed Beach remains unsurrendered reserve land for the sole use and benefit of the First Nation.

The applicant, who lost a municipal school trustee election by a single vote, sought a recount under s. 58 of the Municipal Elections Act.

The court distinguished between undervotes and overvotes/adjudicated ballots.

While dismissing the request for a recount of the 258 undervotes due to their common nature and lack of specific evidence of error, the court found objective grounds to doubt the result based on a single overvote and an unknown number of adjudicated mail-in ballots.

Consequently, a narrow recount was ordered for the overvote and adjudicated ballots to ensure fairness and avoid disenfranchising voters, given the extremely close margin.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision to partially allow an appeal and award damages to the appellant.

The appellant sought trial costs of $750,000 and prejudgment interest of over $2.3 million, compounded annually.

The respondent conceded entitlement to trial costs but argued for a lower amount due to the appellant's limited success and for a reduction in prejudgment interest due to an 18-year delay in prosecuting the claim, also opposing compounding.

The Court fixed trial costs at $475,000 and prejudgment interest at $600,000, denying compound interest and reducing the amount due to the unexplained and unreasonable delay.

The appellant tenant, Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), appealed a motion judge's decision regarding relief from forfeiture under s. 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act, seeking rent abatement due to COVID-19 impacts.

The respondent landlords (Oxford and affiliates) cross-appealed the deferral of rent payments and reduction of interest rates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed HBC's appeal, affirming that s. 20 does not permit rent abatement or reduction as it would rewrite the lease.

The court allowed the landlords' cross-appeal, finding that deferrals should only be granted to allow the tenant to comply, not to mitigate economic harm, and that the interest rate should not have been varied from the lease terms.

The appellant abattoir owner sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion after Ministry officials occupied its plant for 19 months following an investigation into illegal meat processing.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no duty of care and no breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Ministry owed a duty of care to the targeted suspect, breached the standard of care by unreasonably prolonging its occupation of the plant and allowing meat to spoil, and caused the appellant's inability to sell the plant.

Damages of $3,520,000 were awarded for loss of enterprise value.

The plaintiff, a person under disability following a severe motor vehicle accident, sought court approval of a $487,500 tort settlement and associated legal fees under Rule 7.08.

The court approved the settlement amount, noting it was on the low end of reasonable but acceptable given the outstanding accident benefits claim.

However, the court rejected the proposed legal fees based on a 30% contingency agreement, finding them unreasonable given the lack of liability risk and early settlement.

The court reduced the fees to slightly above docketed time and ordered a portion of the funds to be structured with a case manager appointed to oversee the plaintiff's treatment plan.

The decision also provides a comprehensive checklist for counsel filing Rule 7.08 applications.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.