D’Arcy McGoey

The moving party insurer sought an extension of time to file materials for leave to appeal and a stay of a Divisional Court order requiring it to pay $365,257 for home modifications under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The responding party, a 92-year-old woman with catastrophic injuries, required the funds to modify her daughter's home for her care.

The Court of Appeal granted the unopposed extension of time but dismissed the stay motion.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the insurer failed to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the responding party given her advanced age, poor health, and immediate need for the benefits.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking reconsideration and amendment of a prior endorsement that approved a minor's settlement in a tort action.

The motion sought to clarify or correct findings regarding the settlement quantum, structured settlements for minors, and the enforceability of contingency fee and referral fee agreements.

The court dismissed the motion for reconsideration, except for a minor accidental slip, reaffirming the narrow scope for judicial reconsideration of decisions before formal judgment entry, emphasizing that such motions are generally not a substitute for appeal.

The minor plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while crossing the road after collecting mail.

A settlement of $400,000 was reached at mediation.

The litigation guardian brought a motion for court approval of the settlement, legal fees under a contingency fee agreement, and a referral fee.

The court approved the settlement amount for the minor plaintiff but found the contingency fee agreement and referral fee agreement unenforceable due to non-compliance with statutory and Law Society requirements.

Legal fees were reduced and approved on a quantum meruit basis.

This appeal concerns a dispute between two insurers regarding the payment of statutory accident benefits (SABS) to an injured claimant.

The central issue is whether an insurer's failure to notify the claimant of a priority dispute between insurers within 90 days of receiving the SABS application precluded the insurer from pursuing the dispute.

The arbitrator determined that while notice to the claimant was mandatory, no specific time limit was prescribed by regulation.

The Superior Court reversed this decision, applying a correctness standard of review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the reasonableness standard of review applies to arbitrator decisions on SABS priority disputes, even where questions of law are engaged.

The arbitrator's interpretation that late notice did not bar the priority dispute was reasonable.

Kingsway appealed an arbitrator's decision ordering it to indemnify Dominion for statutory accident benefits paid following a four-vehicle chain reaction collision.

The arbitrator found that s. 9(3) of the Fault Determination Rules did not apply because the fourth vehicle was stationary, and applied ordinary tort rules to find Kingsway's insured 100% at fault.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 9(3) applies to the three vehicles in motion regardless of the stationary fourth vehicle.

Following the Court of Appeal's decision in State Farm, s. 9(3) precludes 'leapfrogging' loss transfer claims between vehicles that do not directly collide.

This appeal concerns an arbitrator's decision regarding sanctions for an insurer's improper deflection of a statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim and failure to provide timely notice of dispute.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (MVACF) appealed the arbitrator's decision to impose only costs sanctions on TD Insurance, arguing that TD should be permanently liable for the SABs due to its conduct.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding it reasonable and within jurisdiction, as existing appellate authority supports that a breach of the "Disputes Between Insurers" regulation does not automatically result in permanent liability, especially when another insurer initiated the dispute process within the required timeframe.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of Regulation 283/95 under the Insurance Act, specifically whether an insurer disputing liability for statutory accident benefits must provide notice of its dispute to the insured person within the same 90-day period it provides notice to the other insurer.

The arbitrator had found that late notice to the insured was permissible.

The court, applying a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, held that the 90-day period for notifying other insurers also applies to notifying the insured, as indicated by the word "also" in the Regulation and to ensure the insured's rights to participate in the dispute are not nullified.

The court also confirmed that relief from forfeiture is not available for statutory time limits under this regulatory scheme.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent's dispute was barred due to late notice to the insured.

An insurer appealed an arbitrator’s decision in a statutory accident benefits priority dispute under s. 268 of the Insurance Act.

The arbitration determined that the accident victim was principally dependent on his father and stepmother, making the father’s insurer responsible for statutory accident benefits reimbursement.

The appellant argued the arbitrator misapplied the dependency test and failed to conduct a proper mathematical analysis of financial support.

The court held the arbitrator correctly applied the dependency criteria established in Miller v. Safeco and that the conclusion that the claimant was not financially independent was both correct and reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a motor vehicle accident on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The responding parties argued the claim was not discoverable until medical evidence confirmed that the injuries from the second accident met the statutory threshold and exceeded the deductible under the Insurance Act.

The court held that determining discoverability required a global assessment of injuries from two separate accidents and an apportionment of damages between them to determine whether the deductible for the second accident was exceeded.

These factual determinations required credibility assessments and expert evidence that could not be fairly resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The motion was therefore dismissed and the matter left for determination at trial.