SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Estate of Barbara Doreen Laing, represented by Tasheka Shereffa Robinson, Executor and Estate Trustee, Tasheka Shereffa Robinson, Estate Trustee for Barbara D. Laing & Tasheka Shereffa Robinson, personally et al., Plaintiffs
AND:
His Majesty the King in right of Ontario, Secretary of the Cabinet in Ontario et al., Defendants
BEFORE: M.T. Doi J.
COUNSEL: Tasheka Shereffa Robinson, self-represented Plaintiff Michele Valentini, for the Defendant, His Majesty the King in right of Ontario Jonathan C. Lisus and Nicole J. Kelly, for the Defendant, Secretary of the Cabinet Patrick Hawkins and Issac Wright, for the Defendant Trillium Health Partners Nina Bombier and Mahgol Taghivand, for the Defendant Physicians
HEARD: May 19, 2026 (In Chambers)
Endorsement
Overview
1On February 9, 2026, I directed the registrar to notify the plaintiffs that I had reviewed the statement of claim issued October 28, 2025 and was considering a dismissal of the action for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process after the defendant His Majesty the King in right of Ontario filed a written request under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990 Reg 194, to stay or dismiss the action. Thereafter, the parties filed written submissions as directed.
2For the reasons that follow, I find that this action should be dismissed.
Legal Principles
3The court may dismiss an action that appears on its face to clearly be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court: r. 2.1.01.
4The court interprets and applies its gatekeeping power under r. 2.1.01 robustly to weed out frivolous and vexatious claims, to protect parties opposite from incurring costs inappropriately, and to avoid a misallocation of limited court resources: Scaduto v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733 at para 8, leave to appeal refused, [2015] SCCA No 488; Markowa v Adamson Cosmetic Facial Surgery Inc., 2014 ONSC 6664 at para 3. A frivolous proceeding lacks a legal basis or legal merit, is not serious, or is not reasonably purposeful, whereas a vexatious proceeding lacks reasonable grounds and, therefore, is an abuse of the court’s process: Gao v Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497 at para 9, citing Currie v Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 7815 (ONCA) at paras 14-15; Van Sluytman v Orillia Soldiers' Memorial Hospital, 2017 ONSC 692 at para 11, affirmed 2018 ONCA 32; Nikou v. Karageorgos, 2019 ONCA 83 at para 8.
5The Court of Appeal distilled the key principles governing the operation of r.2.1 in Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690 at para 8, leave to appeal refused [2020] SCCA No. 473, as follows:
Rule 2.1 must be “interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488. The Rule is not for close calls — it may be used only in “the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto, at paras. 8-9; Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320 (“Khan”), at para. 6, leave to appeal refused.
A motion under r. 2.1 focuses on the pleadings and any submissions of the parties made under the rule. No evidence is submitted on a r. 2.1 motion: Scaduto, at paras. 9, 11-12. A court may, however, review reasons and pleadings from other proceedings to determine whether the case is abusive: Khan, at para. 9.
Rule 2.1 does not replace other rules in the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike out actions or to deal with other procedural irregularities summarily: Khan, at para. 7. The rule is “not meant to be an easily accessible alternative to a pleadings motion, a motion for summary judgment, or a trial”: Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, 138 O.R. (3d) 581, at para. 12; P.Y. v. Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2020 ONCA 98, at para. 11. The Rules provide many other remedies to address cases that are not clear on the face of the pleading: Khan, at para. 15.
6In Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720 at paras 19-20, the Court of Appeal set out the following hallmarks for determining whether a proceeding is frivolous or vexatious:
19In his [2019 article entitled “Querulous and Vexatious Litigants as a Disorder of a Modern Legal System”, 24 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 265] Morrisette J.A., at pp. 274-76, lists the signs of “a querulous disposition” as follows:
• the litigant is virtually always self-represented
• the litigant’s attitude is characterized by marked obduracy
• persistent reiteration and amplification
• arguments are often unintelligible or highly confused
written submissions contain much that is not legally relevant to the dispute
the style of written submissions is quite distinctive (opaque and long written materials, faulty terminology and syntax, emphatic tone reinforced by different fonts and styles, multiple appendices and supporting documents, and the expression of a keen desire for moral vindication)
• marked lack of due diligence in the advancement of claims
exhaustion of all rights of review, appeal, or revocation any time there is an adverse judgment
unsustainable allegations and gratuitous complaints against members of the legal profession, and
a cessation of proceedings only when the litigant cannot pay legal fees and costs.
20Similarly, in Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, 37 C.L.R. (4th) 7, at paras. 14-15, Myers J. described the characteristics typically found in vexatious litigants:
• bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine already determined issues
• rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings
• persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals
• failure to pay costs awards
• bringing proceedings for a purpose other than the assertion of legitimate rights
bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought, and
inappropriate submissions in both form (curious formatting, many pages, odd or irrelevant attachments, multiple methods of emphasis, numerous foot and marginal notes) and content (rambling discourse, rhetorical questions, repeated misuse of technical terms, references to self in the third person, inappropriately ingratiating statements, ultimatums, and threats).
Gao was approved by this court in Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 O.A.C. 87, at para. 9, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488; Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, 138 O.R. (3d) 581, at para. 13; and Rallis v. Myers, 2019 ONCA 437, at para. 5.
Procedural History
7On June 3, 2025, the plaintiffs issued a notice of action in The Estate of Barbara Doreen Laing v Trillium Health Partners et al., Superior Court of Justice File No. CV-25-00002890-0000 (the “Trillium Action”). On July 3, 2025, the plaintiffs issued a statement of claim in the Trillium Action containing 154 paragraphs over 102 pages in length. The defendants to the Trillium Action are Trillium Health Partners and J. Bartucz who are defending the action.
8On August 11, 2025, the plaintiffs served the Crown with a notice of claim under s. 18(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 7, Sched 17 (the “CLPA”). In their notice letter, the plaintiffs advised of their intention to bring a claim against the Crown and enclosed the issued notice of action and statement of claim in the Trillium Action.
9On October 28, 2025, the plaintiffs brought the within action as a new claim in Estate of Barbara Doreen Laing v His Majesty the King in right of Ontario et al., Superior Court of Justice File No. CV-25-00005957-0000 (the “HMK Action”). The statement of claim in the HMK Action comprises 216 paragraphs, is 258 pages in length, and seeks $200 million in damages against a number of defendants including, a) His Majesty the King in right of Ontario (“Ontario”), b) the Secretary of the Cabinet in Ontario, c) various John and Jane Doe’s as placeholders for doctors, nurses, and other staff associated with Trillium Health Partners, and Catherine Marie Marguerite Grenier.1 On November 21, 2025, Ontario served the plaintiffs with a notice of intent to defend. On November 24, 2025, the Secretary of the Cabinet in Ontario served a notice of intent to defend. On or after February 24, 2026, the defendant doctors named in the Trillium Action served notices of intent to defend the HMK Action.
10On December 1, 2025, Ontario served a request for a stay or dismissal of the HMK Action under r. 2.1 on the basis that the action appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process of the court.
11By endorsement dated February 9, 2026, I issued notice to initiate the process under r. 2.1 for considering Ontario’s request to stay or dismiss the HMK Action. I also stayed the HMK Action pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43 pending the outcome of the r. 2.1 process by which further filings could not be accepted in the HMK Action but for written submissions filed pursuant to r. 2.1.01(8).
12On February 23, 2026, the plaintiffs delivered submissions in response to the r. 2.1 notice. At the same time, the plaintiffs served Ontario with a requisition for default judgment in an amount exceeding $387 million (i.e., to reflect $200 million in damages plus over $187 million in interest at 5% per year from June 6, 2007 when the cause of action allegedly arose) even though the HMK Action was stayed pending the outcome of the r. 2.1 procedure. On March 3, 2026, the plaintiffs served Ontario with an updated requisition for default judgment and filed revised submissions for the r. 2.1 notice that, among other things, noted service of their requisition for default judgment.
Analysis
13As explained below, I am satisfied that the within HMK Action is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court’s process.
14The plaintiffs’ claim in the HMK Action concerns the allegedly inadequate treatment and care that Ms. Laing received from various doctors and hospital staff at Trillium Health Partners from 2007 to 2022, and seems to be framed as a medical malpractice action. In addition, the HMK Action seems to raise issues about allegedly inadequate care that the plaintiff Tasheka Robinson received from Trillium Health Partners.
15I find that the claim in the HMK Action against Ontario and its Secretary of the Cabinet is frivolous for lacking a legal basis or an intelligible legal theory. A statement of claim must give a concise statement of material facts to ground a claim: r.25.06(1). As well, a proper pleading of bad faith requires a high degree of particularity: Yadeta v. Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2023 ONSC 6387 at para 74, aff’d 2024 ONCA 341, leave to appeal refused 2025 290 (SCC). However, neither the statement of claim nor the plaintiffs’ written submissions to the r. 2.1 notice disclose a legal theory or a discernable claim against the government defendants, or show any connection between the government defendants and any harm suffered by Ms. Laing or Ms. Robinson, respectively, let alone any wrongful acts or omissions by these defendants.
16The lengthy statement of claim in the HMK Action raises no allegations of tortious conduct by any of Ontario’s officers, employees or agents. The only allegations against Ontario in the statement of claim for the HMK Action are found in a few paragraphs to the claim that broadly and vaguely raise assertions without any meaningful particulars that could support a viable legal claim.2 The claim in the HMK Action pleads that Ontario is closely linked to Trillium Health Partners as a “stakeholder” and “party”, and that both are close allies because the Secretary of the Cabinet was formerly CEO of Trillium Health Partners.3 The claim also raises bald and unclear assertions of an abuse of power.4 At best, it follows that the HMK Action seeks to implicate the government defendants because the provincial government is “involved” in funding or regulating health care or health coverage, and because health care is a matter under provincial jurisdiction. Ms. Robinson also baldly asserts that someone in the Ontario government is “tracing” her “OHIP health card and interfering in [her] healthcare and attempts to access care.”5 This constitutes the full extent of the allegations against Ontario and the Secretary of the Cabinet in the HMK Action. Even on the most generous reading of the statement of claim in the HMK Action, with allowances for drafting deficiencies, there is no discernable cause of action pleaded as against Ontario or the Secretary of the Cabinet nor any material facts or particulars given to show how the government defendants are liable for any alleged wrongdoing, what role they had in Ms. Laing’s care or death, or how they are proper parties to the action.
17The provincial Crown may only be held vicariously liability for tortious acts or omissions of its officers, employees, or agents, and cannot be directly liable in tort: s. 8(1) of the CLPA; Ontario v. Madan, 2023 ONCA 18 at paras 50-57. Furthermore, a public hospital, such as Trillium Health Partners, is an independent corporation for which government in not involved in its day-to-day affairs. It follows that Ontario and the Secretary of the Cabinet cannot be liable for Trillium Health Partner’s actions or operations: s. 9(1) CLPA; Umlauf v Halton Healthcare Services, 2017 ONSC 4240 at paras 16-18, affirmed 2018 ONCA 265.
18Accordingly, I am satisfied that the HMK Action as against the government defendants is frivolous for lacking any legal grounds or legal merit. On this basis, I am satisfied that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the HMK Action against these defendants to proceed.
19I also harbour concerns that the HMK Action may be frivolous for lacking legal merit as the claim would seem to be statute-barred by the basic 2-year limitation period, if not the ultimate 15-year limitation period: Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c.24, Sched B, s. 4. The HMK Action was started on October 28, 2025, that is more than 3 years from Ms. Laing’s passing on May 8, 2022, over 5 years from when she was diagnosed with cancer in June 2020, and over 18 years after her alleged misdiagnosis in June 2007. Claiming that their cause of action arose on June 6, 2007, the plaintiffs requisitioned default judgment with pre-judgment interest accruing from that date. In any event, as a tort claim by a trustee on behalf of a deceased must be started within 2 years of the death, it seems to follow that the HMK Action may be statute-barred on this basis as it was started over 3 years after Ms. Laing passed away: Trustee Act, RSO 1990, c. T.23, s. 38(3).
20In addition to finding the HMK Action against the government defendants to be frivolous for not advancing a cause of action against them, I find that the HMK Action against the other defendants is an abuse of the court’s process for being largely duplicative of the Trillium Action as it relates to Ms. Laing’s treatment and care, as the plaintiffs expressly acknowledge in the HMK Action and in their written submissions to the r. 2.1 notice. By Ms. Robinson’s own admission, the HMK Action was brought to plead further allegations of fact and to add defendants who were not properly added to the Trillium Action.6 The statements of claim in both actions include nearly identical factual allegations and placeholder identities over multiple paragraphs that extensively detail Ms. Laing’s medical history at length (i.e., for over 100 pages, with excerpts from her medical charts) including her diagnosis of mixed connective tissue disease in June 2007, her cancer diagnosis in June 2020, her treatments and surgeries, and her death from illness on May 8, 2022. Despite the minor variations or additions in the HMK Action in relation to the Trillium Action, I am satisfied that they do nothing to distinguish the HMK Action from the Trillium Action that are clearly duplicative of each other. An abuse of process may arise if duplicative proceedings would waste the resources of parties, witnesses, and the court: Chijindu v Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 6046 at para 1; Currie v Halton Regional Police Services Board at para 11; Lina Ahmed v Ministry of the Attorney General, 2020 ONSC 7892 at para 3, affirmed 2021 ONCA 427. Although the statement of claim in the HMK Action has some revised and added paragraphs when compared to the statement of claim in the Trillium Action, I accept that the HMK Action essentially advances the same underlying claims against doctors and hospital staff at Trillium Health Partners based on the same factual circumstances in the Trillium Action, which is being defended. In the circumstances, I find that the duplication between the HMK Action and the Trillium Action gives rise to an abuse of process that would be unduly wasteful of party and court resources such that the HMK Action should not be allowed to continue: Ibid.
21The statement of claim in the HMK Action exhibits may hallmarks of a vexatious pleading given its 258-page length (i.e., replete with links to media articles, social media blogs, and lengthy excerpts from caselaw and legislation), rambling or wandering narrative (i.e., that includes a paragraph running across four pages), and inconsistent formatting throughout the pleading: Lochner at paras 19-20; Gao v. Ontario, 2014 ONSC 6497 at paras 9, 14-15. Moreover, despite the February 9, 2026 order that stayed the HMK Action pending the outcome of the r. 2.1.01 procedure, Ms. Robinson, who is self-represented, served Ontario with a requisition to have the government defendants noted in default for an amount of over $387 million.7
22Taking everything into account, I am satisfied that the HMK Action is clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court’s process that should not be allowed to continue.
23Accordingly, the within HMK Action is dismissed without costs.
Date: May 19, 2026 M.T. Doi J.
CITATION: Laing Estate v. His Majesty the King in right of Ontario et al., 2026 ONSC 2865
COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00005957-0000
DATE: 2026 05 19
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Estate of Barbara Doreen Laing, represented by Tasheka Shereffa Robinson, Executor and Estate Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs
AND:
His Majesty the King in right of Ontario, Secretary of the Cabinet in Ontario et al., Defendants
BEFORE: M.T. Doi J.
COUNSEL: Tasheka Shereffa Robinson, self-represented Plaintiff Michele Valentini, for the Defendant, His Majesty the King in right of Ontario Jonathan C. Lisus and Nicole J. Kelly, for the Defendant, Secretary of the Cabinet Patrick Hawkins and Issac Wright, for the Defendant, Trillium Health Partners Nina Bombier and Mahgol Taghivand, for the Defendant Physicians
ENDORSEMENT
M.T. Doi J.
DATE: May 19, 2026
Footnotes
- The statement of claim improperly names Ontario as “His Majesty The King in Right of Ontario as Represented by the Attorney General of Ontario, Minister of Health – Ontario” and “Crown in Right of Ontario.”
- Statement of claim, p 148 at paras 138(q), 137(r), 138(bb), and 138(ff)(iv.).
- Statement of claim, p 148 at paras 138q, p 149 at para 138(r), p 161 at para 138(bb),
- Statement of claim, p 149 at para 138(r).
- Statement of claim, p 168 at para 138(ff)(iv.)
- Affidavit of Tasheka Shereffa Robinson sworn March 1, 2026 at para 1.
- The Plaintiffs are not in compliance with r.15.01 that requires estates to be represented by counsel: Scarangella v. Oakville Trafalgar Memorial Hospital, 2024 ONSC 5518. Although r. 2.03 affords the court a general discretion to dispense with compliance with any rule where necessary and in the interests of justice, this discretion is exercised sparingly for r.15.01 as the Legislature has clearly and intentionally limited the court’s discretion to allow a representative party to be self-represented: Ibid at para 10.