Court File and Parties

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Lina Ahmed, Plaintiff And: Ministry of the Attorney General and Justice of the Peace Louise Logue, Defendants

Before: A.A. Sanfilippo J.

Counsel: Lina Ahmed, Plaintiff acting in person Matthew Chung, for the Defendants

Heard: In writing, December 16, 2020

Endorsement

I. Overview

[1] This matter was referred to me by the Registrar further to a written request of the Defendants, the Ministry of the Attorney General and Justice of the Peace Louise Logue (collectively the “Defendants”), pursuant to Rules 2.1.01(1), 2.1.01(6), and 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, which provide as follows:

Order to Stay, Dismiss Proceeding

2.1.01 (1) The court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of this court.

2.1.01(6) Any party to the proceeding may file with the registrar a written request for an order under subrule (1).

2.1.01(7) If the registrar becomes aware that a proceeding could be the subject of an order under subrule (1), the registrar shall notify the court.

[2] The Defendants provided a copy of their request to the Plaintiff, Lina Ahmed.

II. Applicable Principles

[3] Rule 2.1 was enacted on July 1, 2014 to allow a Judge to exercise her or his gatekeeping function to determine, in a summary manner, whether, on its face, a proceeding should be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process. The Courts have provided guidance on the principles by which this Rule is to be applied, including as follows:

(a) The Court must read the pleading generously and identify the core complaint pleaded: Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, at para. 18; Covenoho v. Ceridian Canada, 2015 ONSC 2468. The Court must then assess whether there is a basis for application of the attenuated process under Rule 2.1.01 or whether another rule is available for the same subject matter: Raji v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, at paras. 8-9.

(b) The Rule should be “interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 O.A.C. 87, at para. 8.

(c) The application of this Rule should be limited to the “clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto, at para. 8.

(d) The focus is on the pleadings to assess whether the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process: Scaduto, at para. 11; Covenoho, at para. 6. The parties shall not deliver submissions with their request and do not deliver written submissions unless requested to do so by the Court under Rule 2.1.01(3)(4) and (5): Raji, at para. 12; Covenoho, at paras. 4-5. Here, the Defendants did not deliver any submissions with their request.

(e) A “frivolous” action is a proceeding that lacks a legal basis or legal merit: Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board (2003), 233 D.L.R. (4th) 657 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 14.

(f) A “vexatious” action is a proceeding that was instituted without reasonable ground: Currie, at para. 15, relying on Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.), at p. 226; or brought where it is obvious that the action cannot succeed; or brought for an improper purpose, including through duplicative proceedings: Currie, at para. 11.

(g) A proceeding is an abuse of process when it is inconsistent with the objectives of public policy: Currie, at para. 16, relying on Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), at para. 31, rev’d on other grounds 2002 SCC 63, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 307. “The doctrine of abuse of process engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute”: Canam Enterprises (C.A.), at para. 55.

(h) There is overlap between the meaning of the terms “frivolous, vexatious and abuse of process”, but they apply to “any action for which there is clearly no merit”: Currie, at para. 17.

[4] In Scaduto, at para. 9, the Court of Appeal endorsed the interpretation and application of Rule 2.1 set out by Myers J. in Raji, at paras. 8-9:

[R]ule 2.1 is not for close calls. Its availability is predicated on the abusive nature of the proceeding being apparent on the face of the pleadings themselves. …. [T]here are two conditions generally required for rule 2.1 to be applied. First, the frivolous, vexatious, or abusive nature of the proceeding should be apparent on the face of the pleading as required by the rule. Second, there should generally be a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process of rule 2.1.

[5] I will apply these principles to the Statement of Claim issued by Ms. Ahmed.

III. Analysis

[6] The Plaintiff pleaded that she was the victim of a home invasion that caused her injury. She pleaded that she attended before Justice of the Peace Logue some time between April 18, 2019 and May 10, 2019, for the purpose of applying for a peace bond which, the Plaintiff claims, was denied. The Plaintiff pleaded particulars of the conduct that she alleged of the Justice of the Peace. The Plaintiff claimed relief that she pleads is based on the home invasion and the alleged denial of a peace bond.

[7] There are no allegations in the Statement of Claim against the defendant the Ministry of the Attorney General.

[8] A Justice of the Peace has the same immunity from liability as a judge of the Superior Court of Justice: Justice of the Peace Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.4, s. 20; Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 82. A judge of the Superior Court of Justice is immune from a civil suit: Morier v. Rivard, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 716, at p. 737; Salasel v. Cuthbertson, 2015 ONCA 115, 124 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 35; Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 706 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal to the SCC refused [2000] 2 S.C.R. xiv (note), at para. 32; [Sirros v. Moore, [1974] 3 All. E.R. 776 (C.A.), at p. 785](Sirros v. Moore, [1974] 3 All. E.R. 776 (C.A.)).

[9] Accordingly, the defendant Justice of the Peace Logue is immune from this claim. This claim is thereby not sustainable at law, in that it has no legal basis or legal merit and is thereby frivolous. The claim against the defendant Justice of the Peace must therefore be dismissed.

[10] There is no claim pleaded in the Statement of Claim against the defendant Ministry of the Attorney General. This action against the Ministry of the Attorney General is thereby not sustainable on the basis that the Plaintiff has not pleaded a cause of action against this defendant and must be dismissed. I observe that the claim against the Ministry of the Attorney General is improper in that there is no basis for commencement of an action against a ministry of the Crown: Deep v. Ontario, [2004] O.J. No. 2734 (S.C.), at para. 82, aff’d Deep v. Ontario, [2005] O.J. No. 1294 (C.A.); Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, at s. 14.

IV. Disposition

[11] I order that this Action is dismissed.

A.A. Sanfilippo J. Date: December 16, 2020