Court of Appeal for Ontario

DATE: 20221007 DOCKET: C70299

van Rensburg, Pardu and Copeland JJ.A.

Parties and Counsel

BETWEEN

Ian LeBlanc, Gil Huns LeBlanc (also known as Gilles LeBlanc) and Clara Ocampo Applicants (Respondents)

and

Lina Saleh Ahmed Alghamdi, also known as Lina Saleh Ahmed Algahamdi, also known as Lina Ahmed Respondent (Appellant)

Counsel: Lina Ahmed, acting in person J.F. Lalonde, for the respondents

Heard: September 19, 2022 by video conference

On appeal from the order of Justice Andra Pollak of the Superior Court of Justice, dated December 7, 2021, with reasons reported at 2021 ONSC 7330.

Reasons for Decision

1Ms. Ahmed appeals from an order declaring that she is a vexatious litigant within the meaning of s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the “CJA”). The order provided further that the action against the respondents was discontinued and that she was prohibited from initiating or continuing any proceeding against the respondents without leave of a judge of the Superior Court.

Background

2The litigation between the appellant and the respondents had its genesis in a short-term rental of a home owned by Gilles LeBlanc and Clara Ocampo to the appellant.

3Ian LeBlanc, son of the occupants, made arrangements for the rental through the Airbnb platform. The rental agreement provided for a 30-day notice period for termination. The respondents gave notice to terminate the arrangement, but the appellant refused to leave. On March 26, 2019, the respondents entered the property to inspect it, after giving further notice to the appellant. A confrontation resulted.

4Ian LeBlanc’s evidence was that the appellant pushed him against the stairs. He called 911 and sent his parents to the second floor for safety while he remained in the stairwell and recorded the events on his phone. He says the video showed the appellant grabbing an object and cutting her thumb to simulate an injury caused by another party.

5Ms. Ahmed’s alleges that her home was broken into, that she was physically and sexually tortured by Mr. Ian LeBlanc and by responding Ottawa Police (“OPS”) officers, that those police officers were racist, that she was left disabled by the attack and that she was left half-naked and bleeding.

6The appellant submits that the application judge erred in granting the order requested. In her factum she raises the following grounds of appeal:

(i) That the application judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of her jurisdiction in interpreting s. 140 of the CJA;

(ii) That the application judge erred by misapprehending the evidence presented;

(iii) That the application judge’s reasons were inadequate and obstructed meaningful appellate review; and

(iv) That there was a prejudicial impact of the decision on the appellant.

7Further, in the course of argument, the appellant submitted that the entire judicial system was prejudiced against her and that the application judge lied when she expressed views about the content of the video taken by Ian LeBlanc. She reiterated a request for an adjournment which the panel had previously refused and requested that the court appoint the Human Rights Commission as intervener. She claimed the intervention was necessary because she says she was disabled as a result of the confrontation, but she had not produced any medical evidence to support her claim that she is unable to advance her arguments. She appeared remotely and was able to express herself. The panel refused her further requests for an adjournment and to appoint an intervener.

The Application Judge’s Reasons

8The application judge’s reasons are sparse. After reviewing the evidence, s. 140 of the CJA and a number of authorities describing the characteristics of vexatious litigants, she noted “Many of these principles are applicable in the proceedings commenced by the Respondent. I thus find that the Applicants have met their burden of proving that the Respondent is a vexatious litigant as set out by s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act”.

Analysis

9Section 140 of the CJA provides as follows:

Vexatious proceedings

140 (1) Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds,

(a) instituted vexatious proceedings in any court; or

(b) conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner,

the judge may order that,

(c) no further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court; or

(d) a proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court not be continued,

except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

10We begin with the observation that s. 140 applies to both proceedings that are themselves vexatious and to proceedings that are conducted in a vexatious manner. Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”) provides that a court may stay or dismiss a proceeding in a summary manner, on the basis of written material if a proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. In contrast, s. 140 of the CJA ordinarily requires a hearing, on notice to the respondent. Both measures are designed to alleviate the burden on parties and to the judicial institutions caused by lengthy, spurious, and repetitious proceedings.

11Vexatious proceedings do not arise out of thin air; rather, both statutory provisions, either expressly or implicitly, contemplate an animating vexatious litigant. Features characteristic of vexatious litigants, most recently summarized at para. 20 of Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, include:

• bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine already determined issues;
• rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings;
• persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals;
• failure to pay costs awards; and
• bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought.

12Often documents in such proceedings are marked by persistent reiteration and hyperbolic amplification, unintelligible or confused arguments, written submissions containing much that is not relevant, exhaustion of rights of review or appeal anytime there is an adverse decision, unsustainable allegations and gratuitous complaints against members of the legal profession: Lochner, at paras. 19-20.

13The entire context must be looked at, always keeping in mind that legitimate claims should not be unfairly foreclosed. An application under s. 140 of the CJA is in no way a substitute for a summary judgment motion, but some proceedings are so lacking in substance that it is reasonable to conclude that they are vexatious and should not be allowed to continue.

14There is no doubt that the application made pursuant to s. 140 was properly before the application judge and that she had jurisdiction to rule on the matter. The question on appeal is whether she erred in making the order she did. We are satisfied that the record below amply supports the conclusion that the appellant conducted the proceedings against the respondents in a vexatious manner and further that the proceedings are the product of malice, that is to say they are pursued for improper or vexatious purposes.

Multiplicity of Proceedings

15The appellant commenced three separate actions arising out of the confrontation in issue.

16First, by a statement of claim filed in the Superior Court on February 17, 2021, she sued each of the respondents for assault, battery, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of mental distress. She complained of the conduct of the police during the confrontation and alleged that the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (“OIPRD”) and the Ministry of the Attorney General confirmed the misconduct of the police and offered to support her case by testifying in her favour. She alleged that Ian LeBlanc was an intelligence agent employed by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”).

17The respondents filed their notice of intent to defend on March 9, 2021 and served a statement of defence and counterclaim on the appellant on March 25, 2021. They were advised that they had been noted in default. The respondents say that the appellant noted them in default by using fraudulent affidavits of service. The appellant’s response to the motion to set aside the noting in default was to indicate that she would block all further emails from the firm representing the respondents and would file a complaint with the Law Society.

18The respondent’s motion to set aside the noting in default was heard on July 8, 2021 and was granted with costs to the respondents fixed at $2,000. The appellant sought leave to appeal the order of the master setting aside the noting in default to the Divisional Court. That motion should have been brought before a judge of the Superior Court but further action on that matter was deferred until after the vexatious litigant application was heard.

19On March 24, 2021, the appellant started another action arising out of the same confrontation. She sued Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, the Ottawa Police Board, and a number of individual officers of the OPS, including the Chief of Police. She sought damages for torture, assault, battery, uttering threats, intimidation, abuse of public office, and breaches of the Charter. Her claims against Canada invoked multiple international conventions, including the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and she sought damages of $10.5 million. She also sought an order in the nature of mandamus instructing the OPS to arrest and charge Ian LeBlanc.

20On June 18, 2021, the appellant sued the Attorney General of Canada, CSIS, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (“NSIRA”), Ian LeBlanc, the Ministry of the Attorney General, the OIPRD, the OPS and several of its members, including the chief of police in the Federal Court. Again, all of her claims relate to the confrontation on March 26, 2019, which she characterized as an “alleged operation by alleged CSIS agent named Ian LeBlanc who conducted home invasion, physical assault, and torture on me.” She sought approximately $60 million in damages. Contrary to her allegations in an earlier statement of claim, she alleged in this claim instead that the OIPRD had covered up crimes against her and were conspiring against her along with CSIS (including its director), the NSIRA, various police officers, as well as Ian LeBlanc.

21Beyond her efforts to appeal the setting aside of the noting in default of the respondents, the appellant has commenced numerous other motions and has appealed many of the procedural orders made within the actions listed above. On June 29, 2021, the appellant served a motion for contempt on counsel for the respondent in the first action, returnable July 6, 2021, but did not provide proof of filing with the court. She did not respond to the respondent’s request for confirmation that the motion had actually been filed.

22The appellant brought a motion for a Mareva injunction, also within the first action, and served it on the respondents on May 16, 2021. Her affidavit in support was unsworn. A practice court judge ordered that her motion would not be heard until after the respondents’ application under s. 140 of the CJA had been decided. The appellant served a notice of appeal seeking to set aside the decision of the practice court judge.

23There is no apparent merit to any of the appeals that the appellant has brought from procedural orders made in these proceedings.

24Additionally, the appellant tried to apply for a peace bond based on the same confrontation. This was refused. She sued the Ministry of the Attorney General and the Justice of the Peace as a result of that refusal. That action was dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01 of the Rules, and a further appeal to this court was dismissed on the ground that the claim was “frivolous and completely devoid of merit”: Lina Ahmed v. Ministry of the Attorney General, 2020 ONSC 7892, aff’d 2021 ONCA 427. Ian LeBlanc received a Notice to Appear as a result of the appellant’s attempts to initiate this process. He attended at the Ottawa courthouse in response, but when the appellant did not appear the notice was dismissed.

25Lastly, and of note, the respondents attempted to cross-examine the appellant on the affidavit she filed in response to the s. 140 application. She refused without reasonable excuse to answer questions put to her or to participate in any meaningful way.

Documents Filed by the Appellant

26The documents filed by the appellant are characterized by vitriol expressed towards anyone who does not agree with her. She has alleged broad conspiracies which seem utterly farfetched. Her documents are full of scandalous comments about personal traits of the respondents that have nothing to do with the matters in issue. The detailed personal information she has inserted into her documents supports Ian LeBlanc’s statement that she broke into a locked room in the rented premises and took personal documents belonging to the respondents. Her many hyperbolic statements are not supported by evidence. She accuses the application judge, the police, lawyers and numerous agencies of lying, fraud or conspiracy. She has made claims for relief that no reasonable person would expect to obtain.

Appellant’s Argument on Appeal

27In her argument on this appeal, the appellant relied heavily on the video recording taken by Ian LeBlanc during the confrontation. She submits that the recording does not show her cutting herself so that she could falsely claim that she had been assaulted, contrary to what was said by the application judge. Ian LeBlanc deposed in his affidavit that there was a portion of the video which showed the appellant cutting herself. There is a portion of the video where the appellant is doing something with her hands and an object, which is not entirely clear. The appellant showed us the recording on her cellphone which she placed in front of her camera during the remote hearing. There is nothing in the recording she showed to us that supports her allegations that she was tortured, sexually assaulted, and left half-naked and bleeding.

28Further, police at the scene viewed the recording. Although they refused to remove the appellant from the premises as they viewed the issue as a matter for the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”), they declined to lay charges against the respondents. The OIPRD also reviewed the recording and concluded that the appellant’s complaints against the police were not substantiated. Under these circumstances it would be reasonable to infer that the recording did not assist the appellant’s case.

Examples of Incredible Claims by the Appellant

29The appellant argued before the LTB that she did not receive notice of a hearing before that board, and that it was just by happenstance that she attended at the place, date and time set for the hearing of the respondent’s claims against her in that forum. This is not credible. She alleges without supporting evidence that the respondent Ian LeBlanc is a CSIS agent and part of a broad conspiracy with CSIS to harm her. Ian LeBlanc’s statement that he has never been employed by CSIS nor represented that he was so employed is credible in these circumstances. It is unclear how there could be any basis for an action against Canada or the NSIRA.

Evidence of Malice on the Appellant’s Part

30Ian LeBlanc says that on April 23, 2019, the appellant waylaid him at the courthouse and spat upon him. This event was captured on a security video. Police viewed the video and charged her with assault.

Unpaid Orders for Costs Against Her

31The appellant has not paid the orders for costs made against her.

Conclusion

32Given the multiplicity of proceedings, the manner in which the appellant has pursued this litigation, the unsupported and farfetched claims, the evidence of malice and the unpaid costs, the order made by the application judge was well supported by the evidence before her.

33The application judge limited her order to proceedings involving the respondents. That she did not go further and extend the order to all proceedings proposed or continued by the appellant inured to the benefit of the appellant on this application and was a permissible exercise of the application judge’s discretion.

34The appellant also asked this court to consider fresh evidence. We do not see how the proposed fresh evidence could be of any assistance and do not admit it.

35The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondents fixed at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.