Peter M. Campbell

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 years imprisonment (less 5 years for time served) imposed on December 21, 2016 for multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences.

The sentencing judge had determined an appropriate aggregate sentence of 17 years before applying mitigating factors and the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence unfit, holding that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's guilty pleas, his relative youth and status as a first offender at the time of the initial offences, and the principle that an offender should not be crushed by the sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 9 years imprisonment (less 5 years for pre-sentence custody).

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He brought two applications for a stay of proceedings based on infringement of his right to a timely trial under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The first application was dismissed on September 25, 2015, and the second was brought following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Jordan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of both applications and dismissed the appeal against conviction.

The accused, Lowell Somerville, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging abuse of process.

The application stemmed from police misconduct during the execution of a search warrant at his storage unit, where an officer stole a valuable Tony Montana statue and subsequently fabricated evidence.

The court found that four police officers lied under oath to conceal the theft and their knowledge of it.

The court concluded that this egregious state conduct, including theft and perjury, profoundly undermined the integrity of the justice system, warranting a stay of proceedings despite the serious drug charges faced by the accused.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police seized 554 grams of methamphetamine and $2,000 from a hotel suite rented by the offender.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of commercial mid-level trafficking against the mitigating factor of the offender's 15-year drug addiction.

The offender was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, reduced to 80 days after credit for pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation.

The applicant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was committed for trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession after police found 6.2 grams of crack cocaine on the vehicle's centre console.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the committal, arguing there was no evidence he had control over the drugs.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that mere proximity and opportunity to control the drugs did not amount to actual or constructive possession.

The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer control from the evidence, and quashed the committal for trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

During his arrest, police officers mistook him for a fugitive and used excessive force, including punching, kneeing, and tasering him while he was handcuffed and compliant.

The court found the officers' testimony to be contrived and untruthful, and accepted the accused's version of events.

Concluding that the police conduct was extra-judicial punishment that offended society's sense of fair play and decency, the court found a breach of section 7 of the Charter and ordered a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of codeine following a traffic stop.

The accused brought an application to exclude the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the stop was arbitrary and based on racial profiling, and the subsequent arrest and search were unlawful.

The court found the arresting officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop and his observations of the drugs to be untruthful.

Concluding that the accused's ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were seriously breached, the court excluded the drug evidence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking after police, acting on a confidential informant's tip and subsequent surveillance, arrested her and searched her vehicle and residences.

On appeal, she argued her ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were violated because the police lacked objectively reasonable grounds for her arrest and the search warrant for her home was unjustified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the informant's tip was credible, compelling, and corroborated by surveillance, providing reasonable grounds for arrest and a sufficient nexus to search the residence.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The applicant sought review of a detention order on serious opium possession, importation, and conspiracy charges, arguing both error in principle and a material change based on a revised release plan including sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court accepted that electronic monitoring constituted a material change sufficient to permit a de novo review, but held detention remained necessary on the primary ground.

The court emphasized the strength of the Crown's case, the applicant's prior foreign conviction for heroin importation, minimal roots in Canada, strong family and economic ties to Iran, and the absence of an effective mechanism to prevent absconding.

Electronic monitoring was found to assist only in notification after flight, not prevention.

The review application was dismissed.

The accused applied for a subpoena requiring police to produce a confidential informant file following the dismissal of a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized under a search warrant.

The accused argued that, under Step 6 of the Garofoli procedure, the trial judge should review the informant file to ensure police compliance with informant handling procedures and the reliability of information provided to obtain the warrant.

The court held that disclosure or judicial review of such material requires a threshold showing that the material could reasonably assist the defence, and mere speculation or a desire to verify police conduct is insufficient.

The judge rejected the argument that Step 6 transforms the court into an inquisitorial investigator and emphasized the continued primacy of the adversarial system and the strength of informer privilege.

The application for a subpoena and judicial review of the informant file was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of drugs and cash seized from his home pursuant to a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act search warrant, alleging the Information to Obtain failed to disclose reasonable and probable grounds and contained misleading information.

The court applied Step 6 of the Garofoli process to review redacted informant material and determine whether the excised information could support the warrant.

After reviewing the unredacted ITO and a judicial summary, the court found the informant’s tip compelling, credible, and sufficiently corroborated by police investigation.

Although certain statements in the ITO were misleading, they did not undermine the overall basis for the warrant once excised.

The court concluded there was no breach of s. 8 of the Charter and that, in any event, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine and cannabis for the purposes of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

A Charter application was brought challenging the lawfulness of the vehicle search and cell phone seizure.

The court found that the initial traffic stop was justified based on unattached licence plates.

However, the subsequent search of the concealed tire-well compartment in the vehicle trunk was found to be an unreasonable search in breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable grounds to arrest prior to discovering the drugs and that the search was not a bona fide inventory search but rather a pretext for a drug investigation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years' imprisonment for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, producing crack cocaine, and possession of marijuana.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider his youthfulness, his decision to limit the trial to a Charter application, and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's age, extensive criminal record, and the large quantity of crack cocaine involved.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and conspiring to import heroin after a controlled delivery of a package to a third party's apartment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of the third party, who claimed the appellants orchestrated the importation.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was fatally flawed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the charge failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing credibility, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, improperly exhorted minority jurors to reconsider their views, and failed to separately review the evidence against each appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of property obtained by crime, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging police entrapment.

The accused argued that the undercover officer lacked reasonable suspicion prior to initiating a telephone call that led to the drug transaction.

The court held that police were entitled to make the investigative call without prior reasonable suspicion and that reasonable suspicion arose during the conversation before the accused was provided an opportunity to commit the offence.

The court found the police conduct did not constitute random virtue testing and did not create an undue risk of inducing innocent individuals to commit crimes.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of charges for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, alleging unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to trial approached 24 months, exceeding the guidelines established in earlier Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The court examined the length of delay, waiver, explanations for delay, and alleged prejudice to the accused.

Most delay was attributed to institutional factors and inherent requirements of the case, with a small portion attributable to the defence and none to the Crown.

Balancing these factors, the court held that the delay was not sufficiently unreasonable to outweigh society’s interest in a trial on serious indictable charges.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainants' credibility regarding consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony about her lack of consent and concluding that the trial judge did not engage in impermissible propensity reasoning.