J. Marchand

The court sentenced Arthur Kotula for two counts of dangerous operation causing death and two counts of dangerous operation causing bodily harm, following a fatal multi-vehicle collision.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Kotula’s lack of prior record, his immigration status, and the impact on the victims’ families.

The court imposed a global sentence of six and a half years, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, a 15-year driving prohibition, and a weapons prohibition.

The decision discusses the sentencing range for dangerous driving offences and the effect of recent legislative amendments.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He argued that the police violated his right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b) of the Charter by failing to wait a reasonable amount of time for his preferred lawyer to call back and by improperly influencing him to speak with duty counsel instead.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court agreed, finding that the police failed to take reasonable steps to contact his counsel of choice and interfered with his right by suggesting he speak with duty counsel.

The court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, noting a systemic problem with police failing to respect the right to counsel of choice, and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Exceed 80 following a roadside stop for a Highway Traffic Act infraction.

The trial proceeded as a blended hearing on consent due to Charter issues.

The court found that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were breached when the breathalyzer technician failed to offer a further opportunity for legal consultation despite objective indicators that the accused was confused about his rights and obligations.

The breath readings were excluded under s. 24(2) as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

However, the court found the accused guilty of Operation Impaired based on observations of impairment preceding the Charter breach.

The court also addressed the retrospective application of the presumption of identity in transition cases under Bill C-46.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol and stunt driving.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, erroneously relied on the repealed presumption of identity under the Criminal Code, and erred in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no uneven scrutiny, holding that the presumption of identity continues to apply to transitional cases where the offence predated the legislative amendments, and concluding that the police fulfilled their informational and implementational duties under section 10(b) without steering the appellant toward duty counsel.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant was arrested following a failed breath screening device test during a marine safety inspection.

He challenged the admissibility of breath samples obtained after his arrest, arguing that police failed to provide sufficient information about his right to counsel and that his waiver was not informed.

The court found no breach of the defendant's Charter rights, holding that the defendant was provided adequate information about his right to counsel, that he did not assert his right to counsel, and that his waiver was clear, unequivocal, and informed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80, and dangerous driving after a vehicle was seen driving with a heavily damaged wheel throwing sparks.

The court found the circumstantial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver.

The accused applied to exclude breath test results based on a common law discretion to prevent an unfair trial, following a prior ruling that found a Charter breach but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, holding that s. 24(2) is the exclusive mechanism for excluding breath test results obtained following a Charter breach.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving and driving over 80.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a rear-end collision on Highway 409.

The Crown alleged the defendant's vehicle struck the victim's vehicle at approximately 4:15 am on January 31, 2016.

While the court found the defendant was clearly the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision, it acquitted him of impaired driving.

The Crown's evidence consisted primarily of an odor of alcohol detected by the investigating officer and the nature of the collision itself.

The court found this evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, distinguishing the case from precedents where additional indicia of impairment were present.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood (exceed 80) following a roadside sobriety check.

A police officer observed the defendant exiting a bar at 2:39 am, conducted an approved screening device (ASD) test at 2:49 am after the defendant reported consuming a shot of tequila at approximately 2:35 am, and obtained a "Fail" result.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the ASD result on two grounds: (1) violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to facilitate contact with counsel at the roadside, and (2) potential unreliability of the ASD test due to insufficient waiting time to account for mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no violation of the right to counsel and, assuming arguendo a potential breach regarding the mouth alcohol protocol, concluded that the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with defrauding her employer, the LCBO, by scanning items through her cash register, accepting cash payments, and then immediately voiding the sales without turning over the cash.

On eight separate occasions between October 10 and 25, 2014, the accused engaged in this pattern of conduct.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video surveillance and electronic journal records.

The court found that the only reasonable inference from the undisputed facts was that the accused deliberately kept the cash while concealing the purchases from the employer's records.

The defence argued that a supervisor could have removed the money, but the court rejected this as speculative.

The accused was found guilty of fraud under $5,000.