Jennifer D. Strasberg

The accused, Malcom Bryce-Brown, faced ten criminal counts, including sexual assault, assault bodily harm, assault, possession of child pornography, and probation breaches.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of child pornography, two counts of assault (one causing bodily harm), and three related probation breaches based on concessions.

For the remaining counts, including sexual assault and assault bodily harm related to a choking incident, the court found reasonable doubt regarding consent, particularly concerning the agreed-upon "safe word" and the complainant's impaired memory due to marijuana use.

The court also addressed the legal principles of vitiation of consent in sexual activity involving bodily harm, concluding that the Crown did not prove the subjective intent to cause bodily harm required to vitiate consent in the choking incident, nor was sufficient evidence of bodily harm presented.

D.W. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation involving the complainant G.J., who was 13-15 years old at the time of the offence (1988-1990).

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the abuse of a position of trust and authority, the grooming and manipulation of a vulnerable child, the repetitive nature of the abuse over two years, and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her family.

Mitigating factors included the offender's guilty plea, lack of a prior criminal record, low risk of reoffending, and strong family support.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for child abuse offences.

The court sentenced D.W. to three years and six months in jail, along with a DNA order and a 10-year SOIRA order.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court hearsay statements made by the complainant, W.W., an adult with Down Syndrome, in a sexual assault trial.

The court assessed the admissibility under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, focusing on necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found W.W. incapable of testifying meaningfully due to her communication limitations, thus establishing necessity.

Reliability was established based on the circumstances of the statements, including their spontaneity, corroborating behavioral changes, lack of motive to fabricate, and the declarant's relationship with the recipients.

The statements were deemed admissible.

The offender, Michael Johnson, pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired operation causing death, two counts of dangerous operation causing death, one count of impaired driving causing bodily harm, and one count of dangerous operation causing bodily harm.

These charges stemmed from a high-speed collision (161 km/h in a 50 km/h zone) while impaired (BAC 1.5-2x legal limit) that resulted in the deaths of two pedestrians and serious injury to a third.

The defence argued that the offender's suicidal ideation at the time of the collision should be a mitigating factor, while the Crown argued it was an aggravating factor due to the foreseeable risk to public safety.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be significant, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The court concluded that driving recklessly with suicidal intent on a public street constitutes an aggravating factor.

A sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and a DNA order.