Joanne Park

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg percent, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1)(a), adducing the certificate of the qualified technician and two analyst certificates.

The central issue was whether the Crown must prove, not merely disclose, the target value of the alcohol standard used in the system calibration check in order to rely on the presumption of accuracy.

The majority held that while the target value must be disclosed pursuant to s. 320.34(1)(b), it need not be independently proven at trial as a precondition to the presumption of accuracy, as Parliament did not intend it to be a statutory precondition.

Côté J. dissented, finding that both disclosure and proof of the target value are constitutionally required to preserve the presumption of innocence and the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding the legal limit within two hours of ceasing to operate the vehicle.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code to prove the appellant's blood alcohol concentration, relying solely on the certificate of the qualified technician rather than producing independent evidence from the analyst who certified the alcohol standard.

The central question was whether s. 320.31(1)(a)'s requirement that the system calibration check be conducted with an alcohol standard certified by an analyst could be proved through the qualified technician's hearsay evidence.

The majority held that Parliament intended to preserve the evidentiary rule allowing the qualified technician's certificate to satisfy the precondition, finding that the phrase 'certified by an analyst' carries the same meaning as the former 'suitable for use' and that s. 320.32(1) creates a broad hearsay exception encompassing the qualified technician's statement about certification.

Côté J. dissented, concluding that the 2018 amendments established a new requirement that the Crown lead independent evidence from the analyst and that permitting double hearsay to ground a conclusive presumption of guilt is constitutionally suspect and contrary to the plain meaning of the provisions.

Joel France pleaded guilty to unlawful act manslaughter in the death of two-year-old Nicholas Cruz, stemming from a failure to provide necessities of life.

The court considered aggravating factors, including France's repeated physical abuse of Nicholas and domestic abuse of Nicholas's mother, Marleny Cruz, as well as his abuse of a position of trust.

Mitigating factors included his lack of a criminal record and difficult childhood, though his limited remorse was noted.

The Crown sought a ten-year sentence, while the defence sought four to six years.

The court imposed a nine-year sentence, with a six-year credit for pre-trial custody, and issued ancillary orders including a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items and his security guard uniform.

A two-year-old child died from blunt force trauma to the abdomen.

The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter for failing to provide necessaries of life.

This decision addresses a Gardiner hearing to determine aggravating factors for sentencing.

The Crown sought to prove that the defendant assaulted the child's mother, inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, and assaulted the child on other occasions.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant physically and emotionally abused the child's mother and repeatedly assaulted the child on various parts of the body, constituting despicable assaultive behavior.

However, the court could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, considering other possible explanations and witness credibility issues.

Joel France was charged with second-degree murder.

This decision concerns a voir dire ruling on the admissibility and scope of expert evidence from Dr. Michael Pollanen, a forensic pathologist, regarding the cause of death of Nicholas Cruz.

The court limited Dr. Pollanen's testimony, prohibiting opinions on whether the fatal injury was deliberately inflicted or accidental, the statistical probabilities of causes, or inferences based on other injuries.

The court also restricted the language used by the expert, disallowing terms like "significant blow" and "consistent with" to avoid misleading the jury.

The judge found Dr. Pollanen's preparation and impartiality lacking in certain aspects, highlighting the dangers of expert overreaching and bias.

Two doctors subpoenaed to testify at a murder trial brought a motion seeking an order authorizing them to disclose the deceased child's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that no such order is necessary because a witness compelled by law to answer relevant questions at trial is not exposed to liability for breaching confidentiality.

The appellant pleaded guilty to offences related to a large-scale marijuana grow operation and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias through comments about ethnicity and erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal condemned the trial judge's stereotypical comments about ethnicity but upheld the custodial sentence, noting conditional sentences are rarely appropriate for large-scale commercial grow operations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal to correct a mathematical error the trial judge made when calculating the sentence reduction for the guilty plea, reducing the sentence to 10 months' imprisonment.

The appellant communicated in an internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

Believing he was communicating with a child, the appellant transmitted a video of himself masturbating.

He was convicted of communicating for the purpose of facilitating the exposure of his genitals to a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued that the offence was impossible to complete because the officer was not actually a child, and that the exposure offence required the parties to be in the same physical location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused's belief about the victim's age was sufficient for the inchoate offence, and that the exposure offence applies to images sent over the internet.