Emily A. Cochrane

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding the legal limit within two hours of ceasing to operate the vehicle.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code to prove the appellant's blood alcohol concentration, relying solely on the certificate of the qualified technician rather than producing independent evidence from the analyst who certified the alcohol standard.

The central question was whether s. 320.31(1)(a)'s requirement that the system calibration check be conducted with an alcohol standard certified by an analyst could be proved through the qualified technician's hearsay evidence.

The majority held that Parliament intended to preserve the evidentiary rule allowing the qualified technician's certificate to satisfy the precondition, finding that the phrase 'certified by an analyst' carries the same meaning as the former 'suitable for use' and that s. 320.32(1) creates a broad hearsay exception encompassing the qualified technician's statement about certification.

Côté J. dissented, concluding that the 2018 amendments established a new requirement that the Crown lead independent evidence from the analyst and that permitting double hearsay to ground a conclusive presumption of guilt is constitutionally suspect and contrary to the plain meaning of the provisions.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg percent, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1)(a), adducing the certificate of the qualified technician and two analyst certificates.

The central issue was whether the Crown must prove, not merely disclose, the target value of the alcohol standard used in the system calibration check in order to rely on the presumption of accuracy.

The majority held that while the target value must be disclosed pursuant to s. 320.34(1)(b), it need not be independently proven at trial as a precondition to the presumption of accuracy, as Parliament did not intend it to be a statutory precondition.

Côté J. dissented, finding that both disclosure and proof of the target value are constitutionally required to preserve the presumption of innocence and the accused's right to make full answer and defence.