David Locke

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought alleging a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused clearly and unequivocally requested to speak to his lawyer of choice but needed to contact his wife to obtain the lawyer's name and phone number.

The police failed to facilitate this contact and did not adequately explain the role of duty counsel.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel and excluded the breath samples pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded a violation of section 10(b) rights, acknowledging that special circumstances existed requiring the police to ensure the accused understood his legal rights in a meaningful way.

The central issue was whether the breath sample evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused's limited English proficiency and sincere request for a Punjabi language interpreter were not adequately addressed, resulting in a failure to provide meaningful consultation with counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the approved screening device demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found a nine-minute delay between the formation of suspicion and the ASD demand, during which the accused was detained without being informed of his rights to counsel or the reason for detention.

The court determined that multiple Charter violations occurred and excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE spot-check.

During arrest, the defendant's turban was accidentally knocked off.

The turban was not returned for over three hours, despite the defendant's religious observance as a Sikh.

The Crown conceded that the failure to return the turban violated the defendant's freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a section 24(2) analysis under R. v. Grant to determine whether admission of breath sample evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found the breach serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests significant, and that the long-term repute of the administration of justice favoured exclusion of the evidence.

The breath samples were excluded and the defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg following a motor vehicle collision on June 10, 2014.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence obtained after the accused's arrest.

The defence challenged the admissibility of this evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police failed to make the breath demand as soon as practicable, breached the accused's right to counsel by failing to inform him immediately upon arrest, and failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to counsel in private.

The court excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal on all counts.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual touching of a person under 14 and sexual assault arising from allegations made by a former child music student concerning conduct said to have occurred during private lessons over several years.

The court reviewed the presumption of innocence, the reasonable doubt standard, and the W.(D.) framework in assessing competing testimony from the complainant and the accused.

Although the complainant testified in a generally forthright manner, the court found reliability concerns arising from delayed disclosure, memory that appeared to improve over time, aspects of her post-offence conduct, and the absence of confirming evidence.

The accused's denial, supported in part by contextual evidence about others being present in the apartment, left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The Crown brought an application at a preliminary inquiry for an order permitting audio/video recording of testimony from certain witnesses in a first-degree murder case.

The Crown argued that the evidence of witnesses directly involved in the alleged offence or closely associated with the accused was vulnerable and that videotaping would preserve a complete record for potential use under Criminal Code section 715(1) if witnesses became unavailable or hostile at trial.

The defence argued the court lacked jurisdiction to order videotaping.

The court granted the application in part, permitting videotaping of witnesses directly implicated in the offence but denying it for family members and associates not implicated in the crime.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration after failing a roadside screening test.

The defendant's BAC readings were more than twice the legal limit.

The defence argued that the arresting officer's seven-minute delay in making the approved screening device demand violated the defendant's Charter section 8 rights to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the delay did breach the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, rendering the searches and seizures unreasonable.

However, applying the section 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court determined that the evidence should be admitted as the balance of factors favoured admission.

The defendant was convicted.