Thomas M. Hicks

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breath sample evidence obtained in breach of his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The trial judge had found the roadside breath demand violated the appellant's Charter rights because the officer lacked objectively reasonable suspicion, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter applying the R. v. Grant framework.

On appeal, the sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding the first stage of the Grant test favoured admission.

The appeal court found the trial judge did not improperly equate the officer's conduct with good faith, but rather assessed the totality of police conduct including respectful treatment and diligence in facilitating s. 10(b) rights, and upheld the s. 24(2) analysis as reasonable and well-supported.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device.

She argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting her defence that she did not understand the officer's instructions due to a language barrier.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions—that the appellant understood the instructions and feigned her inability to provide a sample—were supported by the evidence, including the in-car video recording.

The trial judge's reasons were found to be adequate and her credibility assessments were entitled to deference.

The appellant, Timothy Massey-Patel, appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, that she erred in assessing witness evidence, and that she relied on impermissible stereotypes and applied uneven scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her assessment of evidence sound, and that she did not rely on stereotypes or apply uneven scrutiny.

The court affirmed that a reasonable doubt on one aspect of the alleged assault (penile penetration) did not invalidate the conviction for other sexual touching and digital penetration, as the doubt arose from reliability concerns, not credibility of the complainant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and applied unequal scrutiny to the defence and Crown evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge made minor mistakes regarding the evidence, these misapprehensions did not play an essential role in the conviction and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court also held that the trial judge properly scrutinized both the Crown and defence evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown presented evidence of breath test readings of 160 mgs alcohol per 100 ml blood and 150 mgs alcohol per 100 ml blood.

The defence raised two issues: first, whether the Daylight Savings Time adjustment on the morning of the events affected the admissibility of the certificate as evidence, and second, whether the defendant's Charter section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure was breached.

The court found that the DST adjustment was properly accounted for and that the officer had reasonable grounds to demand an approved screening device sample.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, challenging the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application and arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to give adequate reasons.

The appeal focused on whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breath demand under s. 254(3).

The court reviewed the trial record and applicable authorities regarding sufficiency of reasons and the standard of review for findings of fact and legal conclusions.

It held that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and that the officer’s observations of driving behaviour, odour of alcohol, demeanour, and physical appearance supported both subjective and objective grounds for arrest.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or application of the law.

The appellant appealed convictions for refusing to comply with a breath demand, assault with intent to resist arrest, four counts of assaulting a police officer, and carrying a concealed weapon following a roadside stop for speeding.

The appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, erred in dismissing Charter claims alleging violations of s. 10(b), s. 7, and s. 12, and incorrectly found that police had grounds to demand a breath sample.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and that credibility findings rejecting the appellant’s evidence were entitled to deference.

The court further held that police were justified in delaying access to counsel due to safety concerns and that reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption supported the roadside demand.

The convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the reliability of Intoxilyzer 8000C breath test results.

The appellant contended that the decline in successive breath readings suggested malfunction or analytical variability in the instrument and that the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The court held that the evidence demonstrated the instrument was properly calibrated and functioning, and that the discrepancy in readings was adequately explained by biological variability and normal alcohol elimination.

The trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or reverse the burden of proof.

The conviction for impaired driving was upheld.

The appellant, a correctional officer, pleaded guilty to assaulting an inmate and was sentenced to 60 days' incarceration.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by improperly relying on hearsay evidence when finding the assault was unprovoked and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit, contending a conditional sentence should have been imposed.

The court held the sentencing judge erred in placing the burden on the offender to prove provocation rather than on the Crown to prove the aggravating circumstance of an unprovoked assault.

However, the error did not affect the fitness of the sentence.

Given the abuse of authority against a vulnerable inmate and the need for denunciation and deterrence, a custodial sentence remained appropriate.