Stephania Fericean

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation arising from threatening text messages sent to his estranged spouse while subject to a no-contact probation condition.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.), applied unequal scrutiny to defence evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof, did not apply differential scrutiny to the defence evidence, and reasonably rejected the purported alibi evidence.

The court concluded the verdicts were reasonably supported by the evidence and that the appellant failed to establish reversible error.

The appellant appealed a conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code arising from conduct outside an abortion clinic.

The alleged breach involved a civil injunction prohibiting certain activities within 500 feet of the clinic, including intimidation of patients and others.

The appeal court held that criminal liability for breach of an order requires proof that the accused violated a specific term of the order.

The evidence established only peaceful leafleting and silent protest, which did not constitute intimidation or other prohibited conduct within the meaning of the injunction.

The conviction was therefore unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The accused appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident during physiotherapy treatment where the complainant alleged the accused grabbed her breast without consent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by relying on irrelevant considerations, including the complainant’s religious beliefs and courtroom demeanour, and by applying an unduly critical approach to the accused’s evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant’s expressed religious commitment and limited observations about demeanour as minor factors among many when assessing credibility.

The court further held that the trial judge’s rejection of the accused’s account and her reliance on common sense in evaluating his conduct disclosed no legal error.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg and the resulting sentence.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure under ss. 8 and 9, asserting the police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples.

The court held that the totality of circumstances—including poor driving, odour of alcohol, admission of drinking, unsteadiness, and officer observations—provided objectively reasonable grounds.

The court also concluded that even if Charter breaches occurred, the breathalyzer results would have been admissible under s. 24(2).

The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the sentence appeal was allowed in part by reducing the ignition interlock ineligibility period from 12 months to six months.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault arising from an altercation with his former common law spouse during a child exchange.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony of the complainant and the accused, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge made no material misapprehension of the evidence and was entitled to draw the credibility inferences she did.

The court further held that the trial judge applied the proper analytical framework under R. v. W.(D.), assessed both witnesses with equal scrutiny, and provided legally sufficient reasons.

The conviction for assault and the conditional discharge with probation were upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

After the Crown closed its case at trial, defence counsel argued that the accused had not been identified in court as the person arrested.

The trial judge, on his own initiative, reopened the Crown’s case, recalled the officer, elicited identification evidence, and convicted the accused.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s conduct in reopening the case and personally eliciting the missing evidence created a reasonable apprehension of bias, as it appeared the judge had assumed the role of the prosecution.

Although the evidence already led could have established a prima facie case of identity, the appearance of partiality required that the conviction be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for breaching a peace bond and breaching a bail recognizance, arguing that she had a lawful excuse for contacting members of a family despite court‑ordered no‑contact conditions.

She claimed the delivery of a letter to the protected parties constituted service of a court document and therefore justified the breach.

The court held that the letter was not legal process and did not require service, and therefore did not constitute a lawful excuse for violating the recognizance.

The appellant also challenged a DNA order imposed as part of the sentence for the bail breach.

The court held the trial judge properly exercised discretion under the Criminal Code and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the arresting officer's reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples and whether the samples were taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The Superior Court of Justice found no material misapprehension of the evidence, noting the officer's roadside observations were corroborated and the delays in taking breath samples were adequately explained by the need to secure the collision scene and provide the appellant a reasonable opportunity to consult with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the reliability of Intoxilyzer 8000C breath test results.

The appellant contended that the decline in successive breath readings suggested malfunction or analytical variability in the instrument and that the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The court held that the evidence demonstrated the instrument was properly calibrated and functioning, and that the discrepancy in readings was adequately explained by biological variability and normal alcohol elimination.

The trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or reverse the burden of proof.

The conviction for impaired driving was upheld.