Graham Jenner

The appellant was convicted of sexual and violent offences against a complainant aged 12-14 years over a two-year relationship while the appellant was aged 27-29.

The trial judge imposed an 8-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies and admitted lies, the authentication of photographic evidence, reliance on the parents' evidence, and rejection of the defence theory regarding motive to fabricate.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part only with respect to pre-trial custody credit, with the Court finding the sentence otherwise fit given the appellant's position of trust, the complainant's vulnerability, the age disparity, duration of abuse, and instances of violence.

An appellant who was found not criminally responsible on a charge of assault in 2007 appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for a declaration that section 672.56 of the Criminal Code violated her Charter rights under section 7.

The appellant argued that the section did not afford a not criminally responsible accused the ability to compel the Ontario Review Board to hold a hearing to review a decision by a hospital to significantly increase restrictions on liberty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code provides adequate procedural safeguards and liberty protections for such accused persons.

The Crown moved to quash an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that there was no provision in either the Criminal Code or the Criminal Proceedings Rules for an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a stand-alone Charter application.

The appellant had brought a constitutional challenge under section 672.56 of the Criminal Code using the Criminal Proceedings Rules rather than the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the procedural irregularity did not prejudice any party and that the substance of the procedure, which was civil and declaratory in nature, must prevail over its form.

The court exercised its discretion to hear the appeal despite the procedural error.

The appellant appealed her conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her parked, running vehicle facing oncoming traffic.

The trial judge found she rebutted the presumption of care and control by proving she did not intend to drive, but convicted her on the basis that the vehicle's position posed a realistic risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by shifting the burden of proof and requiring the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that she did not present a realistic risk of danger.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for breaching a peace bond contrary to s. 811 of the Criminal Code.

The recognizance prohibited direct or indirect contact or communication with specified complainants.

While attending a church service he was permitted to attend, the appellant pointed at one complainant from a short distance and loudly called her an insulting name to others nearby.

The trial judge held this conduct constituted indirect contact or communication in breach of the recognizance.

The appeal court found the trial judge’s conclusion reasonable and consistent with jurisprudence interpreting indirect communication and contact, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault arising from an altercation with his former common law spouse during a child exchange.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony of the complainant and the accused, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge made no material misapprehension of the evidence and was entitled to draw the credibility inferences she did.

The court further held that the trial judge applied the proper analytical framework under R. v. W.(D.), assessed both witnesses with equal scrutiny, and provided legally sufficient reasons.

The conviction for assault and the conditional discharge with probation were upheld.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed his acquittal.

The trial judge had rejected the applicant's defence of non-insane automatism because he failed to lead expert evidence as required by R. v. Stone.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicant was tricked into consuming alcohol.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no issue of sufficient merit or importance.