Bradley Jordan Juriansz

The appellant, Mr. Wong, appealed his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he waived his right to counsel and in not requiring a "Prosper warning." The appellant contended that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his understanding of his rights and that a Prosper warning was necessary given his initial statement that he would like to speak with a lawyer.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence.

The court clarified that a Prosper warning is only required when a detainee, after asserting the right to counsel, makes diligent but unsuccessful attempts to contact a lawyer and then indicates a change of mind, which was not the case here as the appellant declined counsel at the police station without making any attempts to contact one.

The accused was charged with Over 80 following a drinking and driving investigation.

The officer's approved screening device malfunctioned, resulting in an eight-minute delay while a second device was obtained.

During this delay, the accused was placed in the police car and subjected to a pat-down search.

The accused was arrested and advised of his right to counsel six minutes later.

The defence raised six Charter breaches.

The court found that the ASD demand and test were conducted forthwith despite the delay caused by device malfunction.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 regarding the detention in the police car and search, and a technical breach of section 10(b) regarding the delay in right to counsel advice.

However, applying the section 24(2) test from R v Grant, the court found that admission of the breath test evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the minor impact of the breaches on the accused's Charter-protected interests and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath test results and physical observations of impairment.

The accused alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the officer lacked subjective reasonable grounds to believe the accused was impaired at the time of arrest, objectively reasonable grounds existed.

The court also found no breach of sections 7, 10(a), or 10(b).

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court admitted the breath test evidence, finding that while the Charter violation was serious, the impact on the accused's rights was minimal and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop on November 15, 2013.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no violation of the right to counsel, determining that the accused had sufficient English comprehension to understand her rights despite English being her second language.

However, the court found a violation of section 9 (arbitrary detention) because the booking sergeant relied solely on blood alcohol content when determining when to release the accused, rather than considering all relevant circumstances as required by section 498 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the over-holding to be approximately 3-4 hours.

The court convicted the accused of both charges but stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle to avoid double punishment.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on September 24, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(a) were infringed.

The court found that the officer lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving, as the observed driving infractions were minimal and the alleged signs of impairment (slurred speech, weaving) were not credibly established.

The court also found breaches of the defendant's section 10(a) and 10(b) rights due to a 14-15 minute delay in providing reasons for detention and access to counsel.

While the section 10 breach was found not to warrant exclusion of evidence, the section 8 breach was found to be serious and, combined with the lack of evidence of impairment, led to the exclusion of the breath test results.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was stopped for impaired driving and arrested for driving with excess alcohol.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, including lack of grounds for arrest, breach of rights to counsel, and failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on observations of erratic driving, smell of alcohol, and admission of drinking, followed by a failed roadside screening device test.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, finding no breach of rights to counsel and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable despite cumulative delays.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol.

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with drive with excess alcohol and drive impaired on June 6, 2015, with the information sworn on June 12, 2015.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 16 months.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

Since the case fell below the ceiling, the burden was on the defence to demonstrate both meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found that the delay was typical for drinking and driving cases in the jurisdiction and did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being stopped by police and failing an approved screening device test.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues: whether grounds existed for further testing despite the presence of mouthwash in the vehicle, whether the initial stop was arbitrary, and whether the accused's right to counsel was breached.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, but found multiple breaches of section 10(b) when police failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to speak with counsel of choice and made comments discouraging the exercise of that right.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with Impaired and Over 80 Care or Control and Dangerous Driving following a motor vehicle collision on October 10, 2014.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence based on violations of sections 8, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, the grounds for the breath demand, the timing of breath samples, the right to counsel, and the identification procedure.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found no violations.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusal to take a breathalyzer test following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the dangerous driving charge at trial.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a breath demand.

The officer's evidence contained significant discrepancies when compared to video evidence from the police cruiser, including mischaracterizations of the defendant's driving, minimization of the force used during the stop, and failure to account for the defendant's obvious language difficulties.

The court acquitted the defendant of the refusal charge, finding the breath demand was invalid.

Mr. Notaro appealed his conviction for driving with more than the legal concentration of alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing the arresting officer failed to consider "fresh mouth alcohol" before administering a roadside screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a palpable and overriding error standard of review, found that the trial judge implicitly accepted the officer's awareness of the mouth alcohol issue and reasonably concluded that no circumstances warranted a delay or further inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the accused had a blood alcohol level of 210 mgs/100ml based on approved instrument tests at the station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, the delay in making the demand, the validity of the ASD test, and the adequacy of the right to counsel advice.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on the evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving operation and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown conceded the impaired driving count and proceeded only on the over 80 charge.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and demand a breath sample.

The court found that while the officer possessed a subjective belief of impairment, the objective facts did not support reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The court applied the three-prong test under section 24(2) of the Charter to determine whether the breath test evidence should be excluded as a remedy for the Charter breach.

The court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter based on insufficient grounds for arrest and the arbitrariness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and should have instead demanded an approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the impairment charge based on the limited objective evidence.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues including identification of the vehicle, reasonable grounds for stop and arrest, right to counsel advice, and timing of breath demand and testing.

The court found the vehicle was properly identified, reasonable grounds existed for the stop and arrest, no Charter breaches occurred regarding right to counsel advice despite language difficulties, and the breath demand and testing complied with statutory requirements.

The Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt based on credible evidence of erratic driving, physical impairment indicators, and breath test results showing blood alcohol concentration well above the legal limit.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

A civilian witness observed the accused's truck swerving erratically across lanes and changing speed without apparent cause, prompting a 911 call.

Police officers observed similar driving patterns and stopped the vehicle.

The accused displayed signs consistent with impairment including red and watery eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness.

The court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the credible evidence of the civilian witness and police observations of the accused's inability to maintain a safe driving course.

The court rejected the accused's assertion that diabetes could account for the observed impairment and found a guilty verdict.

The defendant was charged with driving while suspended contrary to s. 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and displaying a suspended driver's licence contrary to s. 35(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the defendant was a suspended driver on the date in question.

The defendant raised a due diligence defence, claiming he was confused about remedial measures requirements and had not received notice of suspension by mail.

The court found the defendant had been personally served with notice of suspension and that his actions fell short of what a reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances.

The court rejected the defence of officially induced error and convicted the defendant on both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and Charter voir dire.

The Crown called two witnesses: the arresting officer and a qualified breath technician.

The defence challenged whether the roadside screening device demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and whether breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) to preserve the statutory presumptions.

The court found no breach regarding the "forthwith" requirement but concluded that multiple unexplained delays in the custody process violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement, resulting in acquittal.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle collision on June 26, 2012, in which the accused made a left-hand turn into the path of an oncoming motorcycle, killing the driver and seriously injuring the passenger.

The court applied the test for committal under section 548(1) of the Criminal Code and committed the accused to trial on all counts except the disqualified driving charge, which was withdrawn by the Crown.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proved the accused had consumed seven beers and had a projected BAC of 160 mgs/100ml or higher.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control when police found him parked in a lot by a baseball field with the engine running, keys in the ignition, and music playing.

The court found the accused occupied the driver's seat, the engine was running, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he intended to walk home, finding his continued occupation of the driver's seat inconsistent with that claim.

Both counts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.