Bradley Jordan Juriansz

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a screening device demand contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused deliberately failed to provide a suitable breath sample during an approved screening device test.

The defence argued the failure was not wilful and alternatively that the accused had a reasonable excuse, claiming he was suffering from a cold or flu and was physically unable to provide a sample.

The court found that the accused deliberately failed to follow simple instructions to blow into the device, repeatedly sucking air instead, and rejected the accused's credibility regarding his claimed illness based on video evidence showing normal breathing and speech capacity.

The Appellant challenged her conviction for impaired driving and Over 80, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and in rejecting her testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming that the arresting officer had sufficient objective grounds based on the totality of circumstances, and that the trial judge's credibility assessment and reasons for conviction were adequate and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80.

At trial, the Crown relied on a toxicologist's report that assumed the appellant had not engaged in bolus drinking within 15 minutes prior to the incident.

The trial judge found sufficient circumstantial evidence to disprove bolus drinking and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual inferences regarding the absence of bolus drinking.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath test evidence on the grounds of breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused alleged that the approved screening device demand was not made "forthwith" as required under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and that no Prosper warning was given when she abandoned her request for counsel and asked to proceed with breath testing.

The court found no breach of section 8, as the informal demand was sufficient and any delay was minimal and reasonably explained.

The court found no breach of section 10(b), as the Crown proved a valid, free, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel with full awareness of the consequences.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault, threatening to cause death, failing to comply with probation arising from a domestic altercation involving strangulation and death threats, and possession under in relation to theft of a Blu-Ray player.

The accused had an extensive criminal record dating back to 1999, including 13 theft-related convictions, 14 prior breaches of court orders, and two recent serious domestic violence convictions against the same complainant.

The court imposed a global sentence of six months custody less time served, with the remaining sentence to be 91 days, to be followed by probation with conditions including domestic violence and drug treatment counselling.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operation with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg following a traffic stop on August 28, 2015.

The trial focused on two issues: whether the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) were violated regarding access to counsel of choice, and whether the evidence was sufficient to establish impaired driving.

The court found that while the police failed to take intermediate steps to facilitate contact with the accused's counsel of choice after an initial message went unreturned, the Charter breach was minimally serious and the breath evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving due to insufficient evidence of impairment but convicted of the over 80 charge based on breath analysis results.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on Leslie Street in Richmond Hill.

The defendant admitted to consuming multiple glasses of red wine, providing reasonable suspicion for an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

However, the arresting officer delayed making the ASD demand for 16 minutes and 29 seconds while conducting vehicle registration and background checks.

The defendant applied to exclude the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the delay violated the "forthwith" requirement established in case law, constituting unlawful detention and unreasonable seizure.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control and over 80.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that a "realistic risk of danger" is not a required element where the Crown relies on the presumption of care or control, in unreasonably finding a realistic risk of danger in obiter, and in assessing his evidence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's analysis of de facto care or control and that the findings were not unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The appellant, Mr. Wong, appealed his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he waived his right to counsel and in not requiring a "Prosper warning." The appellant contended that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his understanding of his rights and that a Prosper warning was necessary given his initial statement that he would like to speak with a lawyer.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence.

The court clarified that a Prosper warning is only required when a detainee, after asserting the right to counsel, makes diligent but unsuccessful attempts to contact a lawyer and then indicates a change of mind, which was not the case here as the appellant declined counsel at the police station without making any attempts to contact one.

The accused was charged with Over 80 following a drinking and driving investigation.

The officer's approved screening device malfunctioned, resulting in an eight-minute delay while a second device was obtained.

During this delay, the accused was placed in the police car and subjected to a pat-down search.

The accused was arrested and advised of his right to counsel six minutes later.

The defence raised six Charter breaches.

The court found that the ASD demand and test were conducted forthwith despite the delay caused by device malfunction.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 regarding the detention in the police car and search, and a technical breach of section 10(b) regarding the delay in right to counsel advice.

However, applying the section 24(2) test from R v Grant, the court found that admission of the breath test evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the minor impact of the breaches on the accused's Charter-protected interests and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath test results and physical observations of impairment.

The accused alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the officer lacked subjective reasonable grounds to believe the accused was impaired at the time of arrest, objectively reasonable grounds existed.

The court also found no breach of sections 7, 10(a), or 10(b).

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court admitted the breath test evidence, finding that while the Charter violation was serious, the impact on the accused's rights was minimal and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop on November 15, 2013.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no violation of the right to counsel, determining that the accused had sufficient English comprehension to understand her rights despite English being her second language.

However, the court found a violation of section 9 (arbitrary detention) because the booking sergeant relied solely on blood alcohol content when determining when to release the accused, rather than considering all relevant circumstances as required by section 498 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the over-holding to be approximately 3-4 hours.

The court convicted the accused of both charges but stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle to avoid double punishment.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on September 24, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(a) were infringed.

The court found that the officer lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving, as the observed driving infractions were minimal and the alleged signs of impairment (slurred speech, weaving) were not credibly established.

The court also found breaches of the defendant's section 10(a) and 10(b) rights due to a 14-15 minute delay in providing reasons for detention and access to counsel.

While the section 10 breach was found not to warrant exclusion of evidence, the section 8 breach was found to be serious and, combined with the lack of evidence of impairment, led to the exclusion of the breath test results.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was stopped for impaired driving and arrested for driving with excess alcohol.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, including lack of grounds for arrest, breach of rights to counsel, and failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on observations of erratic driving, smell of alcohol, and admission of drinking, followed by a failed roadside screening device test.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, finding no breach of rights to counsel and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable despite cumulative delays.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol.

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with drive with excess alcohol and drive impaired on June 6, 2015, with the information sworn on June 12, 2015.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 16 months.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

Since the case fell below the ceiling, the burden was on the defence to demonstrate both meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found that the delay was typical for drinking and driving cases in the jurisdiction and did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being stopped by police and failing an approved screening device test.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues: whether grounds existed for further testing despite the presence of mouthwash in the vehicle, whether the initial stop was arbitrary, and whether the accused's right to counsel was breached.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, but found multiple breaches of section 10(b) when police failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to speak with counsel of choice and made comments discouraging the exercise of that right.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with Impaired and Over 80 Care or Control and Dangerous Driving following a motor vehicle collision on October 10, 2014.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence based on violations of sections 8, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, the grounds for the breath demand, the timing of breath samples, the right to counsel, and the identification procedure.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found no violations.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusal to take a breathalyzer test following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the dangerous driving charge at trial.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a breath demand.

The officer's evidence contained significant discrepancies when compared to video evidence from the police cruiser, including mischaracterizations of the defendant's driving, minimization of the force used during the stop, and failure to account for the defendant's obvious language difficulties.

The court acquitted the defendant of the refusal charge, finding the breath demand was invalid.

Mr. Notaro appealed his conviction for driving with more than the legal concentration of alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing the arresting officer failed to consider "fresh mouth alcohol" before administering a roadside screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a palpable and overriding error standard of review, found that the trial judge implicitly accepted the officer's awareness of the mouth alcohol issue and reasonably concluded that no circumstances warranted a delay or further inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the accused had a blood alcohol level of 210 mgs/100ml based on approved instrument tests at the station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, the delay in making the demand, the validity of the ASD test, and the adequacy of the right to counsel advice.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on the evidence.