Bradley Jordan Juriansz

The accused was charged with impaired driving operation and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown conceded the impaired driving count and proceeded only on the over 80 charge.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and demand a breath sample.

The court found that while the officer possessed a subjective belief of impairment, the objective facts did not support reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The court applied the three-prong test under section 24(2) of the Charter to determine whether the breath test evidence should be excluded as a remedy for the Charter breach.

The court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter based on insufficient grounds for arrest and the arbitrariness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and should have instead demanded an approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the impairment charge based on the limited objective evidence.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit following a RIDE stop.

The trial judge excluded breath test results under s.24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of ss.8 and 9 because the officer had not personally self-tested the approved screening device before administering the roadside test.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the officer lacked reasonable grounds and that a self-test of the device was not a legal requirement.

The appellate court further held that the trial judge misapplied the framework in R. v. Grant when excluding reliable breath evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the breath test evidence admitted, and a conviction entered with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in an impaired driving prosecution where the trial judge found that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had rejected several indicia of impairment due to inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony and concluded that odour of alcohol and poor driving provided only suspicion warranting a roadside screening demand.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by effectively conducting a full trial-level assessment of whether indicia actually existed rather than assessing whether the arresting officer reasonably believed an offence had been committed at the time of arrest.

Evidence of dangerous swerving combined with a strong odour of alcohol provided an objective basis for reasonable and probable grounds.

The arrest was lawful and the trial judge’s analysis improperly conflated the threshold for arrest with proof of impairment.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath test evidence after finding a s. 8 Charter breach, concluding the officer failed to properly consider the possibility of fresh mouth alcohol before administering an approved screening device.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and incorrectly applied the governing legal principles regarding reliance on ASD results and the obligation to delay testing.

There was no evidentiary basis requiring the officer to suspect fresh mouth alcohol or delay the test.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction substituted, with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on a roadside statement by the accused to explain erratic driving observed by police.

The reviewing court assumed, without deciding, that the trial judge may have made improper use of the statement.

However, the Crown failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that any such error could reasonably have affected the verdict.

The evidence of impairment was equivocal and key alleged indicators were not supported by cruiser video evidence.

The acquittal was therefore affirmed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application because the arresting officer relied on an approved screening device (ASD) fail result after several error messages appeared.

The appellant submitted that the officer’s misunderstanding of the device’s error codes undermined reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent breath demand, contrary to ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the Crown was not required to prove the ASD was functioning perfectly, only that the officer reasonably believed it was working properly.

The trial judge’s credibility findings regarding the officer were entitled to deference and supported the conclusion that reasonable grounds existed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in the killing of his intimate partner.

The court was required to determine the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under ss. 745 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code, considering the offender’s character, the circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendation.

The evidence established that the offender repeatedly struck the victim with a baseball bat in her home and subsequently attempted to access her bank account while leaving her gravely injured.

Aggravating factors included the brutality of the attack, the breach of trust in an intimate relationship, and the offender’s post‑offence conduct.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for fifteen years.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues including identification of the vehicle, reasonable grounds for stop and arrest, right to counsel advice, and timing of breath demand and testing.

The court found the vehicle was properly identified, reasonable grounds existed for the stop and arrest, no Charter breaches occurred regarding right to counsel advice despite language difficulties, and the breath demand and testing complied with statutory requirements.

The Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt based on credible evidence of erratic driving, physical impairment indicators, and breath test results showing blood alcohol concentration well above the legal limit.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to adduce evidence suggesting that two third parties were responsible for the killing.

The court considered whether the proposed evidence established a sufficient nexus between the third parties and the offence to meet the “air of reality” threshold for third‑party suspect evidence.

Applying the principles from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court held that there was no evidence of motive, opportunity, propensity, or other connection linking the proposed suspects to the homicide.

The alleged inconsistencies in their statements and cell phone records did not reasonably support an inference of involvement and amounted only to speculation.

The application to introduce third‑party suspect evidence was dismissed.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit antemortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends and family regarding the accused’s drug use, theft, and deterioration of their relationship, as well as evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under traditional state-of-mind exceptions and the principled approach to hearsay, assessing necessity and threshold reliability under authorities including R. v. Khelawon.

Most statements from close family members and trusted confidants were admitted as evidence of the deceased’s state of mind and the relationship context relevant to motive and identity.

Statements from casual acquaintances lacking sufficient indicia of reliability were excluded.

Evidence of the accused’s drug use and related conduct was largely admitted as contextual relationship evidence, while certain items, including a prior push and some duplicative or prejudicial evidence, were excluded.

In a second‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce multiple autopsy photographs depicting the deceased’s injuries.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly graphic and unnecessary given admissions regarding the cause of death, the injuries, and the expert pathologist’s conclusions.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis described in R. v. P.(R.) and R. v. Handy, the court held that several close‑up images of the head and face were extremely graphic and their probative value was diminished by the defence’s proposed admissions.

Those photographs were excluded, while less prejudicial images illustrating the body’s condition and certain injuries were admitted to assist the pathologist’s testimony.

The ruling balanced the evidentiary value of visual evidence against the risk of reasoning prejudice for the jury.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

A civilian witness observed the accused's truck swerving erratically across lanes and changing speed without apparent cause, prompting a 911 call.

Police officers observed similar driving patterns and stopped the vehicle.

The accused displayed signs consistent with impairment including red and watery eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness.

The court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the credible evidence of the civilian witness and police observations of the accused's inability to maintain a safe driving course.

The court rejected the accused's assertion that diabetes could account for the observed impairment and found a guilty verdict.

The respondent was arrested for impaired driving and placed in a police cell under video surveillance.

She was videotaped using the toilet, which she argued violated her s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The trial judge agreed and granted a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of a s. 8 breach, concluding that the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the use of the toilet.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the remedy, finding that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as this was a case of first instance and the breach was not egregious enough to justify the ultimate remedy.

The stay was set aside.

The defendant was charged with driving while suspended contrary to s. 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and displaying a suspended driver's licence contrary to s. 35(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the defendant was a suspended driver on the date in question.

The defendant raised a due diligence defence, claiming he was confused about remedial measures requirements and had not received notice of suspension by mail.

The court found the defendant had been personally served with notice of suspension and that his actions fell short of what a reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances.

The court rejected the defence of officially induced error and convicted the defendant on both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and Charter voir dire.

The Crown called two witnesses: the arresting officer and a qualified breath technician.

The defence challenged whether the roadside screening device demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and whether breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) to preserve the statutory presumptions.

The court found no breach regarding the "forthwith" requirement but concluded that multiple unexplained delays in the custody process violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement, resulting in acquittal.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle collision on June 26, 2012, in which the accused made a left-hand turn into the path of an oncoming motorcycle, killing the driver and seriously injuring the passenger.

The court applied the test for committal under section 548(1) of the Criminal Code and committed the accused to trial on all counts except the disqualified driving charge, which was withdrawn by the Crown.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proved the accused had consumed seven beers and had a projected BAC of 160 mgs/100ml or higher.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control when police found him parked in a lot by a baseball field with the engine running, keys in the ignition, and music playing.

The court found the accused occupied the driver's seat, the engine was running, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he intended to walk home, finding his continued occupation of the driver's seat inconsistent with that claim.

Both counts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control of an automobile and care and control with excess alcohol.

The Crown alleged the defendant had a blood alcohol reading of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant testified he consumed only two drinks and re-entered his vehicle solely to retrieve his phone to call a tow truck after discovering two flat tires.

The court found the defendant not credible, rejected his evidence regarding alcohol consumption and intent, and found he had been operating the vehicle within ten minutes of police arrival.

The court concluded the defendant was in care and control of the vehicle with a blood alcohol reading of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and that despite the flat tires, there remained a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts, with the care and control with excess alcohol count stayed pursuant to the Keinapple principle.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an “over 80” impaired driving charge following the exclusion of breath sample evidence for an alleged breach of the accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge held that police were required to permit the detainee to re-consult counsel after he repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer during the breath testing process, despite already speaking with duty counsel.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to make positive factual findings establishing an objectively observable change in circumstances required under the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy in R v. Sinclair, R v. McCrimmon, and R v. Willier.

The court found there was no change in jeopardy and no objective indication the detainee misunderstood his rights.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.