Gemma Sang

Barjot Minhas pleaded guilty to one count of assault causing bodily harm and one count of aggravated assault after stabbing two individuals at a house party.

The court considered the serious nature of the injuries, the use of a concealed knife, and the multiple instances of violence as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, first-offender status, positive pre-sentence report, remorse, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on conditions of custody.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a global sentence of 18 months custody followed by 2 years probation, along with ancillary orders.

The offender was found guilty of child luring and obtaining sexual services offences following an undercover police operation.

During sentencing, the offender brought a Charter challenge arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences of one year and six months for these offences violated section 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the gross disproportionality test and considered reasonable hypotheticals, finding that the mandatory minimums could result in grossly disproportionate sentences.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under sections 172.1(2)(a), 172.2(2)(a), and 286.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect.

The Crown applied during a voir dire to admit crime scene and autopsy photographs of the deceased in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused argued the photographs were gratuitous, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial.

The court found the photographs were highly probative to illustrate the forensic pathologist's opinions, corroborate testimony, and rebut potential defences such as self-defence or a third-party suspect.

The court concluded the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and granted the application to admit the photographs.

The accused, charged with murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect defence, pointing to his co-accused who had previously pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact.

The court assessed whether there was a sufficient nexus between the third party and the offence, focusing on motive and opportunity.

Finding that the third party had a severe drug addiction requiring money and was present at the crime scene and with the accused during the relevant times, the court concluded there was some evidence to support the defence.

The application was granted, and the third-party suspect defence was permitted to be put to the jury.

The Crown applied to admit utterances of the accused made to two civilian witnesses as prior discreditable conduct, and two ante-mortem statements made by the victim to the same witnesses.

The accused is charged with first degree murder.

The court found that the accused's prior threats to kill the victim were relevant to animus, motive, and intent, and their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court also ruled that the victim's ante-mortem statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach, as they were reliable, necessary, and highly probative of the victim's state of mind and the relationship between the parties.

The Crown applied to edit letters written by the accused while in custody awaiting trial for second-degree murder.

The defence argued that without significant editing, the letters would invite prohibited propensity reasoning, while the Crown argued they contained highly probative confessions relevant to identity, motive, and the third-party suspect defence.

The court balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect, ordering the removal of references to the accused's knowledge of the legal system and inflammatory language, but retaining passages that amounted to confessions or related to the third-party suspect defence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude audio and videotaped statements made to police following his arrest.

The court found that a specific utterance made during transport to the police station was obtained in violation of the accused's rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, as he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel and was seeking clarity on his charges.

This utterance was excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found the subsequent 3.5-hour videotaped statement was voluntary under the Oickle rule and did not violate the accused's s. 7 right to silence, despite his numerous assertions of the right, as police conduct was not oppressive and the accused maintained an operating mind.

The accused was charged with three counts of assault upon his wife, Jill Delima, with offence dates of March 30, 2010, December 19, 2007, and April 1 to August 1, 2001.

The trial proceeded over several months.

The Crown called the complainant, her brother, a Children's Aid Society worker, and a police officer as witnesses.

The accused denied all allegations.

The central issues were credibility and reliability.

The court found the complainant and Crown witnesses credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's denials.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts based on the totality of the evidence, which established assault beyond a reasonable doubt.