Gemma Sang

Barjot Minhas pleaded guilty to one count of assault causing bodily harm and one count of aggravated assault after stabbing two individuals at a house party.

The court considered the serious nature of the injuries, the use of a concealed knife, and the multiple instances of violence as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, first-offender status, positive pre-sentence report, remorse, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on conditions of custody.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a global sentence of 18 months custody followed by 2 years probation, along with ancillary orders.

Following conviction on charges arising from an undercover online juvenile prostitution investigation, the applicant renewed the entrapment issue after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ahmad.

The court held that while police had a legitimate basis to investigate child sexual exploitation on the website, they did not have reasonable suspicion that this applicant was seeking sexual services from an underage person before inviting him to commit the offences.

The undercover officer’s “bait and switch” approach, including delayed disclosure of age after arrangements and price had already been discussed, constituted impermissible random virtue testing in a virtual space.

Applying the clarified entrapment framework, the court stayed the charges.

The offender was found guilty of child luring and obtaining sexual services offences following an undercover police operation.

During sentencing, the offender brought a Charter challenge arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences of one year and six months for these offences violated section 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the gross disproportionality test and considered reasonable hypotheticals, finding that the mandatory minimums could result in grossly disproportionate sentences.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under sections 172.1(2)(a), 172.2(2)(a), and 286.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment arising from an undercover police project targeting persons seeking sexual services from underage persons through online advertisements.

Applying the entrapment framework from Mack and the bona fide investigation principles from Barnes, the court held that the police had a reasonable basis to investigate the online platform as a site associated with the targeted criminal activity and were entitled to provide opportunities within that investigation.

The court further held that the police did not improperly induce the accused, as there was no pressure, exploitation of vulnerability, or coercive conduct once the undercover officer disclosed the purported age.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Following a police sting targeting persons seeking sexual services from minors through online escort advertisements, the accused was charged after continuing text negotiations and attending a hotel after being told repeatedly that the purported escorts were 14 years old.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed he was communicating with underage persons, notwithstanding his evidence that he thought the references to age were role-play.

Applying the principles from Morrison and the W.D. framework, the court held that the reasonable-steps provision does not create an independent pathway to conviction and that the dispositive question remains the accused's subjective belief.

On the facts, the court rejected the accused's explanation, found that he believed both purported escorts were 14, and convicted on all three counts.

The Crown applied during a voir dire to admit crime scene and autopsy photographs of the deceased in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused argued the photographs were gratuitous, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial.

The court found the photographs were highly probative to illustrate the forensic pathologist's opinions, corroborate testimony, and rebut potential defences such as self-defence or a third-party suspect.

The court concluded the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and granted the application to admit the photographs.

The accused, charged with murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect defence, pointing to his co-accused who had previously pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact.

The court assessed whether there was a sufficient nexus between the third party and the offence, focusing on motive and opportunity.

Finding that the third party had a severe drug addiction requiring money and was present at the crime scene and with the accused during the relevant times, the court concluded there was some evidence to support the defence.

The application was granted, and the third-party suspect defence was permitted to be put to the jury.

The Crown applied to admit utterances of the accused made to two civilian witnesses as prior discreditable conduct, and two ante-mortem statements made by the victim to the same witnesses.

The accused is charged with first degree murder.

The court found that the accused's prior threats to kill the victim were relevant to animus, motive, and intent, and their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court also ruled that the victim's ante-mortem statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach, as they were reliable, necessary, and highly probative of the victim's state of mind and the relationship between the parties.

The Crown applied to edit letters written by the accused while in custody awaiting trial for second-degree murder.

The defence argued that without significant editing, the letters would invite prohibited propensity reasoning, while the Crown argued they contained highly probative confessions relevant to identity, motive, and the third-party suspect defence.

The court balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect, ordering the removal of references to the accused's knowledge of the legal system and inflammatory language, but retaining passages that amounted to confessions or related to the third-party suspect defence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude audio and videotaped statements made to police following his arrest.

The court found that a specific utterance made during transport to the police station was obtained in violation of the accused's rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, as he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel and was seeking clarity on his charges.

This utterance was excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found the subsequent 3.5-hour videotaped statement was voluntary under the Oickle rule and did not violate the accused's s. 7 right to silence, despite his numerous assertions of the right, as police conduct was not oppressive and the accused maintained an operating mind.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in the killing of his intimate partner.

The court was required to determine the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under ss. 745 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code, considering the offender’s character, the circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendation.

The evidence established that the offender repeatedly struck the victim with a baseball bat in her home and subsequently attempted to access her bank account while leaving her gravely injured.

Aggravating factors included the brutality of the attack, the breach of trust in an intimate relationship, and the offender’s post‑offence conduct.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for fifteen years.

During a jury trial for murder, the defence sought to cross‑examine the deceased’s daughters about threatening phone calls, visits by unidentified individuals, and safety precautions allegedly taken due to the accused’s drug‑related associations.

The defence argued the evidence was relevant to show animus against the accused and challenge the credibility of their testimony regarding the relationship between the accused and the deceased.

The Crown objected, arguing the questioning was an indirect attempt to introduce previously excluded third‑party suspect evidence.

The court held that while defence evidence may be excluded only where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the proposed cross‑examination carried a significant risk of inviting the jury to speculate that unidentified drug associates committed the murder.

The court therefore ruled the prejudicial effect outweighed the limited probative value and prohibited the cross‑examination.

During a murder trial, the defence advised that the accused intended to testify that he witnessed another individual commit the killing.

The defence argued that such evidence could be introduced without a formal third-party suspect application, relying on appellate authority concerning direct confessions by third parties.

The Crown submitted that the anticipated testimony should have been raised during the earlier third-party suspect application already dismissed by the court.

The court held that the law was unclear as to whether the rule permitting direct evidence of a third party’s confession without a formal application extends to testimony by an accused alleging another person committed the offence.

The judge indicated a preliminary inclination to permit the evidence but required the defence to provide a written outline of the proposed allegations to be put to the third party to ensure a sufficient nexus existed before making a final ruling.

In a second‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce multiple autopsy photographs depicting the deceased’s injuries.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly graphic and unnecessary given admissions regarding the cause of death, the injuries, and the expert pathologist’s conclusions.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis described in R. v. P.(R.) and R. v. Handy, the court held that several close‑up images of the head and face were extremely graphic and their probative value was diminished by the defence’s proposed admissions.

Those photographs were excluded, while less prejudicial images illustrating the body’s condition and certain injuries were admitted to assist the pathologist’s testimony.

The ruling balanced the evidentiary value of visual evidence against the risk of reasoning prejudice for the jury.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit antemortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends and family regarding the accused’s drug use, theft, and deterioration of their relationship, as well as evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under traditional state-of-mind exceptions and the principled approach to hearsay, assessing necessity and threshold reliability under authorities including R. v. Khelawon.

Most statements from close family members and trusted confidants were admitted as evidence of the deceased’s state of mind and the relationship context relevant to motive and identity.

Statements from casual acquaintances lacking sufficient indicia of reliability were excluded.

Evidence of the accused’s drug use and related conduct was largely admitted as contextual relationship evidence, while certain items, including a prior push and some duplicative or prejudicial evidence, were excluded.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to adduce evidence suggesting that two third parties were responsible for the killing.

The court considered whether the proposed evidence established a sufficient nexus between the third parties and the offence to meet the “air of reality” threshold for third‑party suspect evidence.

Applying the principles from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court held that there was no evidence of motive, opportunity, propensity, or other connection linking the proposed suspects to the homicide.

The alleged inconsistencies in their statements and cell phone records did not reasonably support an inference of involvement and amounted only to speculation.

The application to introduce third‑party suspect evidence was dismissed.

Sentencing for possession of child pornography by a first offender who pleaded guilty and was found with approximately 114 videos and 895 photographs depicting severe abuse of very young children.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were the dominant sentencing principles, emphasized Parliament's mandatory minimum under s. 163.1(4.1)(a), and rejected the defence submission for a shorter custodial term.

Despite mitigating factors including a guilty plea, lack of prior record, family support, and a generally positive pre-sentence report, the court treated the nature of the material, the age of the children, the duration of the conduct, and the absence of specialized treatment as aggravating.

A sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by 3 years' probation was imposed, together with prohibition, DNA, sex offender registration, forfeiture, and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography involving a substantial collection of images and videos depicting very young children in explicit sexual acts.

The court emphasized that denunciation and general deterrence are the dominant sentencing principles for child pornography offences, noting the continuing victimization caused by the possession and circulation of such material.

While the accused was a first offender with positive personal circumstances and a supportive family, aggravating factors included the disturbing nature of the material, the young age of the victims, the duration of offending, and the absence of evidence that the accused had sought specialized treatment.

The court rejected a defence proposal for a significantly lower custodial sentence and imposed a custodial term within the established range.

Ancillary orders included probation, sex offender registration, a prohibition order relating to contact with minors, DNA collection, and forfeiture of computer equipment.

The accused was charged with three counts of assault upon his wife, Jill Delima, with offence dates of March 30, 2010, December 19, 2007, and April 1 to August 1, 2001.

The trial proceeded over several months.

The Crown called the complainant, her brother, a Children's Aid Society worker, and a police officer as witnesses.

The accused denied all allegations.

The central issues were credibility and reliability.

The court found the complainant and Crown witnesses credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's denials.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts based on the totality of the evidence, which established assault beyond a reasonable doubt.