R. v. Martineau, 2015 ONSC 2608

CITATION: R. v. Martineau, 2015 ONSC 2608

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: CR-12-00002982

DATE: 20150422

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Her Majesty the Queen

Applicant

– and –

James Martineau

Respondent

Peter Westgate and Gemma Sang, for the Crown

Corbin Cawkell and Aliki Yorgiadis, for the Defence

HEARD: April 7, 2015

RULING ON CROWN’S APPLICATION TO ADMIT PRIOR DISCREDITABLE CONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED AND THE ANTE-MORTEM STATEMENTS OF THE VICTIM

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION: Pursuant to subsection 648(1) of the Criminal Code, no information regarding this portion of the trial shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before the jury retires to consider its verdict.

GILMORE J.:

OVERVIEW

[1] The Crown applies to admit utterances of Mr. Martineau made to two civilian witnesses, namely John Ball and Stanley Antrobus as prior discreditable conduct.

[2] The Crown also applies to admit two ante-mortem statements made by the victim, Ivan Davison, to the same two witnesses in paragraph [1] above.

[3] Mr. Martineau is charged with the first degree murder of Ivan Davison. The Crown’s theory is that Mr. Martineau loathed Mr. Davison. He found Mr. Davison repulsive and deserving of a terrible death which included torture, dismemberment and dumping the body in a roadside ditch.

[4] According to the witnesses John Ball and Stanley Antrobus, Mr. Martineau threatened to kill Mr. Davison on two occasions in December 2011. As well, mere days before his death Mr. Davison made certain statements to the same witnesses about Mr. Martineau and his mother Wendy Martineau and his intention to move out of the apartment. These are the statements in issue. The defence opposes their admission into evidence on the basis that their probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

[5] There have been two previous voir dires held in this case relating to the admissibility of statements. The entirety of Mr. Martineau’s videotaped statements has been ruled to be admissible in that it was voluntary and did not offend either section 10(b) or 7 of the Charter. As well, significant portions of letters written by Mr. Martineau from jail have been admitted into evidence on the basis that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect. The entirety of these statements contain significant confessions made by Mr. Martineau, some of which name Ivan Davison as the victim and discuss details, including the manner of the killing, a possible motive and the disposal of the body.

STATEMENTS RELATED TO PRIOR DISCREDITABLE CONDUCT

The Threats

[6] The Crown alleges that Mr. Martineau killed Ivan Davison on December 23, 2011. There is evidence that Mr. Martineau verbally threatened to kill Mr. Davison on two occasions in December 2011, including a threat on December 20, 2011 only three days from the date of the actual murder.

[7] John Ball and Stanley Antrobus were friends of Mr. Davison. Mr. Davison had worked with Mr. Antrobus for 35 years and had known Mr. Ball through the construction business for eight years. All three men regularly attended the free Tuesday night dinner at the First Baptist Church. Stanley Antrobus also saw Mr. Davison two or three times a week at the free breakfast held at Grace Church.

[8] In December 2011, John Ball was outside the First Baptist Church smoking a cigarette about ten feet away from Mr. Martineau when he overheard Mr. Martineau say the following to other people, “I’m gonna kill that old bastard one of these days.”

[9] At the preliminary enquiry, Mr. Ball testified that this threat took place during the first or second week of December and he overheard Mr. Martineau say, “I’m gonna kill that old guy one of these days.” In his original statement to York Regional Police, Mr. Ball said that Mr. Martineau had used the words “old fucker, prick” to refer to Mr. Davison.

[10] According to Mr. Ball, Mr. Davison was not present when this threat was made nor was there any reference to Mr. Davison by name. Mr. Ball said that Mr. Martineau often referred to Mr. Davison as the “old man” and, therefore, he made an assumption that Mr. Martineau was referring to Mr. Davison when he overheard the threat.

[11] Mr. Ball recalled one or two conversations he had with Mr. Davison in which Mr. Davison told him that he had lent Mr. Martineau money. He recalled that, on the day the threat occurred, he heard Mr. Martineau say to others that the “old prick never lent me any money today.” Mr. Martineau was “pissed off” about this according to Mr. Ball.

[12] On December 20, 2011, Stanley Antrobus met Mr. Davison outside the First Baptist Church. They sat on a bench around 5:15 p.m. after the usual Tuesday church dinner. After about ten minutes, Mr. Martineau approached them and while looking at Mr. Davison said, “I’m gonna kill that man.” Mr. Antrobus took it as a joke but was certain that the threat was directed at his friend Ivan Davison because Mr. Martineau looked directly at him when he said it.

[13] Mr. Antrobus agreed that Mr. Martineau did not appear angry when he made this threat. He did not yell or point at Mr. Davison. Further, Mr. Davison did not react to the threat. Mr. Antrobus’ evidence at his examination for discovery was that it seemed as if the threat had gone right over Mr. Davison’s head.

[14] The Crown’s position is that the threats are evidence that is important with respect to Mr. Martineau’s planned and deliberate intention to murder Mr. Davison. The threats are also relevant to animus, identity and motive, and critical to rebut the defences of provocation, intoxication, third party suspect and self-defence, should these defences be raised.

[15] The defence position is that the prejudicial effect of the threats will outweigh their probative value. The risks of allowing the threats into evidence include a possible inference that Mr. Martineau is generally a bad person and, therefore, more likely to have committed the offence or that his past bad behaviour should be punished by finding him guilty. This is otherwise known as “propensity reasoning” or “moral prejudice”.

[16] Further, the evidence is not relevant to motive as the utterances were not specific. Submitting the evidence to the jury as relevant to motive only invites the jury to speculate on what, exactly, the motive is.

[17] According to the defence, the utterances could equally be interpreted as figures of speech, or joking comments, or probative only of a degree of tension or anger between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Davison. There is no evidence that the threats were meant to be taken seriously or were said in a manner suggesting aggression or even conviction.

[18] Finally, the fact that Mr. Martineau refers to someone called “the old man” or “the old guy” is ambiguous, and Mr. Ball agreed to this proposition in cross-examination.

GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

[19] The general rule with respect to prior discreditable conduct is that it is presumptively inadmissible because of the dangers of propensity reasoning, as described above. However, the Crown may be permitted to lead such evidence if it is relevant to motive and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

[20] Evidence of an accused’s motive to commit a murder is obviously highly relevant. The fact that such evidence is often, by its very nature, prejudicial to the accused cannot be viewed in isolation. As per R. v. Mahalingan[^1] quoting Professor J. R. Delisle, “Prejudice….does not mean that the evidence might increase the chances of conviction but rather that the evidence might be improperly used by the trier of fact.”

[21] Evidence of the relationship between the accused and a person to whom the accused made threats or demonstrations of violent conduct may be probative to animus and the state of mind of the accused at or around the time of the offence. In R. v. Moo[^2] the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit certain ante-mortem statements made by the deceased. The court held that these statements elucidated the nature of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, afforded evidence of animus, motive and identity and was relevant to the state of mind with which the killing was done.

[22] The court must also consider the context of the threats and whether they assist in providing a necessary narrative for the jury. In R. v. S. B.[^3], the court held that:

Violence within a relationship, spousal or otherwise, necessarily, and frequently, involved the complex dynamics and subtleties of the personalities of the principals within the context of their individual and shared experiences, understandings, roles and emotions.

….to deny the triers of fact complete information regarding the prior history of the parties runs the risk of presenting an entirely sterile and antiseptic record devoid of the realities of the individual circumstances of the participants.

[23] With respect to the relevance of the threats to the issue of intent, the Crown in R. v. Hindessa[^4] sought to introduce evidence of previous threats and assaultive behaviour in a domestic murder case. The court held that this evidence was important for the jury to consider the context of the accused’s state of mind and intent at the time of the killing. Further, the court was concerned that the jury not be left with a sanitized version of events, perhaps leading them to believe that the events occurred “out of the blue”.

[24] With respect to responding to any defences raised, the court in R. v. C.P.[^5] held that prior threats overheard by the accused’s daughter that he would kill his wife if she left him, were highly prejudicial but had enormous probative value because the accused had raised the defences of provocation and lack of intent.

[25] As well, in R. v. Griffin[^6] the court held that an acrimonious relationship between an accused and the deceased was relevant to motive but also “took on additional probative value in that it tended to rebut the specific defence proposition that someone other than Griffin may have had a motive to kill Poirier…” In the case at bar this relates to the proposed third party suspect defence.

[26] The evidence of Mr. Antrobus was that when he heard Mr. Martineau make the threat he thought it was a joke. Courts have found that even where threats are not taken or meant literally they have been found to be admissible. In R. v. Polimac[^7], the accused threatened multiple times to burn down the residence before he would let a realtor in. The recipients of this threat did not take it literally and the defence argued that allowing this evidence in would suggest that the accused was a violent person. The court did not agree, suggesting that the defence would have an opportunity to cross-examine the Crown witness who received the threat and thereby put it into context.

[27] The timing of the threat is also important and, therefore, the proximity of the threat to the date of the murder may affect its probative value with respect to animus. In R. v. Gayle[^8], the court reviewed the escalation of conflict between the victim and one of the accused during the week prior to her murder including specific conversations in which there was a threat to send the victim back to Jamaica. The court found that the context of what was happening within the family in the days leading up to the murder was relevant to context even if not determinative of intent or culpability.

[28] In summary, the court should carefully examine the context, timing and circumstances of the threat with respect to its probative value of intent, motive, animus and identity. However, the court must do so keeping in mind the risks that such evidence may be misused. Specifically, in R. v. L.E.D.[^9] and in R. v. Handy[^10] the court warns against the following:

(a) The Crown may not lessen its burden by stigmatizing the accused as a bad person.

(b) Proof of general disposition is a prohibited purpose.

(c) Discreditable character evidence, at large, creates nothing but “moral prejudice”.

(d) The jury may assume the accused is a bad person who is likely guilty of the offence charged.

(e) The jury may punish the accused for the past misconduct by finding the accused guilty of the offence charged, and;

(f) The jury may become confused and its attention diverted with a danger that they will substitute their verdict on the misconduct rather the issue they are supposed to be deciding.

ANALYSIS AND RULING

ISSUE No. 1 – Are the Statements Relevant?

[29] In order for evidence of prior discreditable conduct to be admissible, it must be relevant, material to the proof of an issue before the court and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

[30] The threshold for relevance is not exacting or particularly high. There was evidence from Mr. Ball that Mr. Martineau was “pissed off” that Mr. Davison would not lend him money. It is a fact that Mr. Martineau and Mr. Davison lived in the same apartment. There was evidence that there was tension between them for various reasons.

[31] As per S.B, Hindessa and Gayle it is important that the jury not be left with an overly sanitized version of events. In this case, evidence about the relationship between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Davison provides important narrative and context.

[32] The evidence of Mr. Martineau’s state of mind in the time leading up to the killing may constitute a link in the chain of reasoning that could lead a trier of fact to conclude that the accused bore some animus towards the victim. (See R. v. Candir, 2009 ONCA 915, [2009] O.J. No. 5485).

[33] Therefore, I find that the statements in question bear directly on the deteriorating relationship between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Davison and Mr. Martineau’s state of mind in the time just prior to Mr. Davison’s death. The statements, therefore, meet this part of the test for admissibility.

ISSUE No. 2 – Are the Statements Material to a Matter in Issue in the Case?

[34] On this issue, the court must focus on whether the evidence has a tendency to advance the enquiry before the court.

[35] It is clear that the threats took place in December 2011. The second threat was a mere three days prior to the killing and could become important evidence of planning and deliberation as well as intent and identity.

[36] The timing of the second threat simply cannot be ignored and clearly makes it material to the case. It reveals a violent attitude on the part of Mr. Martineau and public verbal abuse. As such, the statements are material to identity, motive and animus and meet the second part of the test for admissibility.

ISSUE No. 3 – Does the Probative Value of the Statements Outweigh Their Prejudicial Effect?

[37] This is the most difficult part of the test for admissibility as all of the dangers of evidence relating to prior discreditable conduct must be considered.

[38] I find that, in this case, the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect for the following reasons:

(a) Although the threats may not have been taken seriously by either the victim or the witnesses, that does not mean they are inadmissible. As per Polimac, the defence is free to explore this issue in cross-examination. The fact that a particular witness may not have taken a threat seriously may well affect the weight ascribed to it by the jury.

(b) While Mr. Davison was not named, that does not mean the threat is inadmissible. The fact that a reference to the “old man” is ambiguous may well affect the weight to be given to the threats by the triers of fact.

(c) As the ante-mortem statements are ruled admissible, this lends strength to the probative value of the statements with respect to them being directed at Mr. Davison.

(d) The evidence of an argument about money between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Davison on the night of the first threat is probative of a possible motive to kill. This becomes especially important when combined with the evidence of the cheque written by the accused to himself on Mr. Davison’s account, which was found on Mr. Davison’s bed, and surveillance videotape of Mr. Martineau trying to access Mr. Davison’s bank account with a debit card on December 23, 2011.

(e) The statements are probative with respect to rebutting defences of identity, provocation and third party suspect.

(f) It is highly unlikely that these statements will confuse the jury. They were short and concise. It is not feasible that the jury would become distracted with determining whether or not the threats took place, as opposed to focusing on the actual charge.

(g) All evidence of prior discreditable conduct is prejudicial to the accused in some measure, but as per Malingan, the issue is not whether admitting the statements will increase the chance that Mr. Martineau will be convicted, but whether the statements will be improperly used by the jury. Propensity reasoning can be controlled by both limiting instructions and cross-examination. Specifically, the jury can be reminded that they must consider all of the evidence; that they are not to determine guilt or innocence based on the threats alone, and that just because Mr. Martineau made the threats does not mean he is a bad person, should be punished by the jury, or that he committed the offence.

(h) The jury will be tasked with considering motive and intent. The events of the days leading up to the victim’s death are highly probative to those considerations.

[39] For all of the above reasons, I find that the probative value of statements related to prior discreditable conduct outweighs their prejudicial value. The Crown has met its burden and the statements are, therefore, admissible.

ANTE-MORTEM STATEMENTS OF THE DECEASED VICTIM

[40] Mr. Davison made several statements to his friends which the Crown seeks to tender for the truth of their contents.

[41] In early December 2011, Mr. Davison told John Ball that Mr. Martineau was always bugging him to lend him money. Mr. Ball said to Mr. Davison, “So you pissed the kid off the other day, you wouldn’t lend him money.” Mr. Davison replied, “Yeah, he’s always askin’ me for it. I’ll give it to him when I wanna.” Mr. Ball explained that he was referring to the time in early December when he overheard Mr. Martineau threatening to kill Mr. Davison and that Mr. Martineau seemed angry.

[42] On December 20, 2011 while at the First Baptist Church Tuesday night dinner, John Ball jokingly asked Mr. Davison how his girlfriend and son were. Mr. Ball’s evidence was that he was referring to Mr. Martineau and his mother Wendy Martineau. Mr. Davison told Mr. Ball that, “They’re going to be the death of me, those two.”

[43] On the same day, Mr. Davison was sitting on a bench outside the First Baptist Church talking to Stanley Antrobus. Mr. Davison told Mr. Antrobus that he had to get out of where he was living and move somewhere else. He said that there had been problems.

[44] The Crown submits that these hearsay statements are relevant to Mr. Davison’s state of mind, the identity of the killer, animus towards the deceased, the motive for the killing and intent. They are also essential to rebut the possible defences of provocation, intoxication, third party suspect and self-defence, should those defences be advanced.

[45] The defence argues that the statements are presumptively inadmissible and do not fit into any of the prescribed exceptions. Specifically, the statements are unreliable, not made in a formal setting, they lack corroboration and detail, there is no independent evidence of Mr. Davison’s state of mind at the time, and their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value.

Hearsay – General Rules

[46] The Crown seeks to tender an out-of-court statement for the truth of its contents. In order to do so the Crown must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the evidence is relevant and that it either falls within a traditional exception to the exclusionary rule or may be admitted pursuant to the “principled approach,” so long as necessity and reliability are established.

STEP ONE – Relevance

[47] The Crown argues that while the statements are brief, they may be relevant to Mr. Davison’s state of mind and the tension between he and his roommates to the point where he felt compelled to look for a new place to live.

[48] The defence’s position is that the statements were so brief that they do not provide any information about timing or what Mr. Davison was actually referring to. Mr. Antrobus was aware that Mr. Davison had moved several times in his life so a change of address was not necessarily something shocking or new. Finally, Mr. Davison did not look fearful or upset when he made the statements. Their relevance is, therefore, questionable.

[49] I find that the statements meet the test of relevance. While they may lack detail, they clearly show fear or concern on the part of Mr. Davison about his living situation in the days leading up to his death. The fact that the statements may lend themselves to different interpretations does not mean they are not relevant or inadmissible.

STEP TWO – Are the Statements Admissible to Show the State of Mind of the Victim?

[50] Assuming relevance, statements of a declarant’s state of mind fall within the traditional exception to the hearsay rule, so long as it is made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion[^11].

[51] It is most often the case that hearsay statements lack the usual badges of trustworthiness such as oath and contemporaneous cross-examination. This alone, however, is insufficient to exclude hearsay evidence that is otherwise reliable and relevant[^12].

[52] In a murder case, the victim’s state of mind in relation to the accused may be relevant to the issue of motive. In this case, the ante-mortem statements of the victim relate to the tension in his relationship with the accused as well as problems in their living situation.

[53] It is important to analyze the subject hearsay with respect to the usual “dangers” of accepting it into evidence.

(a) Presence or absence of a motive to lie – this is unlikely to be a danger in this case. There is no evidence from his very good friends Stan Antrobus or John Ball that the manner in which the statements were made gave them any concern about their veracity.

(b) Proximity or remoteness of the statements from the events – the statements were made within the same month or with three days of the killing. Lack of proximity to the events is not a significant danger.

(c) The demeanour of the declarant at the time the statement was made. Similar to the analysis with respect to whether there was a motive to lie, neither witness indicated anything unusual about the manner in which Mr. Davison made the statements. Mr. Antrobus testified that Mr. Davison may have had a beer or two prior to when they were sitting outside of First Baptist Church on December 20, 2011 and Mr. Davison told him he had to get out of where he was living. However, Mr. Antrobus said that Mr. Davison wasn’t “loaded”[^13].

(d) The relationship between the declarant and the recipient/witness – in this case Mr. Davison and Mr. Martineau were roommates. There was ongoing interaction between them and as per Mr. Martineau’s videotaped statement he was unhappy with Mr. Davison’s drinking, the masturbating incident and the request that Mr. Davison pay to watch Mr. Martineau and his girlfriend have sex.

(e) The spontaneity of the statements – the statements were made in the natural course of conversation between Mr. Davison and his friends.

(f) The detail of the statements – there is little detail in the statements without context. As the threats made by Mr. Martineau have already been admitted as having significant probative value, the context of Mr. Davison’s comments is easier to understand.

[54] Given all of the above, I find that the ante-mortem statements fit within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule being both reliable and relevant.

STEP THREE – Are the Statements Admissible using the “Principled Approach”?

[55] If I am wrong that the statements are not admissible using the traditional “state of mind” exception they would be admissible if reliability and necessity are established using the principled approach.

[56] As hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, the Crown must prove on a balance of probabilities that the evidence is both reliable and necessary. The ultimate weight to be given to the evidence will be determined by the jury.

[57] The necessity test is met because the victim in this case is deceased. As to the reliability requirement it can be met in two ways as per R. v. Khelawon[^14]. The first is to demonstrate that the statement is reliable because of the circumstances in which it was made. The second is to show that there is some manner (other than cross-examination of the now deceased victim) in which the truth and accuracy of the statement can be sufficiently tested so that it may be considered reliable and therefore useful for the truth finding process.

[58] Reliability means having confidence in something. With respect to a hearsay statement, admissibility depends on the court having confidence that concerns about the evidence which cannot be tested by cross-examination have characteristics which would suggest the statements are true. While there is no set list of such characteristics case law has developed to provide a general outline of what should be considered[^15].

[59] In this case, there was no motive for Mr. Davison to lie. There would have been nothing to gain by Mr. Davison making false statements to his friends. The statements were made outside of the church, where he and Mr. Antrobus and Mr. Ball regularly went for the free Tuesday dinner and chatted.

[60] Additionally, the utterances were made in the course of a normal conversation in which Mr. Davison was not noted to be acting in any way unusual. He was not intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. His statements were responsive to questions asked by his friends and not given by prompting. Statements made to friends in everyday conversation can be viewed with more confidence than statements made to strangers[^16].

[61] The timing of the later statements is significant because they were made within 72 hours of Mr. Davison’s death.

[62] There is also no reason to believe that Mr. Davison could be mistaken. He was clear about his concerns about having to move out. There is also consistency as between the statements because both speak to problems that Mr. Davison was having with Wendy and James Martineau and his living situation with them.

[63] In terms of extrinsic evidence, there is the evidence of Mr. Martineau from his videotaped statement. As this statement has been found to be admissible, there are references by Mr. Martineau to things that he said Mr. Davison did to his mother, the offer by Mr. Davison to watch Mr. Martineau having sex with his girlfriend, and Mr. Martineau walking in on Mr. Davison while he was masturbating. Mr. Martineau was annoyed when Mr. Davison suggested he was not paying his fair share of rent. Finally, as the statements related to prior discreditable conduct have also been ruled to be admissible, the court can consider the threats made to Mr. Davison by the accused. The extrinsic evidence is therefore considerable with respect to providing a context for Mr. Davison’s statements and his concern about continuing to live with Mr. Martineau and his mother.

[64] Finally, the recipients of the hearsay evidence, Mr. Ball and Mr. Antrobus will be available for cross-examination. Factors concerning Mr. Davison’s demeanour and the context of the statements can be fully explored by the defence. The fact that Mr. Davison himself cannot be cross-examined will go to the weight given to the statement by the jury and not its admissibility.

STEP FOUR – Does the Probative Value of the Statements Outweigh their Prejudicial Effect?

[65] I do not find that the prejudicial effect of these statements outweigh their probative value for the following reasons:

(a) The evidence is not discreditable. The hearsay dangers are adequately addressed as indicated above. The videotaped statement of Mr. Martineau and his threats to kill Mr. Davison provide a reliable context in which to consider what weight to give the statements.

(b) The statements do not support an inference of guilt based on bad character. The statements may both be taken as expressions of frustration and not about Mr. Martineau’s character. The statement “They’re going to be the death of me, those two” may have a literal or a figurative meaning. The statement relating to Mr. Davison having to move out, may again be taken as an expression of frustration with his living situation. In any event, the jury can be given proper limiting instructions with respect to the prohibition on inferring guilt from “bad character” evidence.

(c) The accused can respond to the statements by cross-examining Mr. Antrobus and Mr. Ball.

[66] The probative value of the statements cannot be underestimated with respect to the elements of first degree murder that the jury must consider, including motive, intent, animus, state of mind and the rebuttal of potential defences.

[67] The statements are directly relevant, and it is highly unlikely that they will confuse the jury or result in prohibited reasoning.

[68] The Crown has met its burden, and the ante-mortem statements of Mr. Davison are, therefore, admissible.

Justice C.A. Gilmore

Released in Open Court: April 22, 2015

NOTE: As noted in court, on the record, this written ruling is to be considered the official version and takes precedent over the oral reasons read into the record. Any discrepancies between the oral and written versions, it is the official written ruling that is to be relied upon.

[^1]: 2008 SCC 63, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316 at para 164.

[^2]: 2009 ONCA 645, [2009] O.J. No. 3706 (OCA) at para 98.

[^3]: [1996] O.J. No. 1187 (OCGD) at paras 30-31.

[^4]: 2009 CanLII 48836 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 3837 (SCJ) at paras 21-22.

[^5]: [2005] O.J. No. 427 (SCJ) at para 23.

[^6]: 2009 SCC 28, [2009] S.C.J. No 28 at para 63.

[^7]: [2006] O.J. No. 4757 (SCJ) at para 74.

[^8]: [2013] O.J. No. 4235 (SCJ) at para 37.

[^9]: (1989), 1989 CanLII 74 (SCC), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 142 (S.C.C.) at para 30.

[^10]: (2002), 2002 SCC 56, 164 C.C.C.(3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at para 71.

[^11]: R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144.

[^12]: R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC 28, [2007] S.C.J. No. 28 at paras 116-117.

[^13]: Transcript of the Examination for Discovery of Stanley Antrobus, June 30, 2014 at page 29, line 31.

[^14]: [2006] S.C.R. 787 at paras 62-63.

[^15]: R. v. Singh, [2004] O.J. No. 5746 (SCJ) at para 65.

[^16]: R. v. Assoun, 2006 NSCA 47, [2006] N.S.J. No. 154 (C.A.) at para 122.