R. J. Le Blanc

The defendant was charged with driving while suspended contrary to s. 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and displaying a suspended driver's licence contrary to s. 35(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the defendant was a suspended driver on the date in question.

The defendant raised a due diligence defence, claiming he was confused about remedial measures requirements and had not received notice of suspension by mail.

The court found the defendant had been personally served with notice of suspension and that his actions fell short of what a reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances.

The court rejected the defence of officially induced error and convicted the defendant on both charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid contract of automobile insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act and driving while suspended contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant had constructed a gasoline-powered motorized bicycle and argued it did not fall within the legal definition of a motor vehicle.

The court found that the gasoline-powered motorized bicycle met the statutory definition of a motor-assisted bicycle and therefore constituted a motor vehicle.

The defendant's due diligence defence failed because he did not exercise reasonable care in investigating the legal status of his vehicle, relying instead on selective reading of government guidelines and passive ignorance of his legal obligations.

The court convicted the defendant on both charges.

The defendant was charged with acting as an unlicensed private investigator contrary to section 6 of the Private Security and Investigative Services Act by conducting investigations regarding a municipal tax sale property and subsequently approaching the original owner with an offer to recover any surplus from the tax sale in exchange for a fee.

The defendant conducted research on the property initially for his own purposes as a prospective bidder, but after his unsuccessful bid, used the information gathered to locate and contact the original owner with a business proposal.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that despite initially gathering information for personal purposes, his subsequent use of that information with the intent to profit from it constituted acting as an unlicensed private investigator.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle and racing by outdistancing or attempting to outdistance another motor vehicle while travelling at a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed, contrary to section 172 of the Highway Traffic Act.

A careless driving charge was withdrawn.

The Crown's case relied on witness testimony describing two vehicles travelling at high speed, passing a witness vehicle, and subsequently crashing.

The defendant's co-accused testified for the defence.

The court found the defendant guilty of the racing charge, determining that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove at a marked departure from the lawful speed and attempted to outdistance another vehicle.

However, the court acquitted on the charge as drafted because the Crown failed to prove the element of "repeatedly" changing lanes as required by the regulation.

The defendant was charged with speeding under section 128 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution relied on evidence from an OPP air observer who tracked the defendant's vehicle from an aircraft at 3,500 feet using measured distance zones and a digital stopwatch, recording speeds of 130-132 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone.

The defendant, self-represented, argued mistaken identity, claiming he was driving a red Nissan Cube with a white roof wrap, not a white-roofed vehicle.

The court found the prosecution established a prima facie case meeting the requirements established in R. v. King and found both police officers credible and reliable.

The defendant's evidence and exhibits were found to be of neutral value and failed to raise reasonable doubt.

The court convicted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with speeding, allegedly 60 km/h in a 50 km/h construction zone.

The prosecution sought to amend the charge to reflect the actual speed of 73 km/h.

The central issue was whether the temporary orange and black advisory construction zone speed limit signs were enforceable.

The court found that these advisory signs have no status under the Highway Traffic Act and are therefore unenforceable.

However, the court determined that the enforceable speed limit in the area was 50 km/h under section 128(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act, as the white regulatory speed limit signs were covered during construction.

The defendant was found guilty of speeding 73 km/h in a 50 km/h zone.

The defendant was charged with speeding (115 km/h in an 80 km/h zone) on Highway 7 in Pickering.

The trial involved legal arguments regarding disclosure of a radar manual, the admissibility of the manual in cross-examination without the author present, and whether strict compliance with manufacturer's specifications is required for radar evidence.

The court ruled that the relevant portion of the radar manual should be disclosed, that it may be used in cross-examination without the author present, and that manufacturer's recommendations are guidelines rather than strict requirements.

The trial proceeded on the merits following these rulings.